Macchine leibniziane?

Parole chiave: concetto, animale, robot, Davidson


Are robots capable of forming concepts? The problem can be addressed starting from a similar question, namely that relating to the possibility that animals are recognized as capable of forming concepts. Different positions have been addressed on this issue. A profitable possibility of analysis is offered by Davidson’s skeptical position in his influential Rational Animals. I examine some of the objections made to the position that denies that animals can form concepts. I affirm that none of these are conclusive and I draw the idea that if the ability to form concepts must be recognized to animals, then the same position must also be supported with respect to robots.


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Biografia autore

Pierpaolo Marrone, Università di Trieste

Pierpaolo Marrone è professore associato di filosofia morale all’Università di Trieste. Ha fondato e dirige le riviste Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics e Endoxa – Prospettive sul presente.

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Come citare
Marrone, P. (2020). Macchine leibniziane?. Filosofia, (65), 63-74.