L'idea di realtà in Wilhelm Dilthey
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13135/2038-6788/9082Parole chiave:
Astrazione, Credenza, Esperienza vissuta, Mondo esterno, Pensiero, Scienze dello spirito, Vita, W. DiltheyAbstract
This essay retraces some of Dilthey’s considerations on the concept of reality from out of the fundamental nexus between self and world. In the attempt to historicize Kant’s critique of reason, when delineating the meaning of individuality and its constitutive relation with reality Dilthey prefers to use the conceptual pair self-world rather the pair subject-object with its stricter and more immediate epistemological reference. This means that, when considering reality, one cannot forego the complexity of relations that link reality to human beings considered in their entirety of beings that simultaneously “represent,” “feel,” and “want.”