La sospensione del reale.

Dýnamis e symbebekós nell’ontologia fisica del secondo Heidegger

Abstract

Moving inside Aristotelian philosophy, Heidegger was concerned with the different modes in which Being is said: categories, dýnamis and energeia, truth and falsehood. Although Heidegger had no thematic interest in Being as symbebekos, the dynamic ontology that Heidegger works out against the metaphysics of presence is an ontology of contingency in which symbebekos plays a fundamental role, to such an extent that it even constitutes its very foundation. The “suspension of the real” is a consequence of a radical inversion of the relation between substance and accident, so that Being, in its totality, depends on the eventuality of the symbebekos; it happens, it is an event (Ereignis). Ereignis can thus be understood as the Heideggerian “translation” of symbebekos.