

Ontogeny and Ontology in Schelling's *Naturphilosophie**

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ABSTRACT: *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling* has two objectives. First, to argue that a philosophy of nature becomes contemporarily viable once lazy readings of it as pro or anti science are dismissed, and more nuanced and philosophical accounts of the materials nature–philosophy draws on and the conclusions it reaches are provided. Second, to reject a view of Schelling's philosophical *oeuvre* that does not make the *Naturphilosophie*, in Schelling's own terms, *grounding*. Should both succeed, Schelling's overall philosophical strategy is a contemporary one.

KEYWORDS: Schelling, Philosophy of nature, Ontology, Ontogeny, Nature

Full of wonder at Rodin's fast sketches of the Cambodian dancers the sculptor witnessed at Marseille's 1906 *Exposition Coloniale*, Rilke conceived a series, echoing interminably backwards, yet forming an art that is "of" its subject not because it represents, but because it is sourced in and driven by it to reconstitute the movement at its source into new forms in turn. These sketches embody, writes Rilke,

... a rare grasp of the most ungraspable: dance. Rodin had yearned to find a means to apprehend the dance–moves, which were the very essence of ancient cultures of rhythm, in their nuances, in the decisive nothing that conjoins two turns... (Rilke 2017: 37)

* A first version was published as the Preface to the Italian translation of my *Philosophies of Nature After Schelling* (*Filosofie della natura dopo Schelling*, Turin, Rosenberg & Seiler, 2017). Publishing the essay separately means that the gratitude I express to its translator is no longer appropriately placed at the essay's head. Since neither would it be appropriate to omit it altogether, I place it here. I am honoured by the thoughtful labour Emilio Carlo Corriero has so generously put into rendering this book into Italian. In addition to the long discussions concerning Schelling and contemporary philosophy while he was a visiting scholar at my university in the UK, we enjoyed several clarifying discussions of the present work during the translation process, out of which discussions the idea for this preface arose. It is in gratitude to him, then, that I write this.

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The grasp is rare not because it grasps the ungraspable, but because the ungraspable is the source of the grasping. The movement is not arrested in the dance, just as its apprehension through Rodin's brush does not prevent its comprehension through Rilke's pen. Quite apart from the 'any domain whatever' that may furnish arts with impetus, Rilke seeks not to arrest the movements that drive him to arrest them, but only to be driven by them. The result is never therefore a representation, but always a creation that creates in its turn. Even when, although admittedly rarely, this is grasped, the grasping is not the drive's terminus but rather impetus to metamorphoses in turn. These Protean figures almost naturally evoke Schelling's name, so often did Hegel scold or ridicule him for the mutability of his thinking. Yet what was at stake for Rodin, Rilke and the Dancers, just as for Schelling, is the formation of organisations or structures that have as their particular nature necessarily various modes of apprehending or comprehending the fact of their sourcedness in what those sources produce as their partial, and therefore serial, expressions. Here, we will pursue this movement just as Rilke remarked Rodin did those of the dancers.

That nature should ground philosophy looks *prima facie* unobjectionable when, as now, philosophy self-describes as "naturalist", by which is meant either (a) ontology's content will consist in the issuances of the natural sciences; or (b) in no field is an inquiry epistemically valid that does not operate by scientific method (Putnam 2012: 39–50).¹ This is neither what Schelling nor I mean by 'nature-philosophy', nor is it what that term proposes. Nor yet do we mean to take "philosophy" as entailing the equally prevalent *ethicism* that is naturalism's twin.² Where naturalism makes ontology a scientific issuance, ethicism renders it an ethical one; if naturalism proposes the elimination of the supernatural,³ ethicism proposes that of nature.

Both positions share poor division. If nature is what there is, then anything that is, is nature. The *first* consequence of this is that nothing that is can be *not*-nature, which means that naturalism and ethicism share straw targets owing to their attachment to or rejection of the natural sciences. While we might expect the resultant difference of opinion to hinge around the attachment to or rejection of science as an epistemic arbiter, confusion is introduced when an epistemic arbiter is raised to the status of an onto-

1. On contemporary philosophical naturalism, see *The content and appeal of naturalism* in Hilary Putnam 2012: 39–50. See also the essays collected in de Caro and Macarthur, eds., *Naturalism in Question*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2004.

2. See my discussion of the ethical process in 'Being and Slime: the mathematics of protoplasm in Oken's *Physio-Philosophy*', in *Collapse IV* (2008), pp. 286–322. For an example of this ethicism in contemporary Schelling studies, see Keith R. Peterson's 'Introduction' to *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*. New York, SUNY, 2004.

3. This is Putnam's conclusion in . . . loc. cit.

logical one. Indeed, this confusion is evident in Quine's naturalization of epistemology, which proposes that we abandon the ambition for a 'first philosophy' that would be in a position to arbitrate knowledge claims by the sciences: since knowledge and its acquisition is goal of all branches of genuine natural science, knowledge claims concerning knowledge should only issue from those sciences. Naturalism, in consequence, is the ethos adopted by a philosophy that, as a naturalistic artefact, is second in respect to the sciences, and so ought to be derived from them.

The confusion begins not with the slide into normativity in epistemic questions, but with the equation of epistemology with first philosophy, when according to Aristotle this last concerns the *first to be* and the causes, not of this or that being, but rather of causes themselves. Aristotelian first philosophy thus adds to this metaphysics of causality an 'arche-ontology'. Yet any philosophy that claims, like Aristotle's, to be "first", will be subject to Schelling's insight that a first will not, because it is first, be *prior to* but rather consequent upon a beginning having occurred. Because therefore, when a first is a first, it presupposes a beginning prior (at least) to it, it will be *at the earliest*, so to speak, only relatively or will be the "*most original [ursprünglichste]*".⁴ We may in consequence say that ontogeny precedes ontology (taking the latter as the reason of however open or restrictive an ontic catalogue the reason allows) or that ontology is a "local" state of ontogeny. Is ontogeny then the Schellingian candidate for first philosophy? Not unless ontogeny itself constitutes a 'first' in the sense that its being is "perfected", grammatically speaking, i.e. in the past of any claim made concerning it — hence the opening sentence of *Die Weltalter*: "the past is known".⁵ Perfected ontogeny, additionally, is precisely *not* ontogeny, but rather only a first *once* ontogeny has already 'been'. Yet *general* nature, whether conceived according to the "new era in natural history"⁶ or as contrastive with "particular nature",⁷ remains productivity *and* product rather than either alone.

4. As for example Schelling says in the *Erster Entwurf*, SW, I/3, p. II.

5. Draw attention to Joe Lawrence's comment on this point in his forthcoming translation of *Weltalter*.

6. Joseph Lawrence, in his English translation of the first draft of Schelling's *The Ages of the World* (forthcoming SUNY, 2019), notes the importance to the substance of Schelling's claim of the verb in this sentence being *wird* (will become) rather than *ist* (is). The result: the past "will be known" emphasizes the genetic element in which the future of knowing will conceive a past state. Thus the *Ages* echoes Schelling's 1800 System: "the lamp of the whole system of knowledge... casts its light ahead only, not behind". (SW I/3, 347) My thanks to Joe for allowing me to read an advance copy of his truly beautiful translation.

7. Schelling distinguishes general from particular nature in *Die Weltalter*, SW, I/8, p. 220: "the only place in which a ground of determination can be sought for the precedence of one of them and the succession of the other is the particular nature of each of the principles, which is different from their general nature which consists in each being equally originary and equally independent and each having the same claim to be that which has being".

There are therefore two reasons why ontogeny is not first philosophy: *first*, were it prior to beings i.e. to products, the latter would by definition not be nature but something else, unless nature were to exclude products. Were it to do so, however, in what would its productivity consist? Nature cannot therefore be either alone because, *second*, the hypothesis of products without productivity is as self-eliminating as that of “consequent without consequence”.⁸ if there are products, there is productivity. Neither, though, do products exhaust productivity, i.e. bring nature to an end, since we would again have the problem of conceiving consequents without consequence.

In brief therefore, ontology remains first philosophy, but (1) philosophy is not first in general, because (2) it is local or has a “particular nature”, and (3) the general nature amongst which ontology and other particular natures are consequent is ontogenetic. Philosophy’s every conceiving of beginning is consequent on its own beginning being conceived as local with respect to beginning as such. Therefore, as *Die Weltalter* demonstrates, ontogeny conjointly entails archaeo-ontology and philosophical futurism, because the beginning recedes with each additional claim concerning it contributing to what will become its future. Accordingly, the future will seek to know as past the beginning that a beginning will become, but that beginning will always be the object of future claims.

Regardless — this is worth stating to show the unorthodox ethos of our current orthodoxy — it is clear that first philosophy most certainly is not an epistemology or ‘theory of science’, a *Wissenschaftslehre*, as both Quinean naturalists and Fichtean ethicists such as Levinas contend. To conclude that it is, additionally conflates epistemically normative science (whether we are Levinasian or Quinean about it) with ontology. Thus, whether we account first philosophy a metaphysical or an ontological undertaking, it is clear that neither is reducible to the species of normative epistemology that Quine’s conflation of philosophical with scientific goals recommends. Additionally, its *normative* content renders Quine’s just as much an ethicism, since the latter accepts the evaluation of the sciences’ epistemic superiority as a precondition of rendering ethics as first philosophy. The result is that both Quineans and ethicists abandon “nature” to the sciences. Since, moreover, as book Gamma of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* reminds us, the sciences address discrete departments of being and so must ignore being prior to the various determinations its divisibility entails, the abandonment of nature paradoxically shared by naturalistic and ethicist first philosophy severs the tie between ontogenetic and ontological questions on which *Naturphilosophie* thrives. Contrastively, the inseparability of ontogeny and ontology — which Schelling early theorised as the asymmetric co-implication of inex-

8. Schelling gives this “law of consequence” in the *Freiheitsschrift* (SW, I/7, p. 345).

haustible productivity and product entailed just if natural production 'takes time' — "unthings", taking 'unbedingt' in its transitive verbal sense, nature in a phase prior to its acquisition of determinacy or, again in Schelling's terms, 'particularity'.

This is precisely why the second consequence of the claim that there is nothing that is that is not nature has bite. For it follows from it that *there is no (one) thing that nature is*. If nature is thus irreducible, under archeo-ontological investigation, to some supposedly primary elements (because nature consists *also* in their consequents, *and* they are themselves, if elements or particulars at all, necessarily consequent on their not-having-been), then it cannot be the case that 'nature' can be equated with *any* entity nor with any group of entities. There is no *ontic* answer, that is, to Novalis's abrupt question: "what is the nature of nature?" (Novalis 1996: 440)⁹ It is because Schelling draws his method from it, that he considers Kiehmeyer's theory of natural history, the beginning of a "new era". It consists not just in what became known as the "Mekkel-Serres Law", nor in attempting to discover a solution to the "genetic problem",¹⁰ but in a theory of *recapitulation all the way down*.

This too has consequences. Firstly, if we construe metaphysics as the study of what it is that beings are, then it follows that, when so defined, *Naturphilosophie* cannot be reduced to such a metaphysics, since it is not reducibly concerned with what it is that is. Secondly, if we consider ontology to be the theory of being, then it is clear that neither is nature a synonym for being nor does it constitute *a* being itself, nor again a domain thereof. When in this context we read Schelling's demand that "the concept of original being is to be "eliminated" from nature-philosophy",¹¹ the outline of ontogeny's role in *Naturphilosophie* above makes clear the reason for this: *being is not original because it is not "first"*. This means either: something else than being is original, or: origination precedes any candidate "first". Since in the first case, there can be no candidate "first" that is *not*, it may be dismissed on the grounds that it is question begging. Not being is prior to being only once being *is* and therefore only if it *was not*. If therefore origination is prior

9. "Where is the primal germ, the *typus* of all nature, to be found? The nature of nature?" Novalis also avers, however, that "Alles ist Samenkorn" (NOVALIS 1996: 440; NOVALIS, 1987: 389). It is Schelling who combines them: "everything is primal germ or nothing is [*Alles ist Urkeim oder nichts ist*]." (SW, I/6, p. 388). See my 'Everything is primal germ or nothing is. The deep field logic of nature', *Symposium* 19.1 (2015): 106-124.

10. See PNS chapter 4 for the contrast between Kiehmeyer's 'natural history of the unthinged' and "the genetic problem". I address 'Recapitulation all the way down' in my contribution to Lydia Azadpour and Daniel Whistler, eds., *Kiehmeyer*. Forthcoming, London, Bloomsbury, 2019.

11. Schelling argues that when "*der Begriff des Seyns als eines Ursprünglichen soll aus der Naturphilosophie (eben sowie aus der Transscendentalphilosophie) schlechthin eliminiert werden*", we have nature "unthinged [*unbedingt*]" (SW, I/3, p. 12).

to any candidate *first*, then being *becomes* such that *ontology is consequent on ontogeny*.

What then is nature–philosophy? Is it then ontogeny, if not *as* first philosophy, then as the philosophy of firstness? Returning to the account of Aristotelian first philosophy as “archo–ontological”, I would like to follow the lead Wolfram Högbe established in attending both to the role played by propositional form in Schelling’s philosophy and to the recapitulation of cosmogony (i.e., of *cosmogogenesis*) in epistemogenesis, which Högbe memorably parses as “the auto–epistemic structure of the world” (Högbe 1989: 52–3).¹² I propose to do this by drawing, as Högbe does, on principles Schelling makes use of in beginning *Die Weltalter* — which, I suggest, along with the *Freedom* essay, forms a pivotal contribution to *Naturphilosophie*. These principles concern Schelling’s experiments in the form of the copula, begun in the essay added to the second and third editions of *On the World Soul* and entitled ‘On the Proportion of the Real and the Ideal in Nature or On the Development of the First Principles of Nature–Philosophy from the Principles of Gravity and Light’.¹³ The title is important insofar as it casts the real and ideal not in the form of an exclusive disjunction (as ‘either naturalism or ethicism’), but as *proportional* one to the other. Moreover, while the object of the essay is to present the first principles of *Naturphilosophie*, these are, the title makes clear, derived from gravity and light, and so are themselves exhibited (*dargestellt*) as consequent upon nature. Nature and philosophy are connected by the copula in judgment, which “doubles” or “recapitulates” the bond between them, which bond is actual whenever there is philosophizing *resulting* in a judgment. That is, following the *Freedom* essay’s recasting of the elements of the proposition from ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’, to ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’, “nature–philosophy” states (1) that nature–as–subject is antecedent to the philosophy that is predicated of it in that science’s name; and (2) because “nature–philosophy” is to this extent itself a proposition, its expression is consequent upon the nature antecedent to it. Philosophy will always be in the future of the nature that is its past, just as it is that of other things.

12. Edinburgh University Press will shortly publish an English translation of this groundbreaking work by myself and Jason M. Wirth.

13. In using “proportion” rather than, as Dale Snow renders it in her welcome and helpful translation of Schelling’s “Treatise on the Relationship of the Real and the Ideal in Nature” (*International Philosophical Quarterly* 55(2) 2015: 235–250), I am drawing attention to the commonality between this work, added to the 1806 and 1809 editions of the *Weltseele*, and the so-called ‘Identity Philosophy’ he is sometimes said to be working on to the exclusion of the *Naturphilosophie* in the first decade of the new century. This is not only in keeping with Schelling’s own judgment that all his work prior to the *Freedom* essay was *Naturphilosophie* (SW, I/7, p. 333), but also makes sense of statements such as the following, from the *Presentation of My System* §. 76, “The empirical magnet must be treated as the *indifference point* in the total magnet.” (SW, I/4, p. 156).

That the first three phrases of *The Ages of the World* are contributions to Schelling's ongoing investigations of propositional form, is evident from their abrupt, undeveloped presentation at the outset of that work:

"Das Vergangene wird gewußt, das Gegenwärtige wird erkannt, das Zukünftige wird gehandelt."¹⁴

Schelling's German makes clear his experiments with the elements of the proposition, following those with the subject and predicate performed in the *Freedom* essay. Here the copula is no longer an articulation of *sein* but of *werden*, not of *being* but *becoming*. This suggests that the book thus introduced is a work of *ontogeny*, echoing Högrefe's auto-epistemologizing cosmos. What then nature "is" is supplanted by the question: "what will it become?" because whatever any *x* "is" will be consequent upon *x*'s genesis. In *Die Weltalter*'s terms, that the past *will be* known closes the gap between science (*Wissenschaft*) and prescience (*Ahnung*), with only this structural change: science is science when it follows or is consequent upon what it knows, or upon its having a past. This is, if you will, Schelling's ontogenetic version of Johann Wilhelm Ritter's definition of *Wissenschaft* as that "*was das Wissen überhaupt schafft*".¹⁵ Accordingly, *Die Weltalter* systematizes the consequent bonding of science to creation that remains individualized in 'the art of physics' for Ritter.

If it is true that the past is what *will be* known, there will never be a science capable of including the proposition in which knowledge of the past is formulated, in the included past. In consequence, every knowledge claim is a contribution to ontogeny, or itself an instance of creation. Prescience or *Ahnung* occurs when this epistemic type *precedes* the object of its claims. It is "pre-science" therefore in two ways: first, because it is the science that upsets the law of antecedence¹⁶ articulated by the first propositional phrase of the book by placing what is its object in the position of consequent with respect to which that science or pre-science is antecedent. Second, because *science* or *knowledge follows* from its object according to the first proposition, what it is that precedes science can never be known because its science will be, if at all, only in its future. A close relative of this claim can be heard in

14. SW, I/8, p. 199. In his excellent forthcoming translation of *Die Weltalter I* into English (SUNY), Joseph Lawrence draws attention to Schelling's use of the verb *werden* rather than *sein* here, as I do below. I am grateful to him for sharing his beautiful, vivid and subtle work on this extraordinary piece with me.

15. The physicist J.W. Ritter presented the talk, 'Die Physik als Kunst' at the Inaugural Celebration of the *Königlich-bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* on March 28, 1806, the same venue as Schelling, on October 31 1807, would present his 'Über das Verhältniß der bildenden Künste zu der Natur'. See Ritter 1986: 288–321, here 294.

16. As stated in the *Freiheitsschrift*: "... no kind of combination can transform that which is by nature derived into that which is by nature original", SW, I/7, p. 340.

Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer's parsing of the relation of thought to nature:

Thoughts are awakened by the *actus*, the emergence of a thing or the causes of this change (Kielmeyer 1938: 213–4).¹⁷

The *Naturphilosophen* of the turn of the nineteenth century once again offer a notable instance of emergentism all the way down. This has the effect, like the *génésis eis ousían* Schelling cites from Plato's *Philebus* in his *Timaeusschrift*, (Schelling 1994: 63, citing *Philebus* 26d) of making ontogeny prior to ontology, insofar as thought remains consequent upon the actuality, which consists in emergence, according to Kielmeyer. This thesis is in marked contrast to the Middle Platonist account of the *kósmos noetós* with which Robert F. Brown (1977) and Michael Franz (2012), amongst others, characterize Schelling's theory of intelligible creation, as the "ideas in God's mind".¹⁸ Nor yet is it the Neoplatonist account of the intelligible creation as flowing from the One; nor, as for example Birgit Sandkaulen-Bock 1990 argues, is it synonymous with the Kantian understanding as the lawgiver to the world *qua* totality of appearances.¹⁹ According to *Die Weltalter*, creation is intelligible owing to the "*Mit-wissenschaft*" of the human soul with creation (SW, I/8, 200). Again, owing to the operation or actuality of science, creation — or rather the created — is not only *known* in science but equally *instantiated* in it, even though the creation that this science is is not amongst the contents of that science, just as never not having a past ensures that science *qua* created cannot sum the creation of which it is an issuant. This account of what is involved in "co-science" is further reinforced if we add Schelling's claim that "quch in Plato means nothing other than *the original principle of motion*, *arché kíneseos*" (Schelling 1994: 28). Here the echo of archeo-ontology in the soul *as* (and not as containing) "original principle" recapitulates the beginning of beginning that is cosmogony's past, since the principle of motion is not itself motion but soul. Soul thus remains akin to creation because the pasts to which the sciences of each seek access are forever cut from them by the fact of having begun. Moreover, soul is akin to creation in that each obtains as antecedent only consequently upon an antecedent having obtained, i.e., once creation has occurred, or once something that was not has become.

Accordingly, science doubles or recapitulates creation both insofar as (1) the former is an instance of the latter, in which (2) it is grounded and thus upon which it is consequent. Knowing's past is the nature in it, where

17. For further support for this reading of *Die Weltalter*, see Judith Norman and Alasdair Welchman, 'Creating the Past: Schelling's *Ages of the World*', *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 4 (2010): 23–43.

18. See below for my argument as to why the Middle Platonist understanding of *kósmos noetós* is the wrong one, and the evidence to support this claim.

19. KANT, KpV A163.

“nature”, it is now clear, does not mean a being or a domain thereof, but rather becomes the past of whatever is emergent, even including creation itself.

Were all this to result only in the claim: ‘nature *qua* physis is and means growth, life, etc.’,²⁰ nothing philosophically would have been accomplished but the reassertion of vitalism, a crime of which I have, on the basis of my *Philosophies of Nature After Schelling* (2e, 2008), been frequently yet erroneously accused. I do not think it is credible to read the book in this way, however, owing to several key theses there developed:

- 1) Because there is no thing that is nature, no special domain of nature enjoys ontological privilege over any other. To assert that the domain of being to which nature properly applies is the living, is always the pleading of special interests.
- 2) Nor, by extension, are the *natural* sciences (are there *unnatural* sciences, or sciences of “un–nature”?) the exclusive arbiters of nature’s beginnings, ends and means. A successfully operative *Naturphilosophie* has therefore mythology as much as it does metallurgy amongst its object–domain.
- 3) Similarly, the unconditioning of nature is here argued to obtain not when nature is made absolute or the One from which thought about it, for example, emanates. Rather, nature is unconditioned or un–thinged once the search for what it *fundamentally is* — its “primal germ”, “protoplasm”, “intermaxillary bone” or *Urpflanze* — is shown, as here, to be question–begging: no *x* is the original of all, since at least the *x* that so serves does not receive its origin from it. There is, so to speak, no “unit of selection” problem for recapitulation because recapitulation recapitulates (or potentiates) recapitulation.

This leads to a related thesis that, although mentioned in my (2008), was not developed therein. The “inborn and indwelling logic of nature” of which Schelling latterly speaks²¹ is not, if we note how it is here qualified, a logic merely *applied* to nature; nor, insofar as nature is here posited as the field within which it is located, does logic exceed it in scope. Rather, it “fills the world”, as Wittgenstein (1981: 5.61) claimed. It follows, therefore, that no science of logic can invert this relation and make nature its subset unless the resultant nature₂ is not equal to the nature₁ in which the logic that so contains it is embedded. It further follows that, since this logic is “indwelling”, that logics are falsely considered to be abstract as opposed to

20. For a sophisticated development of this theme, see PIERRE HADOT 2004.

21. In the *Grounding of Positive Philosophy*, SW II/3, 103.

concrete when they are considered as not indwelling and thus derived. From this it follows that, since logic consists in formally repeatable patternings, nature exemplifies more than one such patterning at different levels, and that no individual pattern therefore suffices as “the logic of nature” or the logic of the all. In other words, a nature–philosophy of logic denies the latter’s self–sufficiency not on the grounds of its reducibility to initial, non–logical instantiations, but rather because there is no limit in principle to the number or kind of pattern–instantiations of which nature is capable.

Why then a nature philosophy? To supplant the *Aristotelian Orthodoxy* according to which Ideas — and therefore not nature — are the subject of the Platonic philosophical ascent “ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας”;²² to reject therefore the *Nietzscheanity Orthodoxy*, according to which it is *Platonism* that must be overturned (on the contrary, Eduardo Paolozzi’s stated aim “to erect hollow gods” provides a better idea for their treatment than can be achieved with a hammer alone);²³ to counter the *Scientistic Orthodoxy*, which states that nature has become philosophically intractable (acceptance of which leads equally, as we have seen, to the Ethicist and Naturalist Orthodoxies); to demonstrate the *Scalar Orthodoxy* unfounded, although it founds in turn the functionalist hegemony of “specialisation” — is ontology conceivable as a specialisation? — and the banality of the small point. Contrary to specialisation, which makes the community of scholars larger than the object it studies, philosophy’s universes simultaneously exceed it and impel it. *Naturphilosophie* takes the insuperable localism of the consequent philosophy that its name hypothesizes not as an occasion for again demonstrating the elimination of the position that once it, but now none, may occupy. Rather, it takes its own embeddedness as modelling nature’s ontogenesis of thought, and the resultant morphology as the ground of a philosophical futurism as its unprethinkable offspring.

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22. Plato, *Rep.* 509b. See Chapter 2.1f, below.

23. See COLLINS 2014: 120, MACDONALD 2000: 196. Again counter to Nietzscheanity, modernity finds in art the anagogic movement his detractors deny Plato. To counter the over simplistic reading of the Platonic divided line and the consequent status of the image, see Plutarch, *Platonic Questions* 1003Fff on the ἀγαιοειδ³ or *boniform*.

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