The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Spinelli Project. A Federal Reform Draft in Disguise

Abstract

This article examines the role of the principle of subsidiarity in the “Spinelli Project” for European Communities reform in federal direction. By analyzing the Vedel, Tindemans, and 1975 Commission Reports, the concept's historical evolution is clearly traced. Spinelli employed subsidiarity as the key criterion for allocating competences between Member States and the European Communities. The Draft Treaty aimed to transform the Community into a supranational entity, blending intergovernmental and community methods. This principle acted as a flexible institutional item, facilitating a gradual and controlled transfer of national to supranational sovereignty. The pragmatic ambiguity of subsidiarity helped disguise the depth of federal reform from wary national governments. The project categorized exclusive, concurrent, and potential competences to ensure the effectiveness of common action. Spinelli viewed subsidiarity as an essential tool to legitimize the transition toward a democratic European government. The research highlights how the project sought to overcome decision-making paralysis rooted in national interests. In summary, subsidiarity reconciled diverse integrationist visions while defining clear limits for central intervention. The “Spinelli Project” remains today a vital reference point for the constitutionalization of the European Union. The principle's flexibility provided the Union with the necessary dynamism to respond to changing global requirements.

Keywords: Principle of subsidiarity; Spinelli Project; European federalism; Allocation of competences; European integration