How many Truths? Relativism and Contradiction

Abstract

Truth-relativism consists in admitting that there are ‘many truths’, but the question is: how many? In fact, the answer is: only two. Relevant plurality in public confrontations does emerge when there is a conflict, to say: some of the alleged truths are incompatible (mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive). In this perspective, the problem of relative truth becomes the problem of contradiction: is it possible to accept «true contradictions»? The answer has always been controversial, and dialetheism nowadays is the most well–known philosophical logic that admits the reality (effectiveness) of contradictions. If relativistic tolerance consists in accepting incompatible beliefs, then tolerantists should assume that acceptance does not involve truth (so they cannot be truth–relativist), or else they must be rather dialetheists. I argue in favour of this drift, showing first that in any kind of intellectual conflict (even in normative conflicts) realistic truth is involved; then briefly examining dialetheist theory of contradiction, and stressing that ‘true’ (effective) contradictions are rare, and usually regard political-social conflicts only in derivate way.