The Extraterrestrial: Alien Otherness in Mental Experiments in Philosophy

Abstract

In this essay, we will focus on the intersection between the history of a specific instance of mental experiments in philosophical argumentation – i.e. the extraterrestrial – and, on the other hand, the defining characteristics of the mental experiment as an argumentative tool. We argue that the second aspect can shed light on the first one. Through the analysis of different cases in which aliens have been evoked in philosophical mental experiments, we will assess their strengths and weaknesses at the level of argumentation, but not solely on technical grounds. We will show that the opposite is true as well, namely, that the case of aliens is relevant to the metaphilosophical debate on mental experiments: our analysis of this particular content will corroborate criticism regarding how effective mental experiments in philosophy are in general. Since the character of the extraterrestrial is strongly dependent on contextual and cultural factors, it is more difficult to understand by readers of mental experiments. The latter are, in turn, most effective when the antecedent of the counterfactual is readily and firmly grasped by readers. Thus, this makes aliens not as much effective characters in such fictional situations as one could expect, given their extreme narrative plasticity.