

Should justice for people come before justice for the environment? Engaging students in debates about environmental justice.

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Abstract.

This paper outlines the main differences between ecocentric and anthropocentric positions in regard to justice, exploring university students' perceptions of the concepts of social and ecological justice and reflecting on how values assigned to humans and the environment are balanced and contested. Putting justice for people before the environment is based on evidence that biological conservation can disadvantage local communities; the idea that the very notion of justice is framed by humans and therefore remains a human issue; and the assumption that humans have a higher value than other species. Putting justice for the environment first assumes that only an ecocentric ethic guarantees protection of *all* species, including humans, and therefore ecological justice already guarantees social justice. This research shows that many students emphasize the convergence of social and ecological justice where human and environmental interests correspond. While not wishing to diminish the underlying assumptions of either ethical orientation, the common "enemy" of both vulnerable communities and nonhuman nature, as identified by students, is an ideology of economic growth and industrial development.

Key words. anthropocentrism, biospheric egalitarianism; ecocentrism; ecological justice; environmental justice

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Introduction

Discourse on sustainability involves both ethical and practical aspects. Ethical aspects range from poverty alleviation, to unequal exposure of vulnerable communities to the effects of climate change, and to treatment of animals in industrial production systems. Practical aspects involve political and economic mechanisms of distribution of wealth, the science and climate change mitigation mechanisms, and technological adaptations to food production technologies. Sometimes, ethical and practical questions can appear mutually exclusive. For example, the moral imperative to lift people out of poverty can lead to severe resource degradation as consumption of natural resources by the “bottom billion” increases. Part of this paradox is erroneous assumptions that stem from the early industrial period. As McDonough and Braungart (2002:32) stated in their book *Cradle to Cradle*, the early industrialists had a different view of the world, as for them “natural resources still seemed unlimited and “quality of life” meant high economic standards of living”. As a consequence, there was unwillingness to acknowledge that natural resources were not infinite (Dietz and O’Neill 2016). Decades later, economic development logic exported to developing countries has meant that poverty reduction practically led to some form of destruction of the environment, whether this took place through the extension of welfare in capitalist democracies or through industrial development in planned socialist states.

In fact, unsustainable consumption in the rich countries is far from abating and developing countries are eager to emulate this ‘progress’ (Hansen and Wethal 2014). As Crist (2012:141) has pointed out, while “raising the standard of living” may be convenient shorthand for the ethical objective of ending severe deprivation, it is in fact a “euphemism for the global dissemination of consumer culture” (Crist 2012:141). Up to date, no effort at radically reducing consumption in rich countries is observed (Dietz and O’Neill 2016). Thus, ironically, while justice in distribution of natural resources through inclusive economic growth attempts to make “winners” of all

human societies, this has simultaneously meant that intergenerational justice – justice for future generations, and ecological justice – or justice between all species – have been endangered. Indeed, to “feed a growing population and enter increasing numbers of people into the consumer class is a formula for completing the Earth’s overhaul into a planet of resources” Crist (2012:141).

Only recently have the finite nature of resources and the vulnerability of the environment been recognized, leading to conclusion that not all economic activity is “good”. Indeed, as McDonough and Braungart (2002:32) reflected, if well-being is only judged by increased economic activity, then illnesses that require prolonged and expensive medical attention and toxic spills that need costly cleanup operations are all signs of prosperity. In fact, it is questionable whether the objective of sustainable development of balancing the social, economic and environmental needs is achievable with the present rate of natural degradation (Kopnina 2012; Dietz and O’Neill 2016). In this regard, the triple P (people, profit, planet) objectives are oxymoronic in their goal of maintaining economic growth, fair distribution of wealth and simultaneously preserving natural resources for future generations.

Additionally, assumption that natural resources are infinite and that environmental impact is divorced from the number of consumers have also lead to the misconception that human population growth is not a problem (Kopnina and Washington 2016). After all, as Dietz and O’Neill (2013) point out: ‘we need smaller footprints, but we also need fewer feet’. Simplistic divisions in “rich and poor” also tend to underplay the growth of middle classes in developing countries and the environmental impact that the increasing population in poor countries has on both environment and the long-term prospects of these populations (Kopnina and Washington 2016). Thus, both in terms of ethics and practice of sustainability, the cult of economic growth associated with demographic expansion as well as industrial development becomes suspect.

As Kidner (2014) and Poirier and Tomasello (2017) have argued, advocates of social justice and environmental protection have much to agree upon. Industrocentrism, which places great value on continuous growth and profit, is increasingly degrading the environment and threatening both the humans and nonhumans who are sustained by it (Poirier and Tomasello 2017). Recognizing that industrial development is a common adversary of both social and environmental domains opens up possibilities of bringing both anthropocentric and ecocentric justice advocates together for a mutual cause (Shoreman-Quimet and Kopnina 2015; Poirier and Tomasello 2017). This realization opens up new venues of education for sustainability, or environmental education (EE) and education for sustainable development (ESD), suggesting ways in which students can be made aware of how to deal with paradoxes of sustainable development (Kopnina 2012) together with the less explored focus on justice.

This paper explores how both the paradoxical nature of conflicting objectives and the shared social and environmental aim of achieving sustainability can be approached through the concept of justice. This exploration will focus on the perceptions of Bachelor students following the course “Environment and Development” that discussed similar issues to those raised in this Introduction. The aim is to contribute to a large field of EE and ESD in exploring environmental and ecological justice in relation to anthropocentrism, ecocentrism and combined perspectives. “Justice” in this paper will serve to highlight both the trade-offs and potential areas of reconciliation between social and environmental aspects of sustainability. Part of the course was reflection on the debate-discussing proposition “Justice for people should come before justice for the environment”. The debate took place in 2013, at the conference organized by the World Congress of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences or IUAES (described in Abram et al 2016).

Defining social and ecological justice

In the IUAES congress debate, the proponents of the statement “Justice for people should come before justice for the environment” were

Don Nonini, an anthropologist at the University of North Carolina and Amita Baviskar, a professor in the Institute of Economic Growth at Delhi University. They criticized conservationists as neo-colonialists who force Western values on traditional societies. The main arguments put forth to support justice for people before justice for the environment was their presupposition that creation of protected areas is a form of neo-colonialism disadvantaging vulnerable communities. Baviskar (2013) implied that more economic development is needed to lift poor societies out of poverty. The ‘working poor’, Baviskar argued, have their own environmental priorities, such as having drinking water and sewers (Baviskar 2013). Instead, in addition to the challenge of survival and meeting their daily basic needs, the poor have to carry the burden of delivering justice for the environment when most of the pollution and environmental harm is not produced by them but by the rich. Nonini (2013) has focused more on the argument that since humans frame the very concept of justice, justice is and will remain a human issue. Nonini also argued that environmentalists supposedly separate humans from nature. In fact, he argued:

It is manifestly the case that human beings are one species that participate actively in networks of metabolic interactions with other species. Human beings depend upon other species for digestion, respiration, waste disposal, shelter, protection, etc., and the other necessities of human life. In turn, humans also have acted, not always under specific conditions of their choice, as stewards for the reproduction and continuity of survival of non-human species. They voluntarily promote the survival of species (and networks of species) which they domesticate, cultivate, and protect from incursions by other humans or by non-human species; they involuntarily serve as food and as environments themselves (e.g. in the case of the thousands of species of bacteria that are part of the human micro-biotic environment), as reservoir (e.g. for parasites during part of these species’ reproductive cycles), etc. (Nonini 2013, in Abram 2016)

The opponents of the motion, anthropologists Veronica Strang (2013) of Durham University

and Helen Kopnina (2013) of Leiden University pointed out that both communities and their environments are interconnected. They argued that it is actually the indigenous and native cultural traditions, and not colonial regimes, that fostered respect for nature and sustainability. As justice is fundamentally concerned with equalizing relations between those in power and those who are not (Strang 2016), both speakers argued that humans and nature are interconnected. If economy is prioritized, environmental interests are likely to be overlooked, especially in cases when nonhuman species or habitats are seen as economically useless. Thus, it was argued that both types of justice should be achieved simultaneously. The opponents of the motion won the debate by around ninety votes to thirty.

Environmental justice in literature has often morphed into social justice as it concerns itself with equitable distribution of environmental goods and risks among human populations (Schlosberg 2004; Kopnina and Shoreman-Ouimet 2013). Environmental justice attempts to further the cause for social and economic equality, as well as dispel notions of environmental neocolonialism. The concept of environmental justice is intertwined with that of “environmental racism” – the term associated with greater exposure of vulnerable communities to environmental burdens, such as pollution (Kopnina 2014).

Anthropocentrism often entails the position that humans are at the centre of the world, supporting a hierarchical order of life in which human well-being is considered to be the most important and desirable moral objective (Crist 2012: 142). Within an anthropocentric framework, the protection of non-human species is contingent on their “usefulness” (often defined in terms of their economic value) for humanity (Kumar and Kumar 2008). By contrast, an ecocentric or a biocentric approach recognizes the intrinsic value of non-human species (e.g. Kortenkamp and Moore 2001). The ecocentric perspective denies the conceptual dichotomy between humans and environment, underlying interdependency between species, and acknowledging their equal right to flourish (Cafaro and Primack 2014; Mathews 2016). Derived from this

ecocentric perspective, ecological justice (Schlosberg 2004; Wienhues 2017) refers to justice between human and non-human species (Naess 1973), extending concern beyond human beings (Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2015). Ecological justice supports non-humans’ entitlement to their living environment (habitat) and their right to flourish according to the species’ own needs (Mathews 2016).

Both social and ecological justice approaches often converge in their critique of industrial development and economic growth, which is associated with industrocentric ideology (Kidner 2014; Poirier and Tomasello 2017). It is recognized that activities such as mining, logging, and industrial agriculture pollute waterways, cause deforestation, facilitate poaching, and impinge upon the lifeways of various human and nonhuman populations who rely on the land for survival (Poirier and Tomasello 2017).

Research strategy and methodology

Between September and October 2016 the students of the elective course “Environment and Development” at Leiden University College were involved in an in-class debate “Justice for people should come before justice for the environment”. This debate was styled after the similar debate on the IUAES congress described above. There were twenty-two international students (twelve females and ten males) enrolled in the course. The majority was Dutch (although of different ethnic backgrounds), the rest European, and two students from the Middle East and two from Asia. The course materials and teaching methodology are described in Kopnina (2017). For this particular assignment, the students were asked to watch the televised debate and read a number of articles representing different sides of the debate. Some of this select literature is used in the student assignments discussed below.

All students were told that their honest opinions and ability to be critical (rather than support of a position that may be preferred by the lecturer and author of this article) would count toward a higher grade. The lecturer acknowledged her own ‘bias’ in supporting

ecological justice, but emphasized that this is personal position and not the 'right' position. The researcher followed European Commission's code of research ethics (Iphofen 2013: 42) in regard to data protection. The students were not asked to sign consent forms in order to not to compromise anonymity and confidentiality (for confidentiality and anonymity in qualitative research, see Saunders et al 2015). Those students who objected to their assignments being used were excluded from this research.

In their essays, the students were asked to define and discuss a number of terms: anthropocentrism; ecocentrism; social, environmental and ecological justice; and biospheric egalitarianism. These definitions could be either based on the assigned literature as well as references of their own choice. Consequently, the students had to explicate their stance as regards the central proposition statement. Although assignments were not submitted anonymously, the text segments used for this research were kept anonymous. Original assignments and information that might enable data to be linked to individuals was kept in a password-protected file. All assignments were pasted into one Word document, which was then searched for recurrent topics. These topics were color-coded and arranged in themes. These themes are now presented and analyzed.

Reflecting on terminology and meaning

Providing a background for a concept of anthropocentrism, one student wrote that the current widely accepted notion of Western anthropocentrism is influenced by the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation (Colchester 1994; Devall 1980). Simkins (2013) finds evidence for this claim in the Genesis account of creation in the Old Testament, which likens man to God's image and places him at the center of the God-created world. This anthropocentrism, according to student, "fails to recognize one of the most basic principles of human existence – that humanity itself is a part of the environment". Quoting Grey (1993), this student writes, "revered intellectuals have whittled away at the notion of anthropocentrism, such as Copernicus'

disproving the centrality of the earth in the universe and Darwin's theory of evolution". Another student noted that anthropocentrism is not universal but culturally variable as it varies throughout "cultures, socioeconomic status, and type of education, which contributes to the complexity of changing worldviews".

A number of students noted that the term environmental justice is essentially related to social justice and the notion of environmental racism. One student summed it up by saying that the term environmental justice term can be misleading as many people think that it has nothing to do with humans but with "saving of the environment". However, the student emphasizes, the "concept of environmental justice is anthropocentric".

Environmental justice is essentially about inequitable distribution of environmental burdens to vulnerable groups. For instance, wealthier people live in a cleaner neighborhood where access to basic needs is not a problem. Also, since they do not have factories in that neighborhood, the air quality is better. Poor people, on the other hand, live where [...] factories are constantly emitting harmful gases. Even though the term [environmental justice] has the word environmental in it, environmental justice is a mere means to solving social inequality.

Another student reflected on how the USA Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental justice as "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of *all people* regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies. Fair treatment means no *group of people* should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies". Evidently, the student wrote, this stance is "extremely anthropocentric".

At the center of this debate is the word 'justice'. This will have a different meaning to

those with a *social* stance, when juxtaposed with those with an *ecological* mentality. This is because it revolves around power relations, which differ depending on the species one considers. For example, justice between people acknowledges discrepancy between human beings in terms of culture, basic rights and autonomy. However, if this same term is applied to both human and non-human species, it is evident that (wo)mankind as an anthropocentric species has generally come first. This is due to the fact that, historically, those (minority groups) with no power were able to expand the parameters of normality in society through affirmative action.

The concepts of ecocentrism are summarized in those assignments that discuss it as a nature-centered system of values. Currently, as a student noted, “humans are far from it” as they relate to the ‘natural’ environment “through the exploitation of resources it offers, highlighting its ‘instrumental value’”. Another student wrote:

Ecological stance [largely rests] on ecocentrism i.e. the denial that “a hierarchical division between human-nature realms exists, that grants humans greater intrinsic value than non-human species.

Students noted that the concepts of ecological justice and ecocentrism are related to biospheric egalitarianism, which, as one student wrote, “concerns the rights of other species independent of human interests”.

We, humans, are no different than other organisms living on this planet. We are not greater than any one of them. This means that all of our lives matter. Therefore, it is wrong to think that cows and pigs exist for our consumption. All the living things on this planet have the same rights and value.

Justice for people

Three students explicitly stated that they choose the ‘people first’ perspective (although the essays of others did express partial agreement with some of the arguments used by these students). Justice for people before the environment was justified by a number of arguments. First, there is evidence that conservation and creation of protected areas

can disadvantage local communities. Second, justice is and will remain a human issue. Third, there is a proposition that humans have a different or higher value than other species because of certain inherent qualities.

Regarding the first point, one student extensively quoted Baviskar in her essay:

Baviskar (2013) argues that in Delhi, where she lives, although securing clean air, water and green spaces is definitely in the public interest, “the greater common good” is “mobilized to exclude and disfranchise large sections of the city’s population” (Baviskar 2013). In addition, she states that both the courts and the media had “turned a blind eye to the devastating effects of such projects and urban improvements on the lives of Delhi’s under class” (Baviskar 2013). Baviskar further states that most of the air and water pollution in the city is generated by the rich, “by their cars and their sewage” (Baviskar 2013). In this means, we end up with more injustice for people and ironically also for the environment in the name of environmental improvements.

One student summed up the criticism in this way: “Academic anthropological discourse takes a very critical stance towards outsider-involvement in traditional indigenous communities. Not only the promotion of economic growth and consumerism has often been criticized but also the conservationist efforts affecting traditional communities have been negatively assessed by various anthropologists”. Here, as the student stated, the “argument is that environmental protection has been warped into a form of western neocolonial imperialism that infringes on human rights and dictates cultural practices in developing countries”. Another student provided these examples:

As Peluso (1993) argues: “some state interests appropriate the ideology, legitimacy, and technology of conservation as a means of increasing or appropriating their control over valuable resources and recalcitrant populations”. For example, as Benjaminsen et al. (2006) explain, a case in South-Africa where they applied a fixed carrying capacities for land allow wealthier individuals to benefit though exclusive access to land, at the expense of black, poorer, farmers in the region.

Also quoting Benjaminsen and colleagues, another student notes that ecological justice can lead to injustice for native and indigenous communities.

Policies supporting biodiversity conservation are regarded as much more important than when communities are aspiring to more land in that same area, and that those peoples' needs and rights remain on the margins (Benjaminsen et al 2008). Let alone when these peoples' needs and rights are in conflict with the environmental conservation goals. A supporting example is that of land redistribution in Namaqualand Park (Benjaminsen et al 2008). Local people in the area of the park view the expansion of the Park as "direct and unfair competition" for land that they wish to acquire, as well as it being an indirect challenge to their local livelihoods (Ibid).

Illustrating these misgivings, another student wrote: "if we were to let the justice for the environment prevail fully before justice for the people, conflict would arise and human rights, equality, or standard of living and health will be violated. As human rights violations are against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this is thus intolerable". To illustrate the point, two students gave examples. An indigenous community in Nepal had to be displaced because of the expansion of the Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve (Ming Lam and Paul 2014). While community members were supposed to be allotted monetary compensation and new land, the distribution disproportionately favoured the rich (Ming Lam and Paul 2014). Furthermore, conservation was said to prohibit traditional practices, as in the case of the Sonahas in Nepal who were restricted from fishing and gold panning (Jonas et al 2014:46). More generally, one student felt that while caring for one's own species is natural, the poorer deserve even greater moral consideration:

Humans, first and foremost, want to ensure their *immediate* survival. Policies are enacted in the short term to ensure popularity and re-election... As a species, we want to ensure that our lineage continues and are thus biologically

driven to reproduce – resulting in the exponential population growth... More help needs to be provided to the poorer people/nations in order to curb this so called need for survival. The vast majority of the global poor live in "rural areas and are poorly educated, mostly employed in the agricultural sector, and over half are under 18 years of age" (World Bank 2016). It is clear that justice and regulations for the poor are essential in ensuring a sustainable future.

Another student reflected that often improving environmental conditions serves the rich and not the poor: "It is obvious that the developed countries, organizations and the current population are able to profit the most from environmental resources and services, whereas developing countries, indigenous people and the future generations will need to bear the burdens". Making a similar point, another student noted that because "no social equality can be achieved among these different groups", which is why justice for the environment should be as important as justice for most vulnerable human groups.

Another student wrote an essay clearly stating that he is a strict anthropocentrist. To explicate his point, the student referred to epistemological anthropocentrism – the Lockean and Cartesian idea that human perception and experience mediate our view of the world and dictate how our judgments are made (Butchvarov 2015). Taking this further, the student continued, the environment, lacking personhood, "has no ability to even perceive reality, therefore humans have to make those judgment for it". The consequences of this, the student stated, is that persons and by extension moral agents are the only entities able to understand or express ethical concerns.

The concept of 'justice' – for the environment or for people – is thus inherently human. The environment cannot defend itself or evaluate its unethical experiences. Biospheric equality can therefore not be attained fully. There have been attempts to include the environment as an agent, such as Bruno Latour's 'Parliament of Things' (Latour 1991), but such institutions always require humans to speak for the environment – with all the problems that

entails, such as determining the will of the environment. In summary, justice is thus inherently a human affair.

The student recognizes that “the lives of people are tied to the environment, for some more than others” and thus environment is something that we clearly value, and is a “worthy topic of ethical debate”. Clearly, the student continued, the environment has value to some people and that is precisely why it is valuable. However, even if some individuals care about the environment, the idea that intrinsic value does not exist or that nothing has intrinsic value (Sartre 1943) seems to this student the most tenable position. He does, however, admittedly “care deeply about a lot of things; and as an economist I am concerned with increasing utility and individual choice”. The fact that he cares about “utility” and “individual choice” that does not mean that these entities have intrinsic value: “There is no metaphysical law or being that declares their value. They are valuable because myself, and others value them. The same goes for the environment”.

This is similar to the idea expressed by another student regarding rights: “as rights are usually based on either commonly agreed or authoritative defined moral ideas of what is appropriate”. Given that humans do not know if other species have moral feelings, she wrote, “the only source and benchmark for the definition of rights in general and nature rights in particular seem to be human ideas”.

The student who defines himself a ‘strict anthropocentrist’ has also examined definitions of “environment”, reporting that according to the Oxford dictionary, it is “the surroundings or conditions in which a person, animal, or plant lives or operates” and “The natural world, as a whole or in a particular geographical area, especially as affected by human activity”. While the first definition refers to the more general sense of space and what surrounds any object or being, the second one rather indicates a separation between the ‘natural world’, i.e. plants and animals, and human beings. This second definition seems to be an oxymoron in itself as the ‘natural world’ by definition from the same source is something “existing in or derived

from nature; not made or caused by humankind”, which would include human beings. Thus, the student reasons, it can be concluded that “humans are part of the environment and that justice is both moral as well as culturally influenced and adapted over time”. Therefore, according to student, caring about the environment does not mean that the environment has intrinsic value. The student concluded that:

Justice for the environment could mean that we put long-term environmental gains over short-term human gains. Even if the environment does not perceive that as justice, people who value it may – especially those whose lives rely heavily on, for instance, the Amazon rainforest. Such justice, however, is also automatically justice for people. Justice for people may not always result in justice for the environment, but the reverse is logically always true.

This conclusion reflects the so-called convergence argument in which what people value (e.g. ‘environment’) means that this is indeed a valuable entity to be protected, not necessarily because of intrinsic value, but because humans depend on and value it.

The third issue is the proposition that humans might have a different or higher value than non-humans because of certain inherent qualities. As one student wrote, while ecological justice consists of the notion that all organisms should have an equal claim over the earth’s resources, environmental justice dictates that the ‘burden’ of environmental preservation should then also be shared. She reasons: “Environmental justice strives to distribute responsibility equally amongst all people. But if animals share the same level of privilege, how could they be excluded from these responsibilities?” Further, she continues, “one could argue that animals are not remotely close to humans when it comes to pollution and environmental degradation”. However, animals “do enjoy the earth’s resources and, if given the chance, exploit these to their maximum benefit”. This leads the student to inquire: “When one regards justice for the material environment just as important as justice for all animals, how do we expect them to take responsibility for their

own overexploitation?” In pondering this question, she reflects:

The answer is we do not. And this is exactly why I believe animals and humans to be on different levels of intrinsic value. We should strive for a balanced ecosystem that maximizes a beneficial habitat for all species. Justice should be practiced so that humans direct their actions to support this ideal. However, as animals are incapable of doing so and do not have the ethical abilities to consider others, justice cannot favor them. Again, this does not mean that I believe mankind should get a free pass for anthropocentrism... On the contrary, I believe people have a responsibility to preserve our environment in virtue of all organisms. But it does not mean we should share a pedestal with them.

Clearly, the student continues, “mankind is in the position of power and is therefore responsible to make sure legislations govern these relations”. However, she reasons, as “animals do not contribute to these practices and are incapable of adhering to universal values, they cannot be held accountable for their actions and, therefore, can also not be treated with the same rights as humans”. Nevertheless, the “environment should be viewed as a separate entity and... should be regarded with at least the same importance as humans when it comes to justice”.

Another student makes a case for placing humans higher than other living beings by first quoting George Orwell’s *Animal Farm*: “All animals are created equal, but some are more equal than others”. Even though this book is an allegory on communism, this statement, she writes, beautifully describes the relationship between humans and the environment.

Even though some people might say that humans and animals are morally equal, that is not the case... There are also practical objections to putting environmental protection before the protection of vulnerable groups of humans. Primarily, I would like to illustrate that humans are of higher moral standing than animals or other species, which leads to one ethical and abstract reason why justice for them should come before justice for the environment. This stems from two main components, namely that only human beings

are able to act morally and humans are the only living being with “personhood”. We can support the first component by arguing that “Human beings, unlike other animals, are able to reflect on and make judgments about our own and others’ actions, and as a result we are able to make considered moral choices” (Guldberg 2011).

The second argument the student uses “stems from the fact that humans have something that animals have not, namely our “personhood”. The philosopher Immanuel Kant writes in his *Lectures on Anthropology* (1772-1789): “The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person.... that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion.” As Guldberg (2011) argues, “humans are not born with their moral capability, but progress from a very limited understanding to a more sophisticated understanding of morality”. This means that our morality stems from how we interact and learn. This means, the student reasons, that “human morality and animal morality are fundamentally not the same”.

Justice for the environment

Fifteen out of twenty-two students argued that justice for the environment should come first. Justice for the environment before people is justified by two factors. First, pragmatically, only an ecocentric ethic supports intrinsic values, promising protection to those species that are instrumentally “useless” to humans. Second, an ecocentric ethic already includes humans in the sphere of values and thus ecological justice already guarantees social justice.

Supporting the first idea, one student wrote that shallow ecology – “which sees the equal distribution of resources amongst humans as more important than the survival of those that constitute these resources” – cannot address environmental problems that are unrelated to human welfare. Although human and environmental interests do converge on a number of matters, not all species have instrumental value to humans. This is evident

in the enormous biodiversity loss – at relative low cost to humanity. One student quoted Albert Einstein: “The environment is everything that isn’t me”, reflecting that some environmental “interests” are independent of human ones – and “in fact it is arrogant to think that all nature is connected to humans as nature can do without us”. It is us who “cannot do without nature”.

One student wrote that the arrogant worldview of Western nations that prioritize the economy and industrial development over the needs of environment, “is merely an extension of anthropocentrism, where any consideration and/or interest in preserving biodiversity is perpetually linked to human welfare and any use-value it provides us”. One of the students quoted Aldo Leopold, who states “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (in Westra 1998). The student concluded:

The self-centered nature of humans tends to disregard species that are not seen as useful for humanity. A species should not only be given intrinsic value once it becomes threatened with extinction. Justice for all starts with adequate ecological representation for non-humans.

Another objection raised against exclusive human justice is ethical. As one student wrote: “If “justice is fundamentally concerned with equalizing relations between those who have power and those who do not” (Strang 2016), we should provide justice for those who have less power, in other words also plants or animals”.

As one student wrote, anthropological criticism of conservation “wrongly creates a dichotomy between justice for people and justice for the environment”. Both long-term and short-term justice for people will benefit from a well-designed approach to ecological conservationism. Even when these “benefits to justice for people are not taken into consideration, the ecological justice paradigm is superior as it takes a more comprehensive approach than the anthropocentric justice for people”. Analyzing human-environmental issues from an ecological justice perspective,

the student concludes, would positively impact both humans and other species.

Another student wrote that it is immoral to claim that the interests of one species are more important than the interests of other species:

Just like all other species, we should have equal rights, should equally make use of the earth. This does not necessarily mean that we literally use as much of a certain resource as other species, but harming other species or the environment in order to be better off economically is certainly not justified. The fact that non-human species are not able to verbally communicate their interests does not mean that our interests are superior, which is why justice for people should not come before justice for the environment.

This student further argues: “in order to be moral, humans need to take the responsibility for their actions”. Another student reflects this same idea:

I am not denying the fact that justice for humans is important. However, if we want to save our human race and prevent the negative consequences of the environment, fighting for justice of the environment must be our top priority.

One student argued that precisely because we as humans might have some unique abilities, such as capacity for moral thought or the ability to change their environment on a global scale, this also means responsibility toward nonhumans:

Humans, after Mother Nature herself, have the largest ability to influence global matters. As such, we have a moral obligation to consider the repercussions for our actions... for other species. However, if we extend compassion to only a selected choice of species, there exists a double standard regarding our intentions, displaying how instrumentality and utility-maximization are at the forefront of our concerns. Instead, an analysis of the pure justice demonstrates that if some species are to be treated well, all others should as well.

Regarding the second point that all arguments are framed by humans, one of the students

wrote: “Whether it is even conceivable for social scientists to *broaden* schools of thought to include other species while using the same ethical framework as with humans, lays within the capacities of human cognition”. Another student wrote: “I don’t have to be a female to support feminism or black to support minorities – even if we make values, it doesn’t mean that they apply only to us”.

One student explicitly addressed the statement by Nonini (2013) quoted in the Introduction, asserting that, contrary to the idea that anthropocentric scientists try to impart, humans and nature are equally reliant on each other, and it is “humans that need nature, not the other way around”. The student continued:

Nonini says that humans are stewards for the reproduction and continuity of survival of other species, which they domesticate and cultivate. He also says that humans protect these cultivated species from incursions by other humans or by non-human species. Of course they do – as these animals and plants are used for human consumption! As Nonini notes, humans – sometimes – serve involuntarily serve as food themselves. Well, how often do humans these days get eaten by tigers or sharks? It is far more likely that tigers are sharks are either killed by hunters, fishers or farmers or incarcerated for human entertainment. The fact that humans host bacteria in their guts (just like all other large living organisms) certainly does not make human bodies and organs into protected areas for wildlife. The relationship between humans and other organisms is largely uneven.

This student also argued that even human burials do not contribute human bodies to the soil for disintegration in order to provide food for the soil. Neither does human excrement contribute to the biological function of the earth, the way other organisms’ waste products do. This reflection was based on another subject discussed in the course – Cradle to Cradle and sustainable production.

Convergence of social and environmental interests

Among three students who explicitly stated that humans should come first, two students

also noted that justice for people does not mean that the environment will be excluded, as humans need it for their own purposes. Among the fifteen students who indicated that justice for the environment should come first, twelve have also argued that justice for the environment also includes humans. All four students who did not explicitly state their stance indicated that they could not choose sides because there are no sides to be chosen – basically, the environment and humans are interconnected.

While explicating the issue of justice, one student wrote: “Justice for people can be understood as the belief that all people should have equal opportunities and privileges”. As such, he reflected, social justice holds that people in the least-developed regions of the world should have equal opportunities to the people in developed areas. The term justice for the environment is somewhat harder to define, as the student further reflected, as “it can be easily confused with (social-) environmental justice”. While, “environmental justice refers to the right of all people to have equal access to the environment”, ecological justice is distinct as it is “about the rights of all species to be valued equally, independent of their instrumental value”. As this student underlined, ecological justice also focuses on the inherent value of all species within a system of ecological interdependence (Strang 2016). Illustrating this interdependency, another student wrote:

At the rate that we are destroying the environment for our own benefit, we won’t be able to benefit from a lot of goods and services. Therefore, now is the time that we put justice for the environment before justice for people to make a difference for the future. Jane Goodall (2005:23) summarizes the first step: “when people acquire a deeper understanding of the natural world, and of the ways their future is being destroyed, they are more likely to care and to want to help to save what is left”.

In a similar vein, this student argues that we cannot afford to prioritize justice for people over justice for the environment.

As we are inherently bound together with non-

humans and the material earth in collective processes of production and reproduction, we are interdependent in such a way that a disruption for one party theoretically can lead to major consequences for the other parties. Humans are biosocial species that share great amounts of biogenetic material with other species and depend heavily on complex interrelationships with ecological processes. And the scientific evidence is clear: immediate action is needed in order to sustain life on earth for the generations to come. Within the next 40-50 years, if no action is taken, the essential coral reefs that are home to around 25% of the earth's aquatic species will have disappeared.

This relationship between justice for people and justice for the environment, in another student's words, "makes clear that the two cannot be addressed individually". For this student, "if the two types of justice were to be conflicting in certain circumstances, the case should preferably be analyzed from the standpoint of ecological justice". He bases this preference on the fact that "ecological justice in itself already takes into account the entire interdependent ecological system" (Strang 2016). Ecological justice would include human beings, "while the justice for people approach is anthropocentric". Thus, this student concludes, "an ecological justice standpoint could give insights in cases even when justice for people should prevail above justice for the environment, while the justice for people approach would be useless in cases where the environment should reasonably prevail".

Convergence theory (Norton 1991), as summarized by a student, states that while there might be a difference in anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric people, they will eventually have to support similar environmental protection policies. This is mainly because of the fact that in order to "adequately sustain a broad range of human values over time, the ecological contexts on which these goods depend must also be sustained, which can be accomplished through long-sighted, multi-value environmental policy". This means, the student continues, that "whilst taking human's best interest into account, we automatically take care of the environment".

Many students shared this position. One student provided a metaphor to illustrate mutual dependency, reflecting that "we are part of nature" and that "the effects of environmental injustice will eventually affect every single one of us".

Let a house represent the Earth and let two siblings living in the house represent humans. It is important for siblings to stop fighting for the happiness of the household but what is more important is the house. If the house breaks down, the siblings will get hurt. Just like this, fighting for justice for humans is important for peace of humanity. However, if we do not fight for justice of the environment, the Earth, our home, will ultimately fail us. For nature to become healthy again, it can take thousands of years. Compared to the 4.5 billion years of life on Earth, humans do not even account for one quarter of it. Therefore, we should respect and protect the nature that is around us.

Another student wrote:

When I cut down a tree to make a chair and therefore harm the environment, I am doing injustice to the environment and it would seem I value justice for people because I harm the environment to achieve personal goals. On a smaller scale, someone might have had a deep relationship with this tree because of memories. In this case, it would have been unjust towards this human as well as the tree for cutting it down.

As one student summarized the argument of supporters of 'people first' justice, because ecological conservation and its advocacy in the current era are predominantly initiated by Western-dominated organizations, it is seen by some as a neo-imperialist agenda that suppresses the rights of indigenous people. Thus, the critics "believe that ecological justice is in conflict with social-environmental justice for local cultures". What is overlooked by this criticism, according to this student, is the "strong linkage between justice for people and justice for the environment". The student further argues: "In the current age of large-scale pollution, environmental degradation, overexploitation of natural resources and climate change, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the current human interaction

with the environment in unsustainable". Thus, these two students maintain that it is the ideology of growth and capitalism that are the main and shared enemy of justice:

The encroachment of the Western civilization, consumerism and an exponentially growing population has permanently degraded ecosystems and depleted natural resources. Pollution, overpopulation, climate change and deforestation are now threatening us. Non-human populations, on which the humans heavily depend, are facing the same threats.

Thus defenders of social practices criticize western political and corporate imperialism. Although it can be seen that both stances contain valid points, they both treat society and ecology as mutual exclusive, despite the fact that they are heavily intertwined. A bridge between the two is *biospheric altruism*, which goes beyond the instrumental value of non-human species and instead recognizes that species as well as ecosystems are interrelated and interdependent (Sponsel 2014). The growing population, anthropocentric attitudes, and the ever-growing gap in social equality that seems to eclipse consideration for non-human species further aggravates this.

If the ideology keeps focusing on growth that comes at the cost of the environment, there may come a point where there is simply no natural environment anymore to sustain human life. A form of social-environmental justice that strives for everyone to reach the level of environmental appropriation of current Western societies would require many more earths to exist. In that sense, long-term social justice requires justice for the environment. The short-term social-environmental justice can to a large extent be reconciled with ecological justice. For ecological justice to be successful, the big underlying causes of environmental unsustainability will have to be addressed. Many of these issues are related to the unsustainable levels of consumption in Western societies. It is essential that the growth-focused ideologies in developed countries are limited.

Indeed, as this student concludes, "the criticism that current conservationist practices are a Western neo-imperialist practice can be tackled by shifting the ecological justice

agenda to more explicitly target Western over-consumption":

Well-designed conservationist practice are unlikely to severely limit truly traditional practices of indigenous communities. After all, if communities were able to continue practicing certain customs or rituals for centuries, it is unlikely that they were critically damaging the environment on a large scale. Instead, indigenous cultures and practices become problematic when habits or rituals become practiced at a much larger scale, or when newly-introduced post-industrial 'traditions' are invented (Strang 2016). In these cases traditional cultures can become unsustainable and have to be addressed, especially because such cultures are likely to be situated in hotspots of biodiversity (Kopnina and Blewitt 2015). Again, justice for people and justice for the environment go hand in hand here.

Formulating a question that appeared in many essays, one student asked: "If people are a part of the environment does justice for people at the same time mean justice for the environment?" As another student argued, "a destruction of the environment at the same time means a destruction of humans". As this student asserted: "Our ecological crisis shows how harmful it is to prioritize human justice, not only to humans but also to nonhumans". One student outlined two motivations for nature preservation:

At first sight it appears as if the concept of social justice is legitimizing the exploitation of nature as a necessary evil for the sake of human well-being. However, even from this perspective it is necessary to promote ecological justice in order to sustain a healthy and abundant environment on which humans essentially depend for fulfilling their material basic needs such as nutrition, clothing and shelter.

Thus, the student reasons, it is necessary to promote ecological justice from two different perspectives. One is anthropocentrism, "which stresses humanity's dependence on sufficient resources" and the need to "sustain a healthy environment for the benefit of both present and future human generations". Another one is ecocentrism, which acknowledges "intrinsic

values and interconnectedness of all living beings”.

A win-win scenario is illustrated by the case discussed by one of the students in examining the ‘TakeCare’ program in Tanzania by the Jane Goodall Institute (JGI). According to this student’s analysis, the program proved that an integrated approach to poverty alleviation is possible while simultaneously conserving forests (Goodall 2015).

The program aimed to increase the quality of life of communities surrounding the protected Lake Tanganyika park. Cooperation of the villagers was gained through appointing Tanzanian locals that addressed and respected the locals’ needs, such as an increased food production and improved health facilities. Furthermore, JGI tried to stimulate environmental awareness by the conduction of micro-credit programs, especially for women, such as tree nurseries, and granted scholarships so that girls would stay in school, and family planning information is available in each village. Similarly, in 2008, JGI started to help the villagers surrounding Gombe National Park to generate land-use maps, and due to the good nature of their communication, the villagers agreed on a buffer zone around the park for forest regeneration purposes. The buffer also surrounds the water source of the village, protecting the supply. After ten years, the results are looking promising: many trees have grown either out of seeds or from the stumps that were still in the ground, and have now reached a height so that chimpanzees can settle once again in the buffer area.

However, some students have noted that anthropocentric motivation is not enough to protect the environment because functionally “useless” species will suffer.

Adding complexity

The same student considers that assigning value to all species might be difficult in practical terms, reflecting that treating all other animals like humans “would likely be too much of a dramatic shift”. However, he continues, “making a concerted effort to be compassionate with other species should increase global justice for all”.

Although it may feel natural for us to be more

inclined to interact with certain animals, usually for our own pleasure or satisfaction, this attitude is in itself problematic because it signifies the existence of an instrumental value we have for other animals. A large proportion of environmental concerns are often bound with concerns for human health.

In discussing complexity, another student reflects that convergence theory has its limitations. As Minter and Manning (2000) explain, J. Baird Callicott and Laura Westra have rejected the validity of Norton’s thesis, refusing to believe that his model’s contextual appeals to a plurality of human and environmental values will be able adequately to provide environmental protection. Minter and Manning argue that, instead of defending ‘a priori’ or intuitively held moral foundations, environmentalists might better draw upon citizens’ value of pluralism in a practical engagement of the alternatives available within policy discourse. Adding a further nuance to the idea of plurality in perceptions, two students wrote:

That is not to say that all humans overlook the value of the environment. Within my own community, I have encountered neighborhoods who value the importance of green space and welfare of plants and animals.

It is important to consider the concept of equity and understanding that not all societies have the same values. As such, it is imperative to realize that not all societies strive to ‘develop’ and ‘modernize’ to the level that many western countries have reached.

In relating to the question of “developing” and “modernization”, a student reflected that while we can all agree that human “wants” created by the market economy are to blame for the expansion of consumerism, the definition of basic needs and associated justice is more complex:

But what are humans’ basic needs? I believe that everyone more or less agrees that it is basic human need to have enough food every day [...], clothing and a roof to sleep under. When it comes to these needs, I don’t see two people disagreeing on them. Thus, these needs must be met even before considering

environmental impacts that are associated with these people meeting their basic human needs. Then, once their rights are met, it is vital that environmental justice follow.

In reflecting on trade-offs, one student wrote that ironically, “while in social justice poor states should be allowed to pollute the environment just like rich states did”, this social justice in relation to carbon emissions actually leads to environmental injustice – climate change – that affects us all. Also reflecting on climate change, another student wrote:

The more topics such as climate change and sustainable development are discussed, the more we realize that our interests are not always aligned with the interests of other species. Some of us think we should strive for sustainability up to the point where our interests and the interests of other earthly species conflict with each other, while others think that striving for sustainability per definition means that we take other species into account, even if that means we need to put aside our own interests.

Illustrating how complex trade-off can be in choosing between different species, one student wrote that it is not easy to know where do we draw the line. In 2016, a 17-year-old gorilla named Harambe was killed at the Cincinnati zoo to save a boy who fell into the enclosure. This event turned into a widely-publicized debate on what was the right (and wrong) thing to do. While the student noted that some people were outraged by the death of a gorilla, if they had let the boy die, people would have been outraged as well. The student provided another example:

Now let’s compare this situation to occurrences in relation to roadkill (Desmond 2013). We always put our own safety on the road before the safety of animals. Although it still varies depending on the type of animals... Why is the answer on what to do in the roadkill situation so easy (humans before animals), yet when it comes to Harambe, which is about one animal, becomes a worldwide debate? Where is the line? Why are some animals more important than others? One cannot always be ecocentric or anthropocentric, thus a

balance needs to be found between the two, whereby ethics and personal beliefs and involvement would also play a large role. Therefore, choosing what is right and wrong becomes a difficult decision to make.

As one student wrote in the case of climate change, some trade-offs involve complex ethical choices:

Developing countries are allowed to emit more GHGs than developed countries because developed countries had already emitted GHGs in order to develop. Therefore, it is just to let developing countries continue emitting GHGs... If we keep going on this trend, eventually all of us will be negatively impacted.

Following up on the example of climate change, another student reflected that “once corporations are involved in something then the law is quick to follow”. However, in the case of climate change, “our economic actions have been guilty of creating the problem in the first place”. Also, the scale of corporate expansion and industrial production has made issues ranging from addressing climate change to biodiversity protection difficult to address at the local level. In relating to the issue of scale, one student stated:

While probably not many would suffer from the removal of one tree, humans would suffer from the removal of multiple trees. Therefore, whether doing justice to the environment or people first, is a question of scale.

Thus, the challenge is to “balance the necessity to supply a growing number of humans and the earth’s limited ecological capacities” as the “anthropogenic destruction of nature had increased over time”. It remains unclear, the student noted, what ecological justice means in practice that on what concrete principles and norms is the ecologically just lifestyle should be based. Another student looking at the ‘biological’ side of the human predicament underlined the complexity of choices, noting that “when looking at population biology, it is essential to have a stable population and reproduction”. Our population, his reasoning proceeds, has expanded to such an extent that “there is a humanitarian crisis with regards to

distribution and access to basic needs... The human species will suffer in the long run as a result of environmental degradation". Another student doubted whether any kind of ecological lifestyle can provide seven and a half billion people with enough food and shelter to stay within ecological limits.

Compromise: Simultaneous provision of justice

Related to the issue of social equality, as one student argued, is the opposing idea that far from under-privileging the poor, in fact, it is precisely the poor that benefit from better environmental protection. He stated that the "poor suffer most from the effects of globalization and environmental degradation. This is the result of how unpredictable weather patterns driven by climate change are destroying homes, crops, and livelihoods by forcing the poor onto marginal plots of land, resulting in deforestation, soil erosion, and depletion". Thus, he continues, the very physical survival of the poor is immediately linked to environmental integrity.

During the debate on the same topic Nonini (2013) said that justice for nature is inextricably related to justice for people. Even though he was in favour of the motion he clearly presented how the environment is intertwined with the humans and vice versa. Thus we can also say that since the two are so much interconnected, why should we separate them in our justice systems and especially why should we decide upon a hierarchy... Simply thinking about *what* the environment is for human society it becomes clear that we actually thrived because of [...] resources. Justice for the environment means justice for people. Strang (2013) even argues that "rather than promoting justice for people we should promote justice for all". Justice for all is certainly a better approach when considering that human beings are as a matter of fact as much part of the natural world as any other species on this planet.

Promoting justice for all is also based on the idea that far from being a Western neo-colonial idea, environmentalism and respect for nature is actually a universally shared 'indigenous idea', as this student wrote that

empirical evidence demonstrates that the (intrinsic) value of the environment was recognized in all states prior to colonization and indigenous respect for their natural surroundings. As this student wrote:

Baviskar (2013) argues that the discussion surrounding environmental justice is fundamentally neocolonial as northern states continue to control southern states by imposing developmental constraints on post-colonial economies for environmental reasons. However, if we look at the case of India, there are certain cultural traditions, which enshrined environmental preservation long before British occupation. Norton (1984) provides the example of the traditions of Jainism and Hinduism, both religions which [...] promoted the preservation of all life, both human and non-human, for the sake of spiritual development...The deep ecology movement of the 1970s was largely dependent on indigenous traditions of natural preservation. Many indigenous cultures practice an animistic spirituality that incorporates humanity into nature (Devall 1980). Therefore, by pursuing an ecocentrism, the global population is adopting indigenous values rather than trying to eradicate them. There is ample anthropological evidence, which demonstrates the universality of environmental conservation. Therefore, justice for the environment should come before justice for people, in order to guarantee a more sustainable and equitable global society.

Other students produced similar observations:

The arguments used by advocates of [justice for people first] often revolve around the idea that justice for the environment is upheld by Western 'neocolonial environmentalists'. The reality, however, is that justice for the environment and non-humans is supported all over the world. And indigenous communities e.g. the aboriginals were known to live in peace with their environment and non-humans (Selin 2003).

The demands of humankind as well as the needs of the environment should be simultaneously met. It is unjustified to place humans above non-humans, as both are equal. Justice can only reach the next step if non-humans are also included within this valuation.

Simultaneous provision of justice depends on the realization of the “common enemy” - as one student put it – “common forces that are responsible for environmental degradation, namely industrial development, economic growth and human population expansion”. Another student wrote:

We are the primary decision makers concerning what happens to *our* environment since we have the capability and the power to adjust, deteriorate and revive *our* environment. If humans are rational beings, we should be able to address and effectively solve the (environmental) problems that we have brought upon ourselves. With the exponential rate that our population is growing, more people need to realize that we still live on an abundant earth (Crist 2012), and we are not able to extract resources at the rate that we are doing now. Thus, we must aim towards “reducing human impacts on the global environment” (Crist 2012). Most of our necessities have already been realized, and everything else that we consume and need can be considered as luxury goods... As we have also become a society that values money more than the environment, in combination with population growth... we will soon reach a point of no return.

In seeking compromise, however, one student argued that while win-win scenarios are certainly desired, convergence is not always possible. Without justice for those that cannot talk human language, non-human interests are likely to come in last. At the moment, as the student reflected, “no compromise can be reached as long as humans only take from nature and give nothing back”. If humans are really part of nature, nature should also have rights, “otherwise unity of all species and simultaneous provision of justice is only academic”.

Discussion

Most students in their essays mentioned convergence theory and simultaneous provision of justice, assuming that human and environmental interests basically correspond. Those students that openly chose an anthropocentric stance used some of the same arguments that students supporting justice for environment, namely human dependency on

nature. There were some marked differences between the arguments as well. While ‘people first’ essays included the argument that preservation of nature might come at the expense of vulnerable communities, ‘environment first’ essays emphasized that without prioritizing the environment the same vulnerable communities are going to be disadvantaged the most, as environmental disasters – from climate change to deforestation – have a greater impact on poorer people. The interdependence of human and environmental interests was emphasized by majority of students, many of them concluding that both social (so-called environmental justice) and ecological justice should be achieved simultaneously. Students that chose people first have also emphasized that since justice and the very idea of intrinsic values are human concepts, they should be applied to humans. Countering this, a student supporting ecological justice noted that even if humans frame all ethical arguments and values it does not mean that these values apply only to us. Adding further nuances, other students argued that assigning intrinsic values may be more complex than just stating that everybody, humans and bacteria, for example, have equal value, and that indeed, practically, some animals might be more “important” (at least from human point of view) than others. While the majority of students chose an ‘environment first’ perspective, the justification of their choice was often anthropocentric – the fact that people need the environment after all and that since all species, including humans, are interdependent, justice for the environment will also guarantee justice for people. More critical students, however, cast doubt on the pre-supposition that humans and other species are interdependent, as it was noted that humans need nature but nature does not need humans. As some students observed, pragmatically, without prioritizing the environment, non-human interests are always likely to always come last.

The writing assignment demonstrated the complexity of environmental orientations within the anthropocentrism-ecocentrism spectrum. The question of justice, variably associated with the ideas of fairness,

responsibility or rights, presented a particular challenge in cases where hard choices and trade-off rather than easy win-win scenarios that emphasize congruency of interests were perceived. Human and environmental interests are precariously balanced, as illustrated by students in cases reflecting on human basic needs and protected areas, or the shooting of a gorilla at the zoo to protect a child.

The greatest convergence of perspectives was in identifying industrial, developed, capitalist society with its cult of economic growth as a culprit in the deterioration of both human and environmental well-being. As one student put it, "A form of social-environmental justice that strives for everyone to reach the level of environmental appropriation of current Western societies would require many more earths to exist". Thus, while convergence between anthropocentric and ecocentric positions is unlikely, as instrumentally "useless" species are likely to be condemned to extinction without recognition of their intrinsic value, convergence of interests addressing the *global injustice* of environmental degradation and displacement is certainly a worthy cause. It is certainly reason for hope that the students documented in this research recognize and mostly support this cause.

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