La portata ontologica della negazione in Edmund Husserl

Abstract

The contribution aims to focus on the notion of negation in Edmund Husserl, with particular reference to its thematization offered by the so–called genetic phenomenology. By analysing the passages of Husserl’s work in which this element is dealt with and the different theses put forward by the bibliography on the subject, an attempt will be made to highlight the oscillation of Husserl’s thought between the two extremes represented by Franz Brentano and Gottlob Frege, showing the problems that emerge in both cases. In accordance with the project of a genealogy of logic, we will try to support, through the reference to Alexius Meinong, the necessity of an admission of the “not” at the ontological level, showing its essentiality in order not to fall into a monistic ontology of Parmenidean type.