

Nostalgic *Freilassen*

Emancipation beyond Empowerment

NICOLAI KREJBERG KNUDSEN

ABSTRACT: Postmodern hermeneutics strongly opposes itself to Heidegger's alleged anti-modernism. This opposition is found in the weak thought developed by Vattimo and Caputo, and in this article I will argue that their dismissal of Heidegger's nostalgia relies on a problematic distinction between Heidegger's progressive, leftist non-foundationalism and his rightist, nostalgic eschatology. This distinction is problematic for two reasons: Firstly, it overlooks the crucial link between Heidegger's notion of belonging (*Zugehörigkeit*) and attunements (*Stimmungen*) that provides Heidegger's nostalgia with a hermeneutic importance, and, secondly, it assumes that Heidegger actually *wants* to return to a time prior to metaphysics, whereby it fails to take into account the late Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of the will. These two points I take to be defining for the affectivity central to Heideggerian hermeneutics and, consequently, to be crucial for any hermeneutics with emancipatory ambitions. If weak thought is still embedded in the metaphysics of the will, we must strive to make it even weaker by considering the Heideggerian terms *Freilassen* and *Gelassenheit*, which will reveal that nostalgia is not politically dangerous but, rather, emancipatory insofar as it seeks to free a different mode of experience beyond the willful metaphysics of *Gestell*.

KEYWORDS: Heidegger, Nostalgia, *Gelassenheit*, Letting-be, Setting-free.

Postmodernity distances itself from any kind of anti-modernism. Anti-modernism is seen as politically dangerous and theoretically unsound. This is even evident in hermeneutics — a philosophical discipline always known for its emphasis on tradition — which Gianni Vattimo and John Caputo have taken into the era of postmodernity. This anti-anti-modernism is particularly clear in their readings and reception of Heidegger. On the one hand, Heidegger provides postmodern hermeneutics with its inaugurating impetus through his attempts to overcome (*verwinden*) the history of metaphysics. But on the other hand, both Vattimo and Caputo distance themselves from parts of Heidegger's thinking, insofar as these parts are deemed to, firstly, contradict the postmodern rejection of metaphysics and, secondly, to conflict with the emancipatory ambitions of this branch of philosophy. In this article, I will critically discuss Vattimo's and Caputo's readings of Heidegger and especially their assessment of his nostalgia, in

order to point out an alternative way for a weak thought with hopes of emancipation.

Hermeneutics and hermeneutic phenomenology suggests that our perception of the world is affected by our cultural and linguistic horizons. Humans are ontologically situated or thrown into the world, and our understanding is intrinsically marked by this context. In Heidegger's late thought the keyword for this hermeneutic ontology is *belonging* or *Zugehörigkeit*, which literally means *listening-to*. This designates that the manifestation of the world — even though it is shaped by our understanding — is not the result of human activity, but something that happens pre-reflectively. The opening of the world through language and history happens outside of the control of the individual. It does not rely on our projections or utterances, but rather on our ability to *listen-to* and get *affected-by* our surroundings. As Heidegger famously states, *die Sprache spricht*, and this is what the human *listens to*. This relation makes language and history (or, as Heidegger would say more generally, Being) the primary actor, and positions the human as a respondent. The human is, ontologically, not acting but affected¹.

Postmodern hermeneutics reflects this affectivity when it insists that there can be no ultimate formulation of the structure of Being. Being affects us, but is essentially self-withdrawing. In this way, there is no metaphysical certainty, only different expressions of this affective relationship. This is not to be understood as a failure for philosophy; rather, postmodern hermeneutics insists that this weakening allows new acts of freedom.

In section 3 and 3, I will outline the hermeneutic ontologies of, respectively, Vattimo and Caputo and emphasize how they seek to extrapolate the emancipatory potential in the late Heidegger. In section 3, I will argue that Caputo and Vattimo share the assumption that we can easily distinguish between Heidegger's leftist non-foundationalism and his nostalgic, rightist foundationalism. This distinction, as I argue in section 3, makes it impossible for us to fully understand Heidegger's affective *Zugehörigkeit*, because it fails to realize that Heidegger's nostalgia is not an unwarranted metaphysical claim, but rather a hermeneutically important attunement or *Stimmung*. Section 3 will show the consequences of such a reassessment in which Heidegger's nostalgia is held to be an attempt to set us free from the technological *will to will* that characterizes *Gestell*. The assumption that Heidegger *wants* us to return to a time prior to modernity overlooks the

1. This, however, is not to be understood in terms of a causal determinism or some sort of fatalism. Heidegger often hints at a secondary meaning of the German word for determination, *Be-stimmung*: attunement. According to Heideggerian ontology, attunements are a way of being in the world that opens up a certain *space of possibilities*. To be historically determined is to be thrown into such a particular space of possibilities. This notion of attunement will be discussed further in section 3.

link between *Gestell* and the metaphysics of the will. In fact, Heidegger's nostalgia seeks to undo the willful disclosure of Being in general, by offering us a different disclosure of the world. As my emphasis on attunements shows, the liberation sought by Heidegger's hermeneutics does not seek to open or broaden a field of action, but, instead, to set different *modes of experience* free. The postmodern dismissal of nostalgia thus reveals that weak thought is, paradoxically, still too powerful and still operating within the domain of the will that Heidegger sought to undo. What I suggest through my reading of Heidegger is a radicalized weakness that seeks emancipation beyond empowerment in the domain of experience.

1. Vattimo's hermeneutic nihilism insists, by way of an interpretation of the historical situation, that there are no strong structures of Being, i.e., no universal, stable structures that order the world, but only weak occurrences of Being in the form of historico-cultural horizons, and as such there is no truth independent of interpretation. In doing so, Vattimo seeks to cleanse hermeneutics from a metaphysical residue and thus to prove it the philosophy of the 'postmodern condition' *par excellence*. The question is, however, in what way philosophy is still meaningful if truth — and with it any claim to objectivity and universality — has been dissolved into interpretations? In order to answer this question and illuminate what Vattimo believes to be the emancipatory potential of hermeneutics after the death of God, I will, firstly, show that the form of interpretation that he believes to be a response to our postmodern condition is based on Heideggerian themes, and, secondly, spell out what he takes to be the political consequences of this view on hermeneutics.

Dwelling, the determining factor of human understanding, experience, and even truth itself, is seen as "an interpretative belonging" (VATTIMO 1997: 82) to tradition or *Überlieferung*. He explains this relation by saying that "[t]radition is the transmitting of linguistic messages that constitute the horizon within which Dasein is thrown as a historically determined project" (VATTIMO 1988: 120). In this way, Dasein's dwelling is historical in the sense of *Geschick*, i.e., a relation, where the human being receives its understanding in a destinal determination, in the form of a *Be-stimmung*, that is, a non-deterministic *attunement*. The tradition is "the horizon of disclosure in which things appear" (*ibid.*: 120), and as such it is a trans-mission (*Schickung*) from the past, outside of the control of the subject. The experience of Being, delivered to the human through *Geschick*, is thus "an experience of the reception of, and response to, these transmissions" (*ibid.*: 176).

Dasein belongs to Being and is embedded in a tradition. This is not a form of determinism, since the relation to the past implied in *Überlieferung*

is not causal, but one in which Dasein is offered or *handed-over* messages to which it can respond. As Zabala, whose position is remarkably close to Vattimo's, puts it, "interpretation is, in itself, a response to a message, an articulated response to its own belonging, tradition, and history from which it arises" (ZABALA 2009: 98). Vattimo and Zabala thus present an anti-subjectivism, in which Being, in the form of *Geschick*, is "in the driver's seat" (*ibid.*: 51). By responding through interpretation Dasein can become a sort of hermeneutic co-driver.

Since Being is something delivered to man, interpretation is not only *aimed* at what is delivered through the tradition; this deliverance is the very *condition of one's interpretation*. This implies a hermeneutic doubleness with ontological consequences: On the one hand, there is the *Überlieferung* in its particular instances, where philosophy, literature, religion, science, etc. are to be interpreted as an expression of a concrete historico-cultural horizon. This amounts to the weak structures of Being, in which concrete phenomena or transmissions are taken as expressions of our hermeneutic situation. But on the other hand, this is accompanied by a stronger mode of alterity, insofar as every transmission seems to contain something incomprehensible and self-withdrawing. Vattimo calls this, following Heidegger, *Erde* (cfr. VATTIMO 1988: 43, 71) or *das Selbe*:

[W]e can say that in history as a transmission of messages, the Same is the unthought that presents itself in each proposition as reserve, as that residuum of transcendence conserved by a proposition in every response, and it is to this 'unsaid', this 'unthought', that the dialogue with the past relates, which inasmuch as it is unthought, is never past but also always yet to come . . . But the being of the Same, precisely to the extent that it remains unsaid, *can be 'proved' only by the very fact of transmission* (VATTIMO 1993: 168, my emphasis).

In the responsive interpretation of the *Überlieferung* there is a "reserve" or "residuum of transcendence" that remains unthought. This unthought is not a substance, but rather the self-withdrawal of every *Geshick*. Every response is given to something that happens as a particular transmission, but this also means that 'something' exceeds the belonging/response-relation of interpretation, something keeps itself in 'reserve' — as the instance *that gives or sends* these transmissions. This something is what Heidegger calls *Ereignis* and can be understood as a happening that inaugurates a difference between Being and being. As such, it is the very process of *Geschick*, in which Dasein happens by being thrown into history and language, which enables it to respond to these conditions.

That this difference between *Überlieferung* and *das Selbe* is crucial in Vattimo's account of hermeneutics is evident when we consider his re-/interpretation of Heidegger's *Andenken*, re-collection:

What do we really experience in taking the leap, the step back, in the oscillation set in motion by *Ge-Stell* and unfolding in finite dialogue with *Überlieferung*? We are not experiencing some metaphysical unity or Equal; rather, we experience the Same, which is in fact only that in respect to which the individual historical/destinal *Prägungen* of the man–Being relation are constituted and destituted in their finitude, for ever in dialogue from transitory, momentary and ephemeral standpoints. To experience the Same is to experience historicity as *Geschicklichkeit*, the finite destiny of every historical/epochal situation (*ibid.*: 181).

Andenken is the dialogue with the tradition, but it is the special kind of dialogue in which the Same is experienced. The Same is the transcendent point that traverses history and never changes. The Same that remains unthought is the fact that *Being happens as Geschick*, and thus re–collection is the experience that reveals the impossibility of a *strong* experience of Being. Re–collection is the insight into the weakness of Being: If Being only happens as *Geschick*, there is no experience of Being outside of the historico–cultural horizon of *Dasein*. Every historical situation is thus an expression of the *Seinsgeschick* — the destinal deliverance of Being to man. The experience of the Same, the self–withdrawal of Being in *Geschick*, is thus the experience that a particular interpretation of the *Überlieferung* — even though it convincingly explains the historical situation — is *not* a fixed structure of Being, but merely a *variation* or *Prägung* of that residuum of transcendence. In this way, the Same “can be ‘proved’ only by the very fact of transmission” (Vattimo 1993: 168).

According to Vattimo, contemporary hermeneutics must rid itself of the ambition of reaching *die Sache selbst*; there is no external point of reference which our interpretations must be adequate to, since the Same that gives our historical constellation always withdraws and, hence, is never identical to its concrete deliverances. Consequently, the hermeneutical task is a nihilistic, non–subjectivistic production of interpretations that (re)produces the weak structures of Being. The ‘truth–value’ of this hermeneutics is entirely immanent to interpretation and consists in the explanatory force of the produced interpretations, which are to be judged by their ability to convince others.

Furthermore, the hermeneutical task to articulate this historical insight in the form of different interpretations is, according to Vattimo and Zabala, “political in itself” (VATTIMO and ZABALA 2011: 77). This claim rests on the assumption that metaphysical realism serves to legitimate political conservatism: “[M]etaphysically framed political systems hold that society must direct itself according to truth (the existing paradigm), that is, in favor of the strong against the weak” (*ibid.*: 12). When metaphysical realism theoretically claims to explicate the objectively true description of the world, it, practically, works “to conserve and leave unquestioned the established order

of the world” (*ibid.*: 96). Nihilistic hermeneutics, on the contrary, contains an “anarchic vein” that involves “not the absence of rules but of the unique universal rule” (*ibid.*: 78). If metaphysical realism justifies the existing world order by describing it as the objectively true, nihilistic hermeneutics is essentially political, insofar as it rejects any notion of objective truth. Thus, it subverts and emancipates us from political domination.

This is not the place to go into detail with Vattimo’s claim that metaphysical realism is tantamount to political conservatism; it only serves to illuminate, what Vattimo believes to be the emancipatory potential of hermeneutics. The adjective ‘weak’ that accompanies his line of thought is, on this account, not only a reference to the weakening of Being, but also a designator for those, whom it seeks to liberate. Given that those in power, the strong, have succeeded in developing a metaphysical legitimation of their domination, nihilistic hermeneutics provides a theoretical justification of the alternative interpretations of the weak “who are not satisfied with the established principles imposed on them” (*ibid.*: 107). Thus, weak thought advocates a “tolerant society” freed from metaphysico-political domination of realism “in which achievements will be determined by the plurality of conversations with different linguistic communities” (*ibid.*: 106). Nihilistic hermeneutics is political insofar as it subverts political and metaphysical dominance by freeing and empowering the alternate interpretations of the weak.

2. Inspired by Heidegger and Derrida, Caputo develops what he calls a radical or cold hermeneutics. His reflections on the situatedness of the human being is largely similar to Vattimo’s distinction between the *Überlieferung* and *das Selbe*: On the one hand, there is a concrete horizon given through a particular disclosure of Being, and, on the other hand, Caputo insists that this disclosure is itself ungrounded and just a particular expression of the mystery of Being. The disclosure of Being, the *Geschick*, is relative and processual. Being itself remains a “residuum of transcendence.”

Caputo finds this hermeneutical difference in two different tendencies of Heidegger’s thought. Firstly, he identifies an “onto-hermeneutical” Heidegger, who seeks to “offer a competing Being/beings distinction” through a nostalgic return to the time before metaphysics (CAPUTO 1987: 174). This movement, however, is itself a metaphysical gesture, insofar as it seeks to provide the *ultimate horizon* for grasping Being. Thus, the onto-hermeneutical Heidegger, who emphasizes a specific disclosure of Being, contradicts the “meta-ontological” Heidegger, who refuses to put forward another name or description for Being itself. Heidegger’s “horizontal-hermeneutical gesture is meant to put its finger on what sustains (*hält*) and maintains in subsi-

stence (*nährt*) all such [metaphysical] projects” (*ibid.*: 174). Another way of articulating the difference between *onto-hermeneutics* and *meta-ontology*, corresponding to *Überlieferung* and *das Selbe*, is to say that hermeneutics concerns itself, not with the concrete *Geschick* or *Schickung*, but the very fact that Being happens as a *Schicken*, that is, *Schicken* as a process. This I take to be the difference, often emphasized by Heidegger, between *Wesen* understood verbally and *Wesen* understood substantially as essence (e.g. UzS: 236; GA 7: 31)².

Meta-ontology cannot be experienced as such, since it is essentially a term for the *self-withdrawal* of Being. Meta-ontology must be mediated through a horizontal experience in the same way as Vattimo seeks to “prove” *das Selbe* through transmissions. Caputo’s hermeneutics seeks to “stick with the original difficulty of life” (CAPUTO 1987: 1) and to rid *Dasein* of all illusions and comfort in order to make it ready for “the openness for *différance*” (*ibid.*: 146). Instead of *understanding* our own situation (as Vattimo wants), Caputo wants us to destabilize this situation, to make us tremble in discomfort.

Here Caputo relies heavily on Derrida, whose deconstruction he reads hermeneutically not as a “destructive criticism but [as] the releasing of another reading” (*ibid.*: 171). Radical hermeneutics destabilizes hermeneutic situations by offering alternate readings or discourses. This is a way of showing that there is no ultimate disclosure of Being, but rather a multiplicity of possible ways for Being to take shape. This is evident even in his reading of Heidegger, where he follows Derrida’s critique of “Heidegger’s ‘nostalgia’ and ‘the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost or native country of thought’” (*ibid.*: 172; see also the epigraph in CAPUTO 1993). Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger aims a blow at Heidegger’s (rightist) tendency for nostalgia and search for a firm origin in order to free Heidegger’s (leftist) refusal to reduce Being to any single form. Caputo calls this deconstructed figure for a demythologized Heidegger.

The releasement of readings is a way to make room for a discursive play, where no single interpretation is final or absolute. The meta-ontological hermeneutics seeks

the moment when one experiences the contingency of any historical configuration and one is alerted to a deeper movement, the movement of *Ereignis/a-letheia*. Then, and only then, does one appreciate the fragility and precariousness of the hold which conceptual-representational thinking has upon things. To take conceptual thinking seriously, to suppose it exempt from the play, is to suffer the illusion of

2. For a list of the used abbreviations of Heidegger’s work see the bibliography. When relevant the page number of the German original will be separated from the page number of the English translation with a /.

con-cipere (*capere*), *be-greifen*, which thinks it has a hold on the play just when the play has a hold on it and which thinks that it can dominate texts, epochs, and mortals themselves (CAPUTO 1987: 204).

A consequence of *différance* is that conceptual thinking is merely a form of metaphysics. Instead, hermeneutics reveals everything to be interpretations that are caught in the infinite play of meaning. The response to this insight is to accept that interpretations are always historically contingent and see an emancipatory potential in the production of alternate readings and discourses. This setting-free, however, can only happen from a certain hermeneutical situation, i.e., a particular horizon, and can therefore only happen as an “inside job.”

Certain interpretations and discourses form institutions or hegemonies; they become dominant and determine the way one can participate in certain fields. Hegemonic interpretations delimit and shut down the field of play by establishing firm rules of conduct. The task of radical hermeneutics is to infiltrate these institutions, to exercise a “double agency” and to assume “the role of a treacherous and wily Hermes who subverts” (*ibid.*: 235)³. Caputo calls this an ethics of dissemination:

The function of an ethics of dissemination is not to try to level all institutional arrangements or discourage the formation of new ones — we have seen Derrida’s interest in the university — but to intervene in ongoing processes, to keep institutions in process, to keep the forms of life from eliminating the life-form they are supposed to house. It means to disrupt hardened shells, to practice the Socratic art, to be a gadfly and sting ray — but always in the polis (*ibid.*: 263).

The difficulty of life that Caputo seeks to reestablish thus undermines a person’s own dwelling by suspecting that every form of comfort is merely a disguised form of power. This is why *cold* hermeneutics — hermeneutics without comfort, without a proper dwelling — is another term for Caputo’s radical hermeneutics. In this way, radical hermeneutics seeks to establish and maintain itself *in-between* the institutionalized, traditional interpretations and discourses, on the one hand, and the production of new interpretations, on the other. It is a continuous setting-free of discourses (and not an attempt to set *one* particular interpretation free in order to establish a new hegemony). In an attempt to maintain or prolong the experience of the mystery of Being and the free play of interpretations, radical hermeneutics “does not lead us back to safe shores and terra firma; it leaves us twisting slowly in the wind. It leaves us exposed and without grounds” (*ibid.*: 267).

3. I will get back to the figure of the double agent in section 3.

3. By now it should be clear that both Caputo and Vattimo base their hermeneutics heavily on Heidegger and the emphasis on *Geschick* developed in his late writings. Furthermore, they both believe that emancipatory hermeneutics is possible only after rescuing Heidegger from himself and from his own nostalgia in particular. Thus, Vattimo writes in *The Adventure of Difference* that there is “no sense” in responding to *Gestell* by “dreaming of an idyllic existence modelled on some imaginary Black Forest peasant or shepherd” (VATTIMO 1993: 112) and that we must “discard all nostalgia” in order to “identify with the destiny of the deployed domination of technology” (*ibid.*: 113). Caputo, as we have already seen, makes a similar dismissal of Heidegger’s nostalgia making it the primary target for his demythologization, insofar as he takes it to be a metaphysical attempt to counter *Gestell* with a competing, strong description of the structure of Being.

This harsh judgment of nostalgia relies on the distinction between a leftist Heidegger, whose strict anti-subjectivism and anti-foundationalism is the common ground between the hermeneutics of Vattimo and Caputo, and a rightist Heidegger, who contradicted his own insistence on the event-like nature of Being by putting forth a foundationalist eschatology that sought to return to the full presence of Being experienced by the Greeks (cfr. VATTIMO 1993: 112; VATTIMO 1997: 13; CAPUTO 1987: 96–97). In this way, the strategic attunement with which Heidegger tried to oppose *Gestell* is vigorously dismissed as mythic, foundationalist, and politically dangerous.

I wish to suggest another reading of Heidegger’s late hermeneutics that challenges this clear-cut distinction between the good and the bad Heidegger. After the recent publications of Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* from the 30’s and 40’s, in which Heidegger aligns his thinking of the history of Being with cultural anti-Semitism and expresses his continued sympathies with the National Socialist movement, this debate concerning the emancipatory promises and limitations of Heidegger’s thought is more relevant than ever. This, however, is not the place to review the vast amount of secondary literature on Heidegger’s Nazism, nor is it the place to comment on the content of Heidegger’s notebooks. In light of this debate, I merely suggest that Heidegger’s nostalgia is *not* to blame and that this way of drawing the line between the good and the bad Heidegger is flawed and, consequently, misleading for any attempt to seriously consider the relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and politics. To conflate Heidegger’s fondness of Hölderlin and the Greeks with his National Socialism is, I believe, based on superficial readings of these aspects of Heidegger’s thought. Instead, we must take seriously Heidegger’s own suggestion that the error of the 30’s and 40’s was *not* related to nostalgia, but the way that he aligned his thinking with the metaphysics of the will. To dismiss the hermeneutic work so often neglected as nostalgic, is, I believe, to throw the baby out with the

bath water. Hence, I propose the thesis that Heidegger's nostalgia is, in fact, an expression of the emancipatory, hermeneutic potential that his thinking offers — despite his political stupidity.

The argument for this thesis will go as follows: Firstly, I argue that the distinction between a left- and a right-Heidegger is problematized by the affectivity underlying Heidegger's notion of language, *Geschick* and *Be-stimmung*, since attunements (*Stimmungen*) are essential to the hermeneutical situation and the hermeneutic work. This means that nostalgia is not to be conceived as a strong metaphysical claim, but, rather, as a world-disclosing *Stimmung*. Secondly, the hermeneutic work at play in this way of understanding nostalgia is an attempt to set us free from the technological *will to will* that characterizes *Gestell*. For Heidegger the emancipatory potential of hermeneutics is, qua his strict anti-subjectivism, not an empowerment of a subject, but entirely opposed to the category and metaphysics of the will. Nostalgia, insofar as it is understood not as a willful, metaphysical longing for the full presence of Being, but as a world-disclosing attunement, is, rather, *a mode of experience*. As such, it falls under the emancipatory hermeneutic work that Heidegger designates with the term *Gelassenheit*.

4. The affectivity inherent to Heidegger's understanding of *Geschick* and language is a primordial belonging that determines our world-disclosing horizons. The hermeneutic task is to (cor)respond to this belonging, and this is what Heidegger calls *the original conversation or dialogue*:

the original conversation [*das ursprüngliche Gespräch*] . . . is the ever wordless address of what is sent to us [*der stets wörterlose Zuspruch des Zugeschickten*], the silent voice of the greeting, in which there comes to pass the demand of that which someone must first bear in his heart, and be determined by this voice to be the one who points [*der durch die Stimme zum Zeigen bestimmt ist*]. To stand under such a claim means to be able to hear [*hören können*]. That is the essential ground of genuine saying [*des echten Sagens*]. Saying is originally a hearing [*Hörenkönnen*], just as a genuine ability to hear is an original re-saying (not a mere mechanical repetition) of what has been heard (GA 4: 124/146).

In the originary dialogue, language addresses or greets us. A greeting is an address from a *distance*, an address from somewhere else. Language addresses and encourages us (*spricht zu*), which means that humans receive something from language. Only this greeting itself is handed over to us, while whatever greets remains at a distance; we only receive the greeting, but not whatever greets itself. To borrow some phrases from Vattimo, greeting implies a self-withdrawing handing-over.

Language delivers our horizon to us, and this deliverance places us under a demand (*Zumutung*). Heidegger identifies this demand with the ability to

listen. Since the listening to language is simultaneously our belonging to language, this belonging itself becomes a task, to which we must respond. The task for hermeneutics, then, *das echte Hörenkönnen*, is to articulate or repeat (*wiedersagen*) the insight that we belong affectively to language.

We can sum up the model of affectivity implied here in the following elements: (1) language is world-disclosing, (2) language and world-disclosure are handed-over to us from elsewhere, and (3) hermeneutic work must reflect this affectivity, i.e., speak *from out of* this affective relationship⁴. Phenomenologically, to listen-to and to be affected-by in the sense of a world-disclosure can be described as an attunement, *Stimmung*. Heidegger puts this concisely in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, where he writes:

Attunements are the fundamental ways in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Attunements are the *how* [*Wie*] according to which one is in such and such a way. Certainly we often take this 'one is in such and such a way' . . . as something indifferent, in contrast to what we intend to do, what we are occupied with, or what will happen to us. And yet this 'one is in such and such a way' is not — is never — simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting [*Denkens, Tuns und Lassens*]. It is — to put it crudely — the presupposition for such things, the 'medium' within which they first happen (GA 29–30: 101/67f).

Attunement is thus another word for the way that we find ourselves always already belonging to a world that pre-reflectively has been disclosed in a certain manner, that is, in which things appear in a certain light and in which certain possibilities makes themselves known to us. Our belonging/listening-to takes the form of attunements. *Zugehörigkeit* attunes (*bestimmt*) us, and this is what discloses the world⁵. The concept of attunement is thus central to the model of affectivity insofar as it is world-disclosing, implies a distance from what attunes, and makes a responsive, qua attuned, hermeneutic work possible.

Caputo and Vattimo do indeed reflect this movement on a formal level, when they argue in favour of the weakening of Being as it follows from the un-grounding Heideggerian meta-ontology, where Being manifests itself in different and unpredictable ways because of its self-withdrawal. They fail, however, to take the full consequence of this originary affectivity, when they dismiss the attunement of Heidegger's own position. Nostalgia is not a metaphysical claim for presence, but rather an attuned response to the hermeneutic situation.

Nostalgia is a longing for something else and even though it, hypothetically, might be a longing for a time before metaphysics, where Being

4. In the same way as Heidegger refuses to speak about [*über*] language in order to speak from out of [*von*] language. (UzS: 151)

5. "Understanding is always attuned" as he writes in *Sein und Zeit*. (SZ: 142)

was fully graspable, we must understand it not as the *strong* theoretical claim that this absolute relation to Being is actually possible, but, rather, as a *Stimmung*. In this interpretation of nostalgia the longing for a particular belonging is something that characterizes a specific hermeneutic position. Caputo is wrong when he rejects it as theoretically unsound, as internally contradictory and as politically dangerous. When we understand nostalgia *as nostalgia*, that is, as something that longs for an *impossible nearness*, we must see this *Stimmung* as part of *the hermeneutic affectivity*. Nostalgia is a *Stimmung* brought about by the hermeneutic position, and as such the *longing for a closer belonging* is part of a *historical belonging*.

We find another explication of nostalgia *as nostalgia* in Jeff Malpas' distinction between nostalgia and mythophilia. Malpas writes that nostalgia "involves both the spatial and the temporal, both memorial recovery and loss, both a sense of home and of estrangement" (MALPAS 2012: 165). The difference between nostalgia and mythophilia, then, is that nostalgia is essentially *self-referential* (*ibid.*: 170), insofar as it requires a homecoming *and* an estrangement. Nostalgia knows that the home (*nostos*) it discloses is impossible and already lost. Thus, it knows the tension in and differentiated nature of its longing and involves pain or homesickness (*algos*). Mythophilia, on the other hand, "lacks any sense of pain, of *algos*, but strictly speaking also lacks any proper sense of home, of *nostos*, since it lacks any sense . . . that what is at issue is its own sense of itself, its own sense of identity" (*ibid.*: 170). In other words, mythophilia lacks knowledge about its distance to Being, and it believes itself to be capable of actually separating itself from its own conditions in order to return to its imagined utopia. The self-referentiality of nostalgia, on the other hand, reflects its own hermeneutical situation and its distance to Being. Nostalgia is a homecoming and an estrangement in the sense that it *contrasts* its painful condition in e.g. the *Gestell* of Heidegger's modernity, with a longing for a different (say, Greek) relation to Being. It does not, however, forget this contrast or tension inherent in its longing.

If it is conceived as an attunement, nostalgia cannot be the sort of foundationalism that Vattimo and Caputo believes it to be, since it through self-referentiality presupposes a *distance* from Being. As a *Stimmung*, nostalgia is merely a particular form of world-disclosure, a deliverance from the perpetual self-withdrawal of Being. Thus, Left- and Right-Heidegger are intermingled: Right-Heidegger, whose nostalgia Caputo and Vattimo are quick to dismiss as metaphysical, presents a *Stimmung* made possible by the ontological, non-foundationalist affectivity illuminated by Left-Heidegger.

Nostalgia is in this way a modern expression of *Andenken*. Thinking nostalgia *as nostalgia* illuminates the hermeneutical position in which something at a distance determines our being-in-the-world. The very fact that we long for the good old days, where everything was as it should be,

reveals to us that we are not in control of our being-in-the-world and that our dwelling is originarily affective and thus conditioned by alterity. In Heideggerian hermeneutics, then, we cannot dismiss moods, dispositions and attunements as unsound. Rather, they must be understood as part of the belonging to Being. In the case of nostalgia, it is clear that Heidegger's longing is already part of his belonging to *Gestell* — and thus not something to be dismissed in favour of a full identification with the domination of technology.

5. Earlier we saw that Heidegger called the relation to language for “the ever wordless address of *what is sent to us* [*der stets wörterlose Zuspruch des Zugeschickten*]” My emphasis on *Zugeschickten* points out that this model of affectivity underlies not only Heidegger's conception of language but also history, *Geschick*. In their anti-subjectivist treating of *Geschick* as deliverance and transmission, Caputo and Vattimo clearly see that Being sends messages to the human without itself being fully transparent or comprehensible. The asymmetry of this hermeneutical affectivity implies that we can never fully understand Being, and that no ultimate horizon is possible.

That this asymmetry is at work, whether we realize it or not, might sound disheartening, but Heidegger does indeed believe it to contain an emancipatory potential. This is not in the usual sense of a subjectivist empowering, but as a *Wesensbestimmung*, an essential determination, that sets something free in its own essence, “etwas in sein eigenes Wesen freilassen” (GA 7: 152). In the light of an essential affectivity, the hermeneutical task is a *letting-be* or *setting-free* of something according to its own essence. Another way of putting this is to say that the human can reposition itself in — but not radically alter — its relation to Being *by letting this relation be*. This change, however small, allows us to view our way of belonging to language from a (slightly) less alienating perspective: The human (nominative case) lets Being (accusative case) determine us (dative case) (in the sense of *be-stimmen*). The rest of this article will unfold this relation by articulating what kind of response allows such repositioning, and by emphasizing in what sense this kind of hermeneutic work can be liberating⁶.

The (apparent) passivity inherent in these formulations reflects the vocabulary of the late Heidegger, whose writings are filled with examples of Dasein letting (*lassen*), lingering (*weilen*) and waiting (*warten*). Heidegger even says that Being *uses* (*braucht*) man. To understand this figure requires

6. Ruin (2008) shows that the transition from the early account of willing to the late emphasis on *Gelassenheit* is still philosophically concerned with freedom, despite the fact that Heidegger is no longer explicit about it. One might say that Heidegger no longer wishes to speak *about* [über] freedom, but wishes to speak from out of [von] freedom.

a closer look at Heidegger's characterization of metaphysics as *Gestell*. He develops the thesis that *Gestell* is the essence of technology in the sense of a disclosure of Being through his readings of Nietzsche, "the last metaphysician." It is in this link that the explanation of the term *Freilassen* must be found⁷.

In a description of the relation between Nietzsche and Heidegger's notion of metaphysics, Bret Davis writes:

Heidegger does not simply discredit Nietzsche's delimitation of being as the will to power; on the contrary, he affirms the truth of Nietzsche's thought, but with one crucial qualification: being is determined as (i.e., reveals / conceals itself as) the will to power only at a culminating stage of the epochal history of metaphysics (Davis 2007: 186).

This means that Heidegger does not criticize Nietzsche for being inaccurate in his description of the will to power. Rather, Heidegger takes it to be the perfect description of the disclosure of Being in that particular epoch. As such, it is the predecessor to the domination of technology. This is evident from the way that Heidegger's description of the will to power already draws on the various forms of *stellen* that will later reemerge as *Ge-stell* and the fact that the will to power already discloses Being as a standing reserve (*Bestand*):

To preserve the levels of power which the will has attained at particular times requires that the will surround itself with that [*mit einem Umkreis von solchem umgibt*] which it can reliably and at any time fall back on and from which its security is to be guaranteed. These surroundings enclose the enduring existence, at the immediate disposal of the will, of that which presences [*unmittelbar verfügbaren Bestand an Anwesendem*]. . . . This enduringness [*Beständige*] is however turned into a permanence [*Ständige*], i.e., into that which is [*steht*] constantly at one's disposal [*Verfügung*], only by its being brought to stand by having set it in place [*Stellen zum Stand*]. This placing [*Stellen*] has the nature of a production [*Herstellens*] that re-presents [*vor-stellenden*] (GA 5: 239/179).

When the will to power is a disclosure of Being, our surroundings (*Umkreis*) are seen, not as independent things, but as objects that are at our disposal (*Verfügung*). This way of representing (*Vorstellen*) the world, discloses it as something that is there for the sole purpose of human manipulation

7. The terms *Gelassenheit* and *letting-be* do appear in Heidegger's earlier writings, but here they mean something entirely different. According to Guignon, the passivity of the terms designate a "powerless" consideration of one's own limitation and finitude that serves to enable an "empowerment" in the form of "the ability to make meaningful choices" (Guignon 2011: 97). This form of *letting-be* is thus primarily understood from the perspective of Dasein's care-structure. In the later writings, this will be seen as insufficient because of its proximity to subjectivism and its reliance on the metaphysics of the will.

and production (*Herstellen*). The world is thus a “standing reserve” (*Bestand*) waiting for us to call it forth to be consumed and manipulated (GA 5: 288). It merely waits for us to order (*bestellen*) it — as in a giant warehouse. *Gestell* — a term for the connection between *Vorstellen*, *Bestellen* and *Herstellen* — is thus a result of the domination of the will (cfr. GA 7: 21).

This means that Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is not merely a critique of technology, Being as presence or the forgetting of the ontological difference. As Davis convincingly argues, Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is, furthermore, a critique of the metaphysics of the will. Technology, then, is merely a continuation of Nietzsche’s will to power with the only, but crucial, addition that the human is not the firm basis for the willful disclosure of the world, but, rather, incorporated into the technological will to will and made into a *human resource* (*Menschenmaterial*) through what Heidegger calls “cybernetics” (DAVIS 2007: 178ff).

The will is metaphysical, insofar as it reduces the world (ultimately, including humans) to a constant reserve. Hermeneutics — whose primary function is to counter the grasp that metaphysics has on our understanding — must try to find a way out of the domain of the will. *Freilassen* and the related term *Gelassenheit* (often translated as releasement) are to be understood in this context. This is pointed out in “Zur Erörterung der *Gelassenheit*,” where Heidegger in the form of a dialogue writes:

Scientist: Then releasement [*Gelassenheit*] lies — if we may use the word *lie* — beyond the distinction between activity and passivity. . .

Scholar: . . . because releasement does not belong to the domain of the will (G: 33/61).

Gelassenheit is a term supposed to point beyond the historical–cultural horizons given in particular deliverances of *Geschick* and thus to bring to attention the affective relation between human and Being. *Gelassenheit* points towards the realm that *gives* these particular horizons. With an old word for region, Heidegger calls it *die Gegend*: „Strictly speaking, a region for everything is not one region among many, but *the region* of all regions [*die Gegend aller Gegenden*]” (G: 38/65, my emphasis). *Die Gegend* is the open realm in which Being happens, i.e., in which something *comes towards* us (*uns entgegenkommt*). *Die Gegend* is the event–like nature of Being that renders strong structures of Being — i.e., the identification between a particular horizon and the “region of all regions” — impossible.

The point of *Gelassenheit*, then, and its reliance on the term *lassen* (letting) is that *die Gegend* cannot be illuminated by an act of willing, because willing relies on the very metaphysics that *die Gegend* seeks to undo. Thus, Heidegger emphasizes on several occasions in the dialogue the opposition

between the hermeneutics of *Gelassenheit* and the will, e.g. “[w]hen we let ourselves into releasement to that–which–regions [*die Gelassenheit zur Gegend*], we will non–willing [*das Nicht–Wollen*]” and “[w]e are to do nothing but wait” (G: 57/79, 35/62). It is crucial to note, however, that Heidegger’s call for a “Nicht–Wollen” is not a mere renunciation, denial or negation of the will that results in a kind of passivity. The dichotomy between activity and passivity is entirely within the domain of the will. On the contrary, when he says that all we can do is to wait, Heidegger aims at something that lies *before* this dichotomy.

Admittedly, Heidegger’s thought is difficult to follow at this point, but a remark from the protocol to Heidegger’s famous lecture “Zeit und Sein” might clear things up a bit. In what can be understood as an elaboration of this sort of non–willing, Heidegger says that his usage of “*lassen*” relates to the term “*Anwesen–Lassen*”, letting–presence, which must not be understood metaphysically as a letting *something* (i.e. a being) become present, but rather a letting be of *presence itself* (GA 14: 47). *Gelassenheit* is a way of letting presencing itself be and not just a particular being. This entails that the repositioning that Heidegger’s hermeneutics calls for remains within the realm of presence, *Anwesen*, and thus within experience, *Erfahrung* (GA 14: 63)⁸.

This is the point Reiner Schürmann is getting at with his distinction between “economies of presence” and “the event of presencing” (Schürmann 1987: 63). The former designates the “aletheiological constellation” of a given epoch, i.e., the ordering and disclosure of beings at a given time, while the latter is an expression of *die Gegend* that cannot be reduced to such a constellation. *Dasein*, however, is essentially bound to (that is, *belongs to*) such a horizon, which is why Heidegger needs a way of ‘pointing towards’ *die Gegend* from inside an epochal constellation. Heidegger, then, is in need of a method in order to illuminate this place where Being happens, and this is what is at stake in his engagement with the philosophical and lyrical tradition. Schürmann describes it as a “deconstruction” of the economies of presence and explains that Heidegger’s

interpretations do not in the least intend to lead us back to some Greek golden age beyond an alleged metaphysical interlude. . . . The modalities of presence are unfolded from the fold where we people of the twentieth century are lodged (*ibid.*: 284f).

The interpretations of the Greeks, Hölderlin, etc. are not strong metaphysical claims but attempts to show the affective relation between human

8. This comes as no surprise, since the quote from *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* already stated: “[T]his ‘one is in such and such a way’ is not — is never — simply a consequence or side–effect of our *thinking, doing, and acting* [*Denkens, Tuns und Lassens*]. It is — to put it crudely — the *presupposition for such things*.” (GA 29–30: 101/67f, my emphasis)

and Being by bringing to attention that Being has been disclosed differently throughout history. Heidegger's alleged anti-modernism then is an attempt to unfold a different 'modality of presence' or, as I prefer to put it, mode of experience (*Erfahrung*).

The terms *Freilassen* and *Gelassenheit* are emancipatory in the sense that they designate a *setting-free of experience*. This is how Heidegger proposes an *emancipation beyond empowerment*, since the categories of experience and presencing are *prior* to the notions of acting and willing. Hence it sounds rather strange to speak of experience in terms of activity/passivity. Instead, and this is the way that Being *needs* and *uses* man, Dasein cor-responds to Being through its experience. To correspond to *die Gegend* (the distance to the self-withdrawal of Being) and not just the epochal constellation of *Gestell* requires an openness to different modes of experience, and this I take to be the sole aim of Heidegger's hermeneutics. In a certain sense, it can be seen as a continuation of the "destruction" proclaimed by the early Heidegger aimed at the understanding of Being as the beingness of what is present (*Anwesenden*). Different modes of experience call for a more nuanced notion of presence or nearness (*Nähe*). This is why Heidegger in the end of the text on *Gelassenheit* summarizes it through Heraclitus' single word fragment *an-chibasie*, which he translates as "In-die-Nähe-gehen," going-into-nearness. This is a term for the essence of thinking that Heidegger tries to advocate, and it is inspired by another summarizing sentence: "That-which-regions [*Die Gegnet*] itself would be the nearness of distance [*die Nähe der Ferne*] and the distance of nearness [*die Ferne der Nähe*]" (G: 66/86). Contrary to *Gestell*, which discloses beings as a *constant* reserve (as something *beständig*) and limits what is real to the constant presence of what is at our disposal, Heidegger wishes to show how the remote (that is not at our disposal) is. By opening other modes of experience Heidegger challenges the metaphysics of the will by showing that *there are things*, which are not merely objects for our manipulation and consummation.

If my understanding of Heidegger's non-willing and the emancipation of experience is correct, we arrive at a deeper understanding of the problem with the postmodern critique and development of his hermeneutics. The distinction between a non-foundationalist Left-Heidegger and a foundationalist Right-Heidegger relies on the misinterpretation that Heidegger actually *wants* to return to the Greeks. Thus, it fails to take his *Nicht-Wollen* into account. The same problem arises when we consider the political dimension of the postmodern hermeneutics: Here, hermeneutics is employed in order to *enable* philosophy to counter either discursive hegemonies (Caputo) or the conservatism of politico-metaphysical realism (Vattimo). Thus, it remains within the metaphysics of the will.

Caputo's terminology, *prima facie*, offers some resistance to this interpre-

tation, since he explicitly aligns his “ethics of dissemination” with the term *Gelassenheit* (CAPUTO 1987: 264ff). For Caputo, *Gelassenheit* means the play of interpretations that will solidify into a hegemony when put into system, and thus, as we saw earlier, the task of the hermeneutic ‘double-agent’ is to infiltrate an institution or discourse in order to free other interpretations from within. Caputo’s figure of the double agent, however, reveals that his notion of *Gelassenheit* in no way resembles Heidegger’s *Nicht-Wollen*. The double agent is, literally, not exempt from willing, but rather bound up in a play between two greater instances of willing. He seeks to do the bidding of a foreign agency and thus operates with a hidden agenda. In Caputo’s case the double agent is — admittedly — not loyal to a *particular* foreign agency, but seeks rather to align himself with *whoever* is *not* in charge. This, however, does not amount to a *Nicht-Wollen*, but rather a form a renegade double agency that supports *any will except the dominating*. Instead of escaping the metaphysics of the will, Caputo’s double agent is *loyal to willing as such*⁹.

Likewise, Vattimo and Zabala do not imagine the hermeneutic emancipation in the form of a *Nicht-Wollen*. Their weakening of Marx, for example, designates a weak and spectral communism without scientific claims and without the strong dominion and monopoly of truth seen in the Soviet Union (Vattimo and Zabala 2011: 114). Thus, they reinterpret the communistic promise of a society “without classes” as a society “without dominion” (*ibid.*: 116). The political consequence of nihilistic hermeneutics is thus clearly an attempt to subvert the dominating power or will of a society that seeks to exchange the one unique truth with a “plurality of conversations” (*ibid.*: 106). As such this kind of weak thought implies an empowerment of marginalized groups.

The politics of postmodern hermeneutics, then, can be encapsulated by the formulation that it does not want *Non-Willing*, as Heidegger did, but rather the *particularization* of the (dominating) Will. This difference is crucial for the assessment of how to read Heidegger’s nostalgia. If we operate within the metaphysics of the will, nostalgia will appear as a dangerous, political anti-modernism that run-counter to any attempts of pluralizing our society by allowing more discourses to appear. If, however, as I have argued in this paper following Davis and Schürmann, we understand the metaphysics of the will to be part of what must be countered, nostalgia is — when understood *as nostalgia* — liberating insofar as it seeks to set free a different mode of experience, which might just bring about a glimpse of *die Gegend*.

9. Furthermore, Davis argues — based on Caputo’s reading of Meister Eckhart’s *Gelassenheit* that positions it well inside Christian orthodoxy — that Caputo falls back into not only an “ontology of presence but also into a theology of will,” when he suggests that the point of *Gelassenheit* is to identify oneself with the (transcendent) will of God. (DAVIS 2007: 335n27)

Nostalgia is in this sense, contrary to mythophilia, an example of the kind of hermeneutic work, where our conception of the world is nuanced through multiple modes of experience. It is not a willfull metaphysical longing for the full presence of Being, but a world-disclosing attunement. Borrowing phrases from Davis' reading of the German *Umstimmung* (DAVIS 2007: 200), we can say that Heidegger's engagement with the past, his so called 'anti-modernism' and his nostalgia are not an attempt to *return*, but to *retune*. The affective hermeneutics seeks — through readings, discussions and contrasts — to *retune* our understanding and *show* (rather than merely talk about) that different modes of experience are possible. What it sets free is thus not a willful subject striving for power, but rather experience itself. By setting experience free, the affective hermeneutics allows things and worlds that are excluded by *Gestell* to be.

6. If we consider the affectivity that underlies the late Heidegger's notions of language and history by emphasizing the intrinsic link between our hermeneutical belongingness (*Zugehörigkeit*) and our attunements (*Stimmungen*), any postmodern attempts to save Heidegger from himself by making a distinction between his progressive non-foundationalism and his reactionary, nostalgic foundationalism seem rather odd. If attunements (as Heidegger implies) are essential to hermeneutics, it cannot be right that we must rigorously dismiss the attunement of Heidegger's own writing.

Against such attempts I argue that Heidegger's nostalgia is in fact an expression of the emancipatory potential of his hermeneutics. As an attunement, nostalgia must not be understood as a willfull, metaphysical longing for the full presence of Being, but as a world-disclosing mode of experience. As such, it falls under the hermeneutic work that Heidegger designates with the terms *Freilassen* and *Gelassenheit*. These terms, I suggest, indicate a hermeneutic attempt to set experience free from the grasp of metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger, includes the domain of the will, since willing (as a world-disclosure) merely posits beings as objects for manipulation.

As I shown with Vattimo and Caputo, weak thought correctly and importantly refuses to identify Being with any particular horizon because of the ontological affectivity between Being and man. I believe, however, that weak thought should be made even weaker. It should not merely oppose itself to objectivity, universality and truth, but also the will. This means that the possibility of an emancipatory hermeneutics does not rely on the empowerment of a subject, but, rather, on an openness to affects; not on a stronger or higher notion of will, but on a heightened disposition to let things be and receive what is given by Being. What is usually considered

a reactionary nostalgia in the late Heidegger, must be reinterpreted as a hermeneutical work that seeks to set attunements free — and thus to make different modes of world–disclosure possible.

Bibliography

- CAPUTO, J.D., 1987, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- , 1993, *Demythologizing Heidegger*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- GUIGNON, C., 2011, “Heidegger’s concept of freedom, 1927–1930, in *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, Dahlstrom, Daniel O. (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- DAVIS, B.W., 2007, *Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit*, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- HEIDEGGER, M., [G], 1959, *Gelassenheit*, Pfullingen: Neske; English translation by Anderson, John M., Freund, Hans, *Discourse on Thinking. A Translation of Gelassenheit*, New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- , [GA 4], 1981, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 4: Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung [1971]*, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann; English translation by Hoeller, Keith, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2000.
- , [GA 5], 1994, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 5: Holzwege [1950]*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann; English translation by Young, Julian, Haynes, Kenneth, *Off the Beaten Track*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- , [GA 7], 2000, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 7: Vorträge Und Aufsätze [1954]*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
- , [GA 14], 2007, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 14: Zur Sache des Denkens [1969]*, Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann.
- , [GA 29–30], 1983, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 29–30: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann; English translation by McNeill, William, Walker, Nicholas, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- , [SZ], 2006, *Sein und Zeit [1927]*, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- , [UzS], 2001, *Unterwegs zur Sprache [1959]*, Pfullingen: Neske.
- MALPAS, J., 2012, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being*, Boston: MIT Press.
- RUIN, H., 2008, “The Destiny of Freedom: In Heidegger” in *Continental Philosophy Review* 41 (3).

- SCHÜRMAN, R., 1987, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy* [1982], Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- VATTIMO, G., 1988, *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-Modern Culture* [1985], Cambridge: Polity Press.
- , 1993, *The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy After Nietzsche and Heidegger* [1980], Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- , 1997, *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy* [1994], Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- VATTIMO, G. and ZABALA, S., 2011, *Hermeneutic Communism: From Heidegger to Marx*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- ZABALA, S., 2009, *The Remains of Being: Hermeneutic Ontology after Metaphysics*, New York: Columbia University Press.