Changes in Kant’s Moral Thought Between 1762 and 1763

Abstract

This paper explores significant shifts in Kant’s moral thought during the years 1762–1763, focusing on the transition from an analytic to an aesthetic approach to morality. Through an examination of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality, the study highlights Kant’s evolving methodology in understanding moral principles. Departing from the analytic emphasis on cognitive and conceptual clarity, Kant embraces an aesthetic perspective that prioritizes feeling as a means of accessing universal moral obligations. The paper investigates the challenges of applying analytic methods to morality, including the problem of particularised duties and the tension between justice and emotional impulses such as sympathy and complaisance. By analysing Kant’s reflections on the sublime and the beautiful, the paper elucidates how Kant’s aesthetic turn provides a resolution to the limitations of his earlier analytic framework.