Sul concetto di prudenza in Francisco Suárez

Abstract

By examining Francisco Suárez’s writings on prudence, this article challenges interpretations that align his conception with early modern, politically oriented notions of prudence. According to this interpretation, prudence would be considered as a skill related to the political life, a practical wisdom that primarily regards the sphere of human action, connected to justice. Focusing on three moral treatises (De voluntario et involuntario in genere, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum and De actibus, qui vocantur passiones), this paper argues instead that Suárez understands prudence in continuity with 13th- and 14th-century scholastic thought, especially Thomas Aquinas. Prudentia is in fact conceived by Suárez as a cardinal and intellectual virtue, a connecting principle between the other virtues, an indispensable basis for good action, supported by the action of grace. Although concerned with the circumstances of active life, prudence ultimately remains ordered to wisdom (sapientia) and oriented toward the contemplative life.