## Derrida for the World Economic Forum

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ABSTRACT: In this paper we question the World Economic Forum and its Global Agenda Council on Values regarding the effectiveness of their new Social Covenant, with corporations and institutions, workers therein, and the larger world. From my early contact with Derrida's work, and as a member of the Council I argue for a renewal of the epistemological, not only for workers and victims of the current state of affaire, but also of those at the top, intellectuals, politicians and the corporate sector. We must supplement the one–size–fits–all toolkit–culture of problem solving and work to rearrange the desires of the highly diversified populations of the world. Derrida's work helps us consolidate the argument that Humanities education can be this supplement. The possibility of receiving this help becomes harder if Derrida's work is niched back into disciplinary discourse.

KEYWORDS: rearrangement of desire; uninstrumentalizable ethics; philosophy of education; Marx; Balibar; Gramsci.

Derrida has been niche—marketed in the academy. Nobody in a policy—making situation can pay attention to his work. In terms of making an effect on today's economically devastated world, I believe Derrida would express an anguish similar to that expressed in *Rogues*, the last book of his published during his lifetime, regarding writing on democracy:

I have not yet told you what was, in fact, the double "preliminary question" that, simultaneously, at the same time or by turns, has been torturing me ever since I began to prepare for this *décade* [the 10–day conference where the book was pesented verbally]. To speak democratically of democracy, it would be, to speak on/to *the subject of democracy*, to speak in an intelligible, univocal, and *sensible* fashion of democracy, to make oneself understood by *anyone* who can hear the word or the sentences that one makes with the word.

In the economic context, the text would not have to speak intelligibly to *quiconque*, just anyone, but economists who can affect the world. In *Rogues* Derrida goes on to complicate matters with superb rhetoric—in—logic. I cannot make those moves, but also will not, for reasons given below. My

I. J. Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale–Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 2005, p. 105; translation modified.

own complaint to Derrida was made on the last occasion we performed together, as follows:

I know you have chastised me in print for misreading you on Marx. I haven't read those pages for fear of being hurt. But I must insist on the difference between industrial capital, predicated upon the difference between making and needing; commercial capital, the appearance of money begetting money; and finance capital, competitive markets in negotiable instruments, where capital moves *mit Gedankenschnelle* (with the speed of thought); and the movement of data — telecommunication — is indistinguishable from the circuit of capital. Surplus value is not interest, use value is not usefulness. I repeat this litany not because I'm right, but because I am obstinate<sup>2</sup>.

His response to me was most affectionate. My original title had been *Touched by Deconstruction*. Just before the actual event I, like many others, was overwhelmed by Derrida's book *On Touching* — *Jean–Luc Nancy*<sup>3</sup>. I therefore said on that occasion, recalling Jacques Lacan's description of the subject in the field of vision, that I would think of myself as *une forme tachée* — a stained (in) form on the field of deconstruction<sup>4</sup>. Derrida generously reminded the audience that *la tache* had another meaning in French — task — and dubbed me the task of/in deconstruction. Whatever that means, I would rather think of myself as such than bear the "third world" label<sup>5</sup>. *De la grammatologie* carries the word "ethnocentrism" on its first page<sup>6</sup>. It was 1967 when I opened the book. I had never seen the word before. A formed task of deconstruction, then. Take what follows in that spirit. An account of Derrida *aimé/mangé* showing up, nourishing, in a serious attempt to rearrange desires in some economic masters.

I write from South Africa, where I have just participated in a regional meeting of the World Economic Forum, as a member of the Global Agenda Council on Values, which has proposed a New Social Covenant. It is an assembly of powerful people in the global economic, political, and financial sectors and they can make change. These are the *quiconque*—s at the top.

The evening before the actual Forum meeting began, I was supposed, I had thought, to give a full–scale talk in the Department of Philosophy. (In

- 2. G.C. Spivak, Touched by Deconstruction, «Grey Room» 20 (Summer 2005), p. 101.
- 3. J. Derrida, *On Touching, Jean—Luc Nancy*, trans. Christine Irizarry, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005.
- 4. J. LACAN, The Split Between the Eye and the Gaze, in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed. Jacques–Alain Miller, New York, Norton, 1977), p. 74.
- 5. Like many others, I think the "third world" ceased to exist as such almost immediately after its formation. See N. Harris, *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of An Ideology*, New York, Meredith Press, 1986.
- 6. J. Derrida,  $\it Of\ Grammatology$ , trans. G.C. Spivak, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976, p. 3.

the event, and to my surprise, I merely had a desultory chat with six white female faculty members in English, Afrikaans, and Philosophy, over dinner, moderated by an altogether charming white—haired white male dean.)

Yet, obsessed by the sort of anguish Derrida teaches us in *Rogues* (Ch. 7), I had really wanted to touch these corporate people, as well as the Value Council. Nine months before the meeting I wrote to the New York Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP):

## Philosophy and the World Economic Forum

I am a member of the Global Agenda Council on Values of the World Economic Forum. Generally, humanities professors, even when called, do not attend the meetings, I think because of the infantile procedures of knowledge management techniques in coming to important decisions. I myself feel that in order to affect global policy, we must attempt to create a compromise between the conviction that knowledge management is the best way to produce results and the more complex preparation for both accountability and, beyond that responsibility, and, perhaps even unconditional ethics7. I will be attending one of the regional meetings of this council in South Africa and, quite independently, because the local Council member is an academic (not in the humanities, although formerly so, choosing a more lucrative discipline in graduate school), I have been invited by the philosophy department of his university to present a paper. This gives me an opportunity to think through these questions at the same time as I will be attending the council meetings themselves, where I am not one of the most persuasive members, although tolerated gracefully, in a minority of one. I tried to bring the two approaches together in a speech where I was asked to comment on the usefulness of Marx in the current century, but I think I was too enthusiastic about the WEF, although even then I was careful enough to point at the problems. I should add that my own convictions, as opposed to those of the enthusiasts for knowledge management, are based on teaching the humanities as a vehicle for the rearrangement of desires in the United States for nearly fifty years and training teachers among the landless illiterate in a backward area of West Bengal, India, in the interest of the insertion of the intuitions of democracy in the children of the largest sector of the electorate, for nearly thirty years. I think trying it out at NYSWIP would be particularly challenging and useful for me, because of the fact that in my work, certain convictions generated by early contact with the work of Jacques Derrida has been repeatedly tested and what remains seems to be practically useful. I hope this abstract, although not 750 words, will be persuasive for you, and you will give me a chance to address you and be instructed. Thank you.

(I should mention here that, at the South African meeting that is just over, no one, in spite of the provision of white paper stands and colored magic markers, seemed interested in using them for the typical knowledge management production of solutions. There were repeated calls for "mess.")

<sup>7.</sup> I remain haunted by Derrida's warning against a self-congratulatory "ethical" instrumentalization of his work, J. Derrida, *Passions: 'An Oblique Offering'*, in David Wood (ed.), *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1992, p. 9.

I produced a first draft for SWIP where I was quite unable to bring together my deconstructive intuitions and my sense of audience at the Philosophy department abroad. (I remind you that that audience did not materialize.) Seven months later, and quite desperate to hit the right note, I took the Global Marx? piece (about to be translated into Spanish but with no English publication commissioned), took out the reading of Etienne Balibar, expunged the Marxist language without seriously compromising my position, and devised something that might fly, although we must continue to remember that the foreign exchange tax might not fly. Since that letter never arrived at its destination. I redirect it here, with Balibar reading and Marxist language restored. Please remember this as you think of Derrida's availability to the hard core bankers, the quiconques at the top. With the impossible motto of "human dignity, common good, and stewardship of the planet," the Council on Values has the bankers' ears. By contrast, the Occupiers and informal marketeers are not into the austere rigor of Derrida on the economy/economic either. I am involved at both ends and want to masquerade as William Blake's Idiot Questioner<sup>8</sup>.

In the meantime, I got a request for a blog on the Covenant and some reassuring words from a smart associate director. I put the blog and a bit I added when I was supposed to address a general group at the very beginning of the conference, as my second exergue:

## Staking a claim to improve the world

The World Economic Forum is dedicated to improving the world. We cannot improve our world top down. Our New Social Covenant has potential for realizing this. Its itemized list calls for the re-arrangement of desires. For it begins with "agreement on basic, universal ethical values" and continues with "the promotion of human well-being, happiness, flourishing and equality of freedom to live a valued life," although it also imposes practical tasks. These last are directed towards corporate and nation state policy makers and may be done by other methods, but even here the desires at the top must be generally rearranged so that the prime emphasis changes in turn from sustaining economic development. And the broad ones — the philosophical ones — definitely require going beyond usual knowledge management techniques. Perhaps we should have separated them into two different categories. One talking the talk (basic human values), the other walking the walk ("good" jobs for non-graduates; strong technical education opportunities; apprentice schemes, a pro-active tax and incentive system and 21st century industrial strategy). One cannot walk the walk by merely agreeing to do so. It is a collective decision, not merely something enforced from the top. You have to learn the habit of thinking about other people as equal though not same, comparable to the relationship between the reading pupil and the one who produced the literary work.

<sup>8.</sup> World Economic Forum, *Outlook on the Global Agenda 2014* Report, p. 44b. Available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\_GAC\_GlobalAgendaOutlook\_2014.pdf.

I am thinking of the production of Derrida's notion of the "New International" here, although the palliative language for the *quiconques* at the top makes it almost unrecognizable<sup>9</sup>. I am thinking of the protocol of the "how many are we?" in *Politics of Friendship* and betraying the language requirement as I go along; to make my Derrida — not the right one, but where is there such a thing? — speak to the economic; I must avoid being patronized as a tenured radical or dismissed, as I so often am, as a great speaker but incomprehensible<sup>10</sup>.

Let me explain the statement above about the relationship between the reading pupil and the one who produced the literary work. I am a teacher of literature as well as a member of the Council on Values, so perhaps I emphasize literary reading too much. But I have also given time and skill (not just money and site—visits) for thirty years, training teachers and children at six small elementary schools established by me among the landless illiterate Dalits in western West Bengal. So however impractical I may seem, hear me out.

Normally our desire is to do things ourselves or for ourselves. In good literary teaching, the student is taught carefully to hang out in the space of the other — understand what s/he confronts in terms of the unknown person who wrote what s/he confronts. This hanging out is also the secret of the ethical and the democratic. One has to stay with it, not follow easy steps so that one can say "I have helped you." We at the Council have begun with one teaching module, and I hope we will proceed to many others. The long-term implementation of our Covenant's values, in addition to persuading CEO-s and heads of state, calls for the teaching of the humanities at all levels and in all places so that the desire for social justice, spelled out in the various items of the Covenants, rather than only be taken for granted if one joins up, can inhabit souls long-term, not always susceptible to evaluation by checking statistically how each item on a list is institutionally fulfilled. Are these positions, I ask the readership of this collection, implicit in the University in the Eyes of its Pupils, in Mochlos, in Of the Humanities and the Discipline of Philosophy?<sup>11</sup>

With respect, religion, when mobilized for good, also opens itself up to producing the opposite. It encourages a sort of belief that often leads

<sup>9.</sup> G.C. SPIVAK, A Note on the New International, «parallax» 20 (July-September 2001), p. 12–16.

<sup>10.</sup> G.C. Spivak, Schmitt and Post–Structuralism: A Response, «Cardozo Law Review» 21.5–6 (May 2000), p. 1723–1737.

II. J. Derrida, University in the Eyes of Its Pupils, «Diacritics» 13, 3 (Autumn 1983), p. 2–20; Id., Mochlos: or The Conflict of the Faculties, in Richard Rand (ed.), Logomachia, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1992, p. 1–34; Id., Of the Humanities and the Discipline of Philosophy, «Surfaces» 4 (1994), p. 8–20.

to the expectation of results by following a kind of spiritual toolkit<sup>12</sup>. We teachers of the humanities — literature and philosophy — at our best train the imagination into knowing ourselves differently, and knowing the world differently, so that we want to do the good things contained in the Covenant rather than have to be checked following enforcement.

If religion is belief in faith, knowledge is management.

"Why is there such an upsurge of interest in knowledge?" asks Laurence Prusak, editor of Knowledge in Organizations and cites the Pre-Socratics<sup>13</sup>. Such a question ignores the plain fact that the word "knowledge" has changed since the Pre-Socratics. (There was of course no English at that time. And, if we are thinking the world, we must — absolutely — remember the many languages that make meaning for its peoples. As a doctor working in Kenya who refuses to be a top-down health worker remarked: "The people will understand Swahili, but you can't speak to their heart unless you speak their language: 'I'm getting what you're saying, but I'm not taking it in." That is a basic human value: talking to the heart. If you think it is inconvenient, as it is, indeed, don't dream of improving the world.) (I am thinking of the exhortation to translate in Rogues)14. Our new Social Covenant, at least in the ethical rather than the merely responsible sections, understands that real knowledge depends on cooking the soul with slow learning, not the instant soup of a one-size-fits all toolkit. The world is not populated by humanoid drones. You cannot produce a toolkit for "a moral metric," or if you do you will be disappointed.

The needs I have described are reflected in the world–famous journalist Thomas L. Friedman's recent mistake in the *New York Times*. He writes about the difference between 2013 (when the New Social Covenant was imagined) and the world of today, 2014: «the world of disorder is expanding against the world of order», he writes. He mentions «refugee children from collapsing Central American countries», «major Ebola outbreak in West Africa [...] straining governments», «jihadists carving out a [...] caliphate inside Iraq and Syria», Russia «eat[ing] Crimea [and] taking more bites out of Ukraine», and cites the United Nations announcement that «the number of refugees, asylum–seekers and internally displaced people worldwide has, for the first time in the post–World War II era, exceeded 50 million people»<sup>15</sup>. I have traveled since mid–May in Turkey, Austria, France, the United Kingdom,

<sup>12.</sup> Here I vulgarize Derrida's rereading of Kant's view of religion's Nebengeschäfte in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in J. Derrida, Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, in Gil Anidjar (ed.), Acts of Religion, New York, Routledge, 2002, p. 83.

<sup>13.</sup> L. Prusak (ed.), Knowledge in Organizations, Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1997.

<sup>14.</sup> Cf. J. DERRIDA, Rogues, op. cit., p. 159.

<sup>15.</sup> T.L. Friedman, Order vs. Disorder, part 3, «International New York Times» (06/25/14), p. 7.

Poland, and India; perhaps with the exception of Poland, I could add the rise of right—wing governments to Friedman's list; South Africa could add its own.

After citing his list, Friedman makes a major mistake. He correctly describes "freedom from" as national independence. But he incorrectly describes "freedom to" as «the freedom to live your life, speak your mind, start your own political party, build your own business, vote for any candidate, pursue happiness, and be yourself, whatever your sexual, religious or political orientation». This is a good American list. But this list is based on the more fundamental freedom to think of dissimilar others as equal. This is the profound contradiction within democracy: autonomy (freedom from), liberty; and others (freedom to), equality: us and them. This is why I chose, in my own home state of West Bengal, as title for the last Netaji oration: "Freedom *After* Independence?" Freedom to, after Freedom from. Our New Social Covenant wants to perform that movement and therefore requires the literary — as training for the ethical — as a method.

The contradiction at the heart of the literary is laid out by Derrida in an interview with Derek Attridge $^{16}$ .

For ethics as such cannot be practiced *after* business, or the business of medicine—as—triage has been sustained. Ethics are unconditional. Our real challenge is to combine the unconditionality of ethics — faith—based — and the conditions of the contract. Samir Haddad has written most perceptively about the play of the unconditional and conditionality in *Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy*<sup>17</sup>.

The following example shows us the politico–economic provenance of the global "rule of law." My own sense of the marginal was enhanced by Derrida's reminder in 1968<sup>18</sup> and related to his anguish in *Rogues* to make himself understood by anyone.

Many of us have seen a picture, which apparently is no longer being used by Care.org, of a stunningly beautiful African woman, dressed in cloth, with the caption "I am powerful." I recently wanted to cite the picture in the interest of arguing the limits of equality—thinking. In addition to the question of permission to cite, there arose a question of permission from the individuals photographed. The academic radical niche was thus exposed to its own absurdity.

<sup>16.</sup> J. Derrida, This Strange Institution Called Literature, in D. Attridge (ed.), Acts of Literature, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 3–75.

<sup>17.</sup> S. Haddad, Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2013.

<sup>18.</sup> I am thinking here of J. Derrida, *The Ends of Man*, «Philosophy & Phenomenological Research» 30, I (1969), pp. 31–57, p. 32, where there one can find a passage about there being people who cannot imagine an academic colloquium.

The woman is a refugee and cannot be located. She herself may be adrift in the world, but her case is still imprisoned in "the rule of law" where intellect is property. Her representation demanded non–exclusive permission for all future editions of the book, in all formats and in all languages for distribution throughout the world, and for inclusion of excerpts from the book that might appear in advertising, publicity, and promotional materials for the book, for example Amazon's Search Inside the Book.

Kant says that global right can be rationally if not amicably practiced between «all those of the earth's peoples who can enter into active relations with one another [and it] is not something philanthropic (ethical), but a *rights*–related principle»<sup>19</sup>. Active relations, *wirksam* in the original, which reminds the reader of the more common word *wirklich* — real. There was no real continuity — no active relationship — between the woman in the photograph and my audience, the readership of the book, or the people in charge of the "rule of law." She is still lost.

The "rule of law" arises because barriers between national capital and global capital are removed, and the state is run to manage the global economy, rather than to look after its citizens. Once again, *political* economy, not economy as such.

I resonate with Gramsci's interest in the production of the subaltern intellectual. That project relates to his understanding of Marx's undertaking to be gnoseological. My resonance with the idea of the "New International" and the tending of a collectivity in "How many are we?" — already mentioned — made me move "gnoseological" to an unrestricted epistemological task. As Derrida has often done, I lodged myself in the space between translations. I cannot tell if this was "influence." You judge.

Gramsci writes in Notebook 10:

The proposition contained in the *Preface* to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*<sup>20</sup> to the effect that men acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as an affirmation of gnoseological [gnoseologico] and not simply psychological and moral value. From this, it follows that the theoretical–practical principle of hegemony has also gnoseological significance. [...] The realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge. [...] When one succeeds in introducing a new morality in conformity with a new conception of the world, one finishes by

<sup>19.</sup> I. Kant, *Political Writings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 172; translation modified. It is important to keep in mind that in *Rogues*, the last book published during his lifetime, Derrida warned that Kant could not serve as a solution in contemporary globality.

<sup>20.</sup> K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Maurice Dobb, London, International Publishers, 1979.

introducing the conception as well; in other words, one determines a reform of the whole of philosophy<sup>2I</sup>.

Our general idea about Marxism is a change in governance, dependent upon regime change, the will and wisdom of a leader, supported by a responsible government. What we have seen over the last hundred years is that the success of the system depends a great deal on the power of the people — either in education or resistance — in conjunction with the capacity of the head of state to protect his or her national economy, in the interest of redistribution from the incursions of the global economy.

This model did not work in the great revolutions of the 20th century, because the immensely diversified populations of Russia and China, the two great mammoths of Eurasia, were not equally resistant or educated. They, as well as the Balkans, were too dependent upon charismatic leaders, and their idea of gender empowerment was too mechanical.

Today, that model — charismatic leader and resistant or motivated population — is threatened by the impersonal anti–humanist selective absolutism of global capitalism. The supposedly well–educated peoples of the European socialist or social–democratic sector are either remodeling the resources of the welfare state in reaction against what is elegantly called the "visible minorities," engendered by the sweeping migration and labor export brought on by the vicious inequalities and violence/corruption attendant in turn upon the abstract march of capital harnessed to unregulated greed; and/or manipulating the ekphrastic or miniature globality of the European "Union," a collection of debtor and creditor states.

Marx knew the ways of capital, even if he did not know our worldly modernity. As I have already pointed out, Marx's prediction, that capital, if it could, would want to move at the speed of thought is today fulfilled. With the silicon chip, capital can in fact move at a speed greater than that of thought, since the neuro–ethicists can so far only describe how the brain behaves in the modes of right and wrong. They have not been able to upgrade the computer in the head, although, silicon technologists affirm that the newest model robots (which are called something other than "drones") can be programmed for empathy. Bio–intervention for criminal–tracking, medical support and such, have been in place for some time. No doubt the head will upload. My words may therefore be contingent.

What escapes the program is the contingent as such. The pursuit of the contingent is the edge of the technological will to power through

<sup>21.</sup> A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Noell–Smith, New York, International Publishers, 1972, p. 365.

knowledge. However, the power to be surprised by the contingent is now becoming less and less available because the global disincentive for imaginative training.

Let us go back to Gramsci's comment: «Marx's proposition [...] should be considered as an affirmation of gnoseological value». 'Gnoseological'—in the logic of gnosis, knowing; a word–fragment that is still in colloquial English use in diagnosis, prognosis, and similar words related to healing or the impossibility of healing — can, then, contain the double bind of healing. The Italian political philosopher Michele Spanò writes:

Actually between *gnoseologico* and 'epistemological' there is no difference. *Gnoseologico* is more "old fashioned" than *epistemologico*; I mean: any analytic Italian philosopher [as opposed to earlier traditions] would by no means use *epistemologico*. More generally, I would say that if we are talking of a contemporary text, the translation of 'epistemological' will be *epistemologico/a* for sure<sup>22</sup>.

Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell–Smith translate Gramsci's *gnoseologico* as 'epistemological.' «Actually between *gnoseologico* and 'epistemological' there is no difference». Yet they are two different words, gnoseological in an older tradition which is "continental" for us, itself tacitly affirming a metonymic "Europe" as origin. Spanò's final piece of evidence, which tacitly affirms the Anglo–Saxon as philosophical origin, is a back–translation with English as the "original." Therefore their so–called identity is a heterotautology. It is in that difference–as–identity of a smooth translation that I will place the globalizability of Marx today. The reader will recall the analyses of the heterotautology in «the wholly other is wholly other»<sup>23</sup>.

'Gnoseological' in diagnosis and prognosis carries the double bind<sup>24</sup> of healing as the impossibility of healing; let us extend this from the individual to collective social abnormalities. In any extended discussion of the double bind, we would have to bring in the question of the female appropriation of phallocentrism. (I make this mysterious remark here because I first knew Juan O'barrio — the initiator of "Global Marx?" and its translator — when he was a student in my course on Jacques Derrida's *Glas*, where the male double bind or *double bande* was part of the problematic)<sup>25</sup>.

Here suffice it to say that Gramsci recognizes that Marx wishes to in-

- 22. Unpublished electronic communication.
- 23. J. DERRIDA, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 83.
- 24. For those unfamiliar with "double bind": let us call it «living within equally insistent contradictory instructions».
- 25. J. Derrida, *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavey, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1990. My first reading of *Glas* is captured in *Glas-piece: A Compte-rendu*, «Diacritics» 22 (1977), p. 22–43, the only piece of mine for which I got praise from both de Man ("you've got Jacques's game") and Derrida ("l'objet est superbe").

troduce the worker into the double bind of the contamination of manual labor by intellectual labor, not only the knowledge of the technology of capital, but its gnoseology; so that any worker could become a "dirigent," and "real–ize" (*verwirklichen*) a new hegemonic apparatus, a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge, introduce a new morality<sup>26</sup>. The revolution is not only economic. Dictatorship ("dictating" the priorities of socialization) must be intertextual (folded together) with the pedagogic founding of a new hegemony. This is the task of the new intellectual in the Party as well as in civil society. Leadership training — a phrase that seems to be acceptable in globality. Or is it? When *any* worker can be a dirigent? A re–formulation of the petty bourgeois ideology from everyone a potential capitalist to every worker a dictator (dictating agent) of social priorities. This essay is concerned with a possible re–formulation for the current conjuncture. Via Derrida.

Marx's Preface was written in 1859. The body of A Contribution was written between 1861-63. This was as much a preparation for Capital volume I as was the multilingual notebooks known as the Grundrisse that were first published in 1939<sup>27</sup>. Amidst all of this, he discovered the secret of surplus-value which he describes in Capital I as the Sprengpunkt or "the pivot of his critique," and everything changed. He discovered the secret of reproductive heteronormativity, that everything human and upper primate emerges out of the differences between needing and making. He described it in human terms — the worker advances the capitalist his labor and the capitalist repays less then he gets out of it; and he also describes it in rational terms — labor power is the only commodity which, when consumed, produces value. Yet, this discovery of human and top primate hetero-norm (that the contingent surplus produced in the difference between need and the capacity to make runs the world), was seen subsequently as lodged in the autonormative idea, identical with itself, scientific socialism. Hence Gramsci's word — gnoseological — neither psychological, the logic of the psyche is at the mercy of the individuated contingent — nor moral — though consciousness and morality are at issue, Marx is in Hegel and Gramsci in his teacher Benedetto Croce too much not to know that the moral must make room for the contingent re-written as the transcendental. In the event, the tremendous discovery

<sup>26.</sup> Terry Eagleton was right to complain about my habit of hyphenating normally un-hyphenated words (*In the Gaudy Supermarket*, «London Review of Books» 21.X [1999], p. 3–6). But "real–ize," consistently used in this essay, would not qualify for his dispraise. It means making real, the transformation of capital into money; by analogy, in Gramsci, the making real of a tendency.

<sup>27.</sup> K. Marx, Grundisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus, New York, Vintage Books, 1973.

of the heteronormative as the source of simple as well as expanded reproduction is put in the service of autonormative gnoseology — gnosis, diagnosis, prognosis: the way to scientific socialism.

The Preface to the Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy belongs to a period before the preoccupation with surplus value. Here the emphasis is indeed on gnoseology, to know that ideology is a more conflictual text than the scientifically precise economic base, and tease out that relationship. However, this text already lays down the possibility of backtracking from gnoseology — knowing — to epistemology — constructing civil society as the object of knowledge —, because it does not preclude the inclusion of the writer's own ideological production, and make us move toward being folded together "within the framework of the old society", emphasizing the complicity with the relations of production. Not only is this not necessarily incoherent with the protocols of the text, there is an emphasis on the epistemological performance because the Preface is nothing if not an account of how a student of philosophy with a minor in jurisprudence studies to become the text's writer. Our last step is to open this apparently end-stopped narrative into the persistence of the run-on — a continuing commitment to the historic and generational.

Let us now move back to the beginning, and consider how to write the World Economic Forum into this: perhaps as the site of a new hegemony. (I now know that this cannot happen as the situation is today). It is a large, non–profit, private sector organization, admonishing civil society, examining the decimation of the constitutional state, considering redress to corporate, military, and extra–state violence, consequences of inequality, and climate change, to name a few. It attempts to re–think technology by making it sit down with Amnesty International and Africa. It moves from local, national, to regional, perhaps to access the global. Access to global, unlike for the digital idealists, is not a certainty here. If Gramsci was interested in educating any subaltern/proletarian as potentially a "dirigent," this diversified body, and certainly the Council, wishes to persuade the 1% — to use today's language — potentially to feel not just for, but as, the 99%.

Yet it is also caught firmly in the older hegemony of sustainable underdevelopment. Its teaching method is knowledge management, and its morality "Judeo–Christian" faith base<sup>28</sup>. The World Social Forum, its legitimation by exact reversal — first planned to run concurrently with the World Economic Forum in Davos — is caught within various older hegemonies — including

<sup>28.</sup> For a discussion of the emergence of this phrase, see J. Derrida, *Interpretations At War*, in G. Anidjar (ed.), *Acts of Religion*, New York, Routledge, 2002, p. 152–158.

benevolent feudalism, culturalism, again sustainable underdevelopment, and a vague leftism.

The World Economic Forum is, of course, and also, based on the heteronormative that produces the "human," the anthropomorphic and the anthropocene. Capitalism negotiates the product of this difference to its own end and the Forum seeks to correct this, wishing to go beyond corporate social responsibility to corporate moral responsibility. This may signal a complicity — a folded togetherness — of the confidence in scientific socialism in the 19th century and the 21st century confidence in the social productivity of globalized capital, with the 20th century as the disaster area of collaboration between communism and capitalism, carefully studied in the early work of Stephen Resnick and Rick Wolff<sup>29</sup>.

Etienne Balibar is the felicitous heir of the marxian heritage — a French philosopher deeply trained in German classical philosophy. I am fortunate enough to be able to call him my friend. At his suggestion, I have consulted his brilliant book, *The Philosophy of Marx*<sup>30</sup>.

I write as a woman with no institutional training in philosophy, with thirty years of work in backward districts of West Bengal, where the general social oppression of the landless illiterate outcastes and aboriginals was certainly ameliorated by the Communist–Party–(Marxist), the party in power within the Left Front that also engaged in goon politics in certain rural sectors, and lost the elections after thirty four years. My involvement with Western Marxism is through the soft margins of the U.S. left, a rather different story. Before I put together my response to Balibar's challenge in his magisterial and wise slim book, I should perhaps say that my discussion of the Council on Values at the World Economic Forum is an indication of the politically incorrect effort required to rectify persistently the digital idealism of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's massive volumes that posit a "multitude" automatically produced.

My ignorant alliance with my learned friend is by way of his conviction that one must "argue" with Marx. I also do agree with him that «Marxism is an improbable philosophy today»<sup>31</sup>. Improbable but not more impossible than anything else. My tendency is to go as far as possible.

As our best philosophers call Marxism improbable can I pull it into the global economic, the belly of the beast, to suggest that employability is not the last instance of human dignity? Will Derrida be at work here?

Like Balibar, I too do not think that Marx is "postmodern." I think the

<sup>29.</sup> S. Gabriel, S.A. Resnick, and R.D. Wolff, State Capitalism versus Communism: What Happened in the USSR and the PRC?, «Critical Sociology» 34:4 (2008), p. 539–556.

<sup>30.</sup> E. Balibar, The Philosophy of Marxism, trans. Chris Turner, London, Verso, 2007.

<sup>31.</sup> Ivi, p. 118.

changeful task is "persistent," adding to the thought of Marx, Gramsci, Balibar, and all my brothers, the dimension of the turnover of the generations, a gendered concern of a teacher of other people's children.

Balibar perceives the ambiguities, contradictions, and amphibologies in Marx, including the important textual suggestion that «no theorist, when he has effectively found something new, can re–cast his own thinking. [...] Others will do that»<sup>32</sup>. I have learned to perceive these as the double binds that are the very defining character of life, action, thought. The condition of impossibility as the only available condition of possibility. A persistent rewriting of the improbable.

Before I learned the lesson of the double bind, in the late seventies, I taught and wrote in my own way Balibar's later and more dismissive description: «Revolution and science (revolution in science, science of revolution): [this] alternative was never resolved by Marx. This also means that he never accepted sacrificing the one to the other, which is a mark of his intransigence»<sup>33</sup> as «the heterogeneous dialectic of knowing and doing»<sup>34</sup>. Forest Pyle, now teaching at Oregon, who took my Marx class in 1978, will recall the much repeated–phrase, described as an asymmetry that opens to action.

Balibar charts Marx's lifetime move from an evolutionist history toward its undoing — by way of the experience and study of failed revolutions (1848, 1871), and the tendency of left movements to move away from Marx's methods, and, finally, the out–of–system (or anti–systemic) potentialities of the agricultural communes in Russia. The consequence of this chain of displacements is described as follows by Balibar: «I am tempted, rather, to believe that he never, in fact, had the time to construct a doctrine because *the process of rectification went faster*»<sup>35</sup>. Given my reading and teaching style, I see this as Marx's great gift, autodidact as he was, acquiring knowledge as new needs opened up, not only to be constrained by, but creatively to be able to learn from his mistakes — again a chain into which we can, transindividually and responsibly, insert ourselves<sup>36</sup>. A persistent set of epistemological performative instructions kept overtaking the stern requirements of a gnoseology.

Perhaps because of this tendency to notice ambiguity, intransigence, failure, Balibar is not prepared to recognize an opening moment already waiting in the *Preface* to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, as I have tried to show above.

- 32. Ivi, p. 112; other perceptions on pp. 21, 27, 33, 92, 102 and passim.
- 33. Ivi, p. 115.
- 34. G.C. Spivak, Speculations on Reading Marx: After Reading Derrida, in D. Attridge et al. (eds.), Poststructuralism and the Question of History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 50.
  - 35. E. Balibar, The Philosophy of Marxism, op. cit., p. 117.
  - 36. For the transindividual, see ivi, p. 30.

The thinking of globality requires thinking the contemporary. "In globalization every site is contemporary," I have written elsewhere, "and yet also unique."

Balibar is able to grasp this intuition of globality in Marx: «communal form was 'contemporary' (a term to which Marx insistently returned) with the most developed forms of capitalist production, the techniques of which it would be able to borrow from the surrounding 'milieu'»<sup>37</sup>. To go to the Council on Values of the World Economic Forum is part of such borrowing, in the interest of the real–ization of a new hegemony.

For Christine Buci–Glucksmann, this particular thought of globality is still in the future. However, her reading of Gramsci reading Marx "beyond the letter," reading gnoseology as epistemology («they are the same thing», says Michele Spanò) through Gramsci's idea of the "critico–practical act," is deeply resonant with my own<sup>38</sup>.

These are philosophers with a more "proper" connection to the European tradition. It is Derrida who has taught me — precariously, as task, to claim and teach destinerrance<sup>39</sup>.

I read Spanish slowly, with a dictionary. I will not therefore refer to the work of Luis Tapia, who was present on the occasion of the first delivery of this text as speech. For the same reason, I did not refer to the work of René Zavaleta, which would have been relevant. Let me simply mention in passing that both Luis Tapia's work on Zavaleta and Zavaleta's own work are being translated into English in a series called *Elsewhere Text* that I edit for Seagull Books based in Calcutta, with an office in London, and distributed by the University of Chicago Press in the United States<sup>40</sup>. This involvement in translation — necessary but impossible — is a practical vulgarization of Derrida's exhortation to translate, to desist the implacable monolingualism of the other<sup>41</sup>. At this time of war, to read Khaled Ziadeh and Marilena Chaui in that series gives us a great narrative — a grounding error — that dislocates the ruling presuppositions of our global political economy, based

<sup>37.</sup> Ivi, p. 108.

<sup>38.</sup> C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, trans. David Fernbach, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980, pp. 348, 351.

<sup>39.</sup> J. Derrida, *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987. My own commentary on the book is in *Love Me, Love My Ombre, Elle*, "Diacritics" 14.14 (Winter 1984), p. 19–36.

<sup>40.</sup> L. Tapia, La producción del conocimiento local: Historia y política en la obra de René Zavaleta, La Paz, Muela del Diablo Editores, 2002; R. Zavaleta, Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia, México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1986.

<sup>41.</sup> J. Derrida, Rogues, op. cit., p. 159; Id., Monolingualism of the Other, or The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. Patrick Mensah, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998.

still on the grand narrative of the Sykes–Picot conversation that established an armed "condominium" nicknamed "the Holy Land"<sup>42</sup>.

In The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx suggested that the real long-term result of the French Revolution was, paradoxically, to strengthen the power of the executive<sup>43</sup>. Some of us felt that the long-term result of the great revolution in China and Russia was to make world capitalism possible. Now, following in the same great narrative mode, it can be said that, just as the Industrial Revolution made capitalist colonialism necessary, so does the technological revolution make global governance necessary. And just as monopoly capitalist colonialism did not represent mercantile capitalist colonialism, so does this haphazard global governance not resemble a magnified world state, on the model of nation-state governance. The world's charter is written by finance capital. World trade is financialized. The anthropocene flourishes through greed. Climate is changed drastically. Those who are victims of inequality suffer the natural disasters more drastically than those not. Class apartheid in education produces rape-culture and bribe-culture below. Stoppage of imaginative training produces rape-culture and bribe-culture above. Democracy is exported on the spear-point of war, and trade blackmail. In spite of the abstractions of finance, the bull market is still driven by investor confidence or affect. And the subprime crisis is driven by family values. Here I want to expand just slightly to show the importance of a Marxian insight and prepare the passage from gnoselogy into epistemology, the real-ization, in Gramsci's dated words, of a new hegemony with a democratic morality. I have described this as the uncoercive rearrangement of desire — quoting an undisclosed source — into the intuitions of democracy, the double bind of liberty and equality<sup>44</sup>.

Buying a house, an individual releases the largest amount of capital into the general flow of capital. Marx would call this "productive consumption," consumption that produces capital. Based on the deep–seated gendered ideology of family and home, this is read as private consumption, establishing or grounding a family on the patriarchal model, even when female–headed. The point here is not that the two kinds of consumption should be kept separate on the housing index issue but that their complicity should be understood. (Com–plicity again! Derrida in the cracks of thinking — point-

<sup>42.</sup> K. Ziadeh, *Neighborhoods and Boulevards*, trans. Samah Selim, New York, Palgrave, 2011; M. Chaui, *Between Conformity and Resistance*, trans. Maite Conde, New York, Palgrave, 2011; Sykes–Picot, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/2oth\_century/sykes.asp.

<sup>43.</sup> K. Marx, The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Surveys From Exile, trans. David Fernbach, New York, Vintage Book, 1974.

<sup>44.</sup> G.C. Spivak, *Development: A Concept*, forthcoming in volume edited by Ann Stoler. The almost complete incomprehension of these problems by trained political scientists has taught me something about disciplinary niches.

ing at gender in the cracks of citizenship in *Politics of Friendship*<sup>45</sup>). The movement of capital is supported, here and elsewhere, by unquestioned gendering.

Behaviorist economics, attempting to thicken mere rational choice, is no match for this ethical catastrophe. If international socialism died of an ethics—shaped hole — in other words, no development of a new approach to the ethical — global capitalism, although it is not as embarrassed to talk the ethical talk, will continue to live with the same terminal disease — an ethics—shaped hole.

Into this steps the World Economic Forum, wanting to turn capitalism toward social justice with inadequate imaginative resources but an acknowledgement of complicity in the narrow sense — we alone have done this. Unfortunately, the strongest tradition of amelioration is what any serious examination must call sustainable underdevelopment.

And into this setting of the World Economic Forum steps the newest Global Agenda Council: the Council on Values. Its name is completely conservative. It is not as if the Council is unaware that what I professionally know to be Marx's definition of the value–form as the general commensurability that serves commodity exchange continues to be preserved in the idea of value–adding, although monetized. However, since I also believe that one must know the language with which to enable a group to rearrange its desires, I am convinced that this name is valuable for the introduction of the unconditioned ethical to the working of the world's business, the gnoseology of the current hegemony instrumentalized as the epistemological, welcoming the advent of the ethical as unanticipable contingent, as improbable a task as Marx's philosophy or Gramsci's methodology. Where did Derrida say: say "yes" "yes" to the enemy? Help me. I have aimé—mangé too much.

The Council on Values has thought out a Social Covenant that may be compared to the 1837 People's Charter in Britain which Marx took altogether seriously and which, in spite of its nominal failure, is, by common multi–partisan consent the source of reformed Britain, breaking into bits today. Here is the 1837 Charter:

- A vote for every man over the age of 21;
- A secret ballot:
- No property qualification for members of Parliament;
- Payment for MPs (so poor men could serve);
- Constituencies of equal size;
- Annual elections for Parliament.

<sup>45.</sup> J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins, New York, Verso, 1997.

## And here the 2014 Covenant:

- Agreement on basic, universal ethical values;
- Agreement on the need for these values need [sic] to be reflected in the legislation adopted and regulations promulgated by individual countries, and in the international economic agreements that define countries' duties to each other;
- Education systems which are open to all and which foster equality of opportunity<sup>46</sup>;
- A goal of providing enough "good" jobs. This requires a much greater focus on "good" jobs for non-graduates; strong technical education opportunities; apprentice schemes, a pro-active tax and incentive system and 21<sup>st</sup> century industrial strategy;
- Fair rewards for hard work and contributions to society;
- Adequate security for savings and assets;
- A commitment to reduce inequality and to keep income and rewards within "fair" bands at the top and bottom of the scale;
- Stewardship of the environment and a commitment to preserve natural capital for the benefit of future generations — even "the seventh generation" out as indigenous people use this as a moral metric;
- Financial sectors that are widely perceived to be be [why isn't this simply "are?"], socially useful, and accountable;
- Strengthening the reality of both opportunity and social mobility;
- The promotion of human well–being, happiness, flourishing and equality of freedom to live a valued life as key societal goals;
- Adapting new measurement systems to measure progress at both national and company levels;
- As we move more deeply into a digital and virtual world, infused with complex technologies, personal privacy and public transparency will become crucial to the trust we need;
- Moving from a shareholder model of companies and a client model of other vital institutions (like schools and universities) to a stakeholder model;
- Engaging the next generation in the designing new models and practices;

"Discussion is not enough," says the text, and continues, we must make different decisions. And this depends on transformational, values—based

<sup>46.</sup> See my *Humanities, Democracy, and the Politics of Knowledge in Higher Education*, keynote address delivered at the University of Kwazulu–Natal, September 25, 2014 for an extended critique of this idea.

leadership in every field of human endeavour. We need to cultivate, encourage and honour the models, at the World Economic Forum and beyond. We must engage the people who can respond to global challenges in effective, productive, healing ways — people who will build and leave behind a more just, generous, and sustainable world.

The demands of the 1837 Charter are clearly to the ruling class (the state) and are structural — in other words upon prepared ground. Derrida's *Mochlos* asks us not to ignore the intending subject. And, in *Rogues* he asks the amphibolic question: «How many votes for the unconscious?»<sup>47</sup>

The commands of the 2014 Covenant involve the texture of the will, from the corporate class to itself, an epistemological transformation to know business and finance socially through moral means: not a legal regulation of capital unenforceable by a decimated state, but a moral self–regulation of corporate capital; the formation of a general will for social justice at the top<sup>48</sup>. (The vanguard role of the corporate sector is in place: job creation and equitable wages. This is largely and implicitly accepted by all but armchair communists today.) The writers have an unexamined intuition of unconditional ethics.

This enormous "non–profit" is, as critic of the connection between fundraising "non–profit"—s and the corporate world, trying to find a cure for the auto–immunity of capital. (It goes without saying that the expanded concept—metaphor of "auto–immunity" came to me, again, from *Rogues*.) In this larger context, the word "non–profit" — educational institutions, human rights initiatives, international watchdogs and large and small civil society and philanthropic undertakings — has lost its meaning. The World Economic Forum has realized that it is the "profit" sector that must be shifted. "The realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge."

Yet we must also remember that Gramsci's emphasis on education and culture has been appropriated by liberal culturalists and has been separated

<sup>47.</sup> J. Derrida, Rogues, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>48.</sup> Projecting such a change within the proletariat, Mikhail Bakunin's "all—round education" had been only scientific, only focused on the destruction of the state and the laws of inheritance; as the transformers of capitalism have only knowledge management and digitalism. Yet Bakunin the anarchist knew something at least of the necessary individual epistemic transformation for the formation of a collectivity: "[...] for the International really to acquire this influence, for a tenth of the proletariat, organized by this Association, to be able to rally the other nine tenths, each member of each section must be penetrated much more thoroughly by the principles of the International than is now the case. Only on this condition will he [sic] be able effectively to discharge the mission of propagandists and apostle in time and peace and calm, and that of a revolutionary principal in time of struggle." The problem was that he believed that just association would bring this about. M. Bakunin, From out of the Dustbin, trans. Robert M. Cutler, Ann Arbor, Ardis, 1985, pp. 142, 146, 136.

from his real-ization of Marx's implicit project. And "on the left," Gramsci's emphasis is sometimes dismissed as culturalist. Gramsci's question on the other hand was, how to purge liberal education of its seemingly inevitable connection to the ideology of oligarchy.

Now that the conjuncture has produced oligarchs interested in the ethical, it is time to remind ourselves that the ethical is not to be identified with the rational choice between right and wrong (capitalist gnoseology) but rather a slow training for the rearrangement of desires, for the ability to respond to the unconditional, the contingent. "Knowledge management," which is currently the method, has speedy results as its goal. Summits are planned on consensus achieved by simple collections of staggered multiple-choice questions. In an extended discussion, I would parse out Derrida's practical remark: «Decisions are made in the night of non-knowledge»<sup>49</sup>. For the sake of time and space, we cannot undertake a thorough critique of either the Covenant or the effectiveness of knowledge management techniques combined with a digitalized faith base. Yet it must be pointed out that "agreement" leading to moral convictions that overturn previous greed to a will to law will remain in the domain of enforcement if desires are not shifted with careful patience. A lasting collectivity is formed by individual attention. "How many are we?" And, when we talk of "basic, universal human values," are we speaking only of the masters? In other words, of people who can respond to global challenges in effective, productive, healing ways? Here one invokes the com-plicity — folded-togetherness of fund-raising radicals and the corporate world. These general adjectives — basic, universal, human — call for the alternative broad based pedagogic method that I am insisting on. Additionally, gender is still caught in family values in the Covenant. It does not emerge into its manifest text. That also involves future slow work of the rearrangement of desire.

The slow work here is to acknowledge complicity, act the conjuncture, with the real-ization of a broad "Marx"-ist tendency from gnoseology to epistemology.

By contrast and to repeat, within the Council on Value, the covering over of the heteronormative — that the contingent, beyond programming, rises in the difference between need and capacity to make — is now practiced by knowledge management. The invaluable work that the Council on Values can do is undone by a complete confidence in so–called toolkits and templates. The desire for such speedy solutions must be rearranged with the training of the imagination to understand that to change gnoseology to epistemology today, within the boundaries of the Council on Values, we

<sup>49.</sup> J. Derrida, Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority', trans. Mary Quaintance, «Cardozo Law Review», 11, 919, (1990), p. 967.

must understand that the toolkit closes off the contingent. The readership of this book will tease out the relationship between this understanding and Derrida's bold early move, repeatedly without "venturing up to perilous necessities," to show that grammatology cannot be a positive science<sup>50</sup>. One must teach how to make toolkits as halfway houses to be undone by the contingent rather than offer toolkits for a solution to the problem of action. Some of us have been criticizing the UN for example on the use of platforms of action in order to diffuse and manage violence against women. Some of us have been criticizing the statisticalization of such things as development and progress. All of this has to be integrated into a persistent critique of knowledge management, so that meetings to achieve solutions do not work as if for children, with leaders who divide collectivities into groups, with instructions to produce lists of items that are collected as the groups are put back together. (Do real policy decisions take such antics seriously?). This is not the way that the imagination will be trained for epistemological performance so that unconditional ethics can be introduced to move capital into social justice.

Today gender empowerment through micro-credits and financial independence — taking employability as the bottom line of human dignity — follows the same sort of autonormative agenda. Here gendering as the type case of reproductivity must be acknowledged. Just as in the epistemological project of *Capital* I, the worker was invited to rethink himself epistemologically as agent of production rather than victim of capitalism, so also, and on a broader base, women must understand that men take more and give less and that they themselves are not the victims of phallocentrism but the agent of production and the need for legitimate passage of property must not be the excuse for keeping them in confinement.

How can intellectuals help? To repeat, the intellectual must learn to teach how to *make* toolkits as halfway houses to be undone by the contingent or unexpected rather than offer toolkits for a solution to the problem of action. This is not the way that the imagination will be trained for epistemological performance — or changing the way objects for knowing are constructed for instrumental management — "Knowledge *for* Development," or knowledge understood purely quantitatively as a "growing stock" — so that unconditional or uninstrumentalizable ethics can be introduced to move the corporate world toward social justice. There is no other way to intervene in the incalculable realm of human desire. This is why behavioral economics, first conceived of as an alternative to rational choice, begins to merge with it. This is the work that we must continue to do persis-

tently, by suggesting, for example, that the usual turnover expectation that the corporate sector must necessarily entertain will not work in the arena of the establishment of lasting social justice. In order for this to happen, the mind–sets of corporate leaders have to be changed, for sure, but the intuitions of democracy have to be placed also within the largest sector of the population. In democracies, this will be the grass roots electorates. Speedy evaluation, one of the hallmarks of knowledge management, will fall through the cracks in this sort of endeavor, for there the population is no more than objects for investigation<sup>51</sup>. If convenience is made a priority here, the project should be given up, or will quickly transform itself into fact–checking, with our toolkits as reference.

I have already mentioned the future slow work of the rearrangement of desire in the race-class diversified field of gender. Let me add a few words on something I deeply care about.

India and the Knowledge Economy is a meticulously prepared book. What I am asking for here is a re—thinking of the bits I have italicized in the introductory sentence in its "Foreword:" «Knowledge, as it is applied in entrepreneurship and innovation, research and development, software and product design, and in how people use their education and skills, is now widely believed to be one of the key sources of growth in the global economy». What "knowledge" "drives" "the supply chains and markets that now dominate the global economy"? The Council and the Forum must realize that their bold plan is to question such knowledge and it cannot be done in its own terms.

If you need a Derridian formula here, how about the dangers of thinking: «the idea of knowledge is knowledge about knowledge», especially when it is instrumental for the securing of capital for capitalism?<sup>52</sup>

This is a summary: I have spoken of philosophy as the philosophy of an education that will attempt to access the epistemology of those who will implement the Social Covenant, with corporations and institutions, workers therein, and the larger world. I propose an expansion of the idea of knowing.

<sup>51.</sup> Here is an example of the fact-checking style of assessment: «The most recent version of the KAM [Knowledge Assessment Methodology], KAM 2008 makes comparisons based on 83 structural and qualitative variables that serve as proxies for the four knowledge-economy pillars described above. Some 140 countries can be compared — among them most of the developed economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and about 100 developing countries. All 83 variables are normalized on a scale from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest), and all 140 countries are ranked on an ordinal scale. The KAM therefore reports the relative performance of countries on the knowledge economy.\* [\*]: Some of the indicators used in the KAM are also used in the benchmarking systems of other institutions, such as UNIDO, which measures countries' potential to "catch up" with more developed countries, and the World Economic Forum, which looks at competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine a country's productivity», *Measuring Knowledge in the World's Economies*, "World Bank Institute".

<sup>52.</sup> J. DERRIDA, University in the Eyes of Its Pupils?, op. cit.; ID., Mochlos?, op. cit., p. 5.

This involves a change of mindset, in the intellectuals, in the corporate sector, in the workers attached to it, extending to the general population, with the help of intellectuals engaged in the work of transforming the philosophy of education and its application. Measuring or evaluating terms of prompt success are not appropriate to the interminable task of working for a change in the desires of the highly diversified, incalculably gendered populations of the world.

The Council on Values cannot take this risk. And, this dangerous supplement to the economy of the world will be ignored by those who resemble us rather than them as our friend Jacques Derrida is niched back by scholarly Sancho Panzas, with the best will in the world, into pushing the frontiers, perhaps, of disciplinary literature and philosophy.