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Animal Spirits Revisited: American Capitalism and Emotional Life

I

After nearly forty years of free market fundamentalism, the ideas of John Maynard Keynes are making a comeback – at least among a handful of economists with no influence on public policy. Paul Krugman and Robert Reich urge Keynesian countercyclical government spending, Robert Shiller and George Akerlof note the centrality of what Keynes called “animal spirits” in sustaining prosperity or provoking panic. Shiller and Akerlof’s argument is part of the broader agenda of behavioral economics – a schismatic sub-discipline that questions the orthodox Benthamite faith in Economic Man. Behavioral economists have the temerity to suggest that economic decisions might not always be based on calculating rationality. Even the dismal science is beginning to show some signs of life – some animal spirits, Keynes might say.

But Keynes was a notoriously elusive thinker. His most interesting ideas – and the idea of animal spirits is surely one – were often his most ambiguous. Even sympathetic economists like Shiller and Akerlof tend to domesticate Keynes, to assimilate much of his thinking to a neoclassical economic model. Rather than treat Keynes as an economist, it is more helpful to see him immersed in the great maelstrom of modernist thought – engaged in conversation with Bergson and Freud on libidinal energy, with William James on uncertainty, chance, and risk. Keynes’s discussion of animal spirits in economic life was part of a broader transatlantic revolt against the Benthamite vision of an atomistic society of selves, freely choosing in accordance with their rational self-interest. Keynes aimed to undermine the keystone of economic orthodoxy, the rational actor, by focusing on the ambiguities of decision-making. He wrote:

Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities. Enterprise only pretends to itself to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die; – though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes of profit had before.... In estimating the prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it largely depends.

We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of irrational psychology.... We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance. (*The General Theory* 161-62)

Never were the shortcomings of the rational actor model clearer than during a financial panic, as Keynes observed:

The practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation. All these pretty, polite techniques, made for a well-panelled Board Room and a nicely regulated market, are liable to collapse.... I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques. ("The General Theory of Employment" 215)

From Keynes's view, the rational actor model distorted human motives and falsified the nature of the cosmos, denying caprice, insisting that merit matched reward. The recognition of animal spirits had important philosophical implications. Economists tend to ignore them, defining animal spirits down, as Shiller and Akerlof do, to mere confidence or the lack of it.

I want to return to Keynes the modernist, extending and broadening his notion of animal spirits to include all the visceral impulses left out of the rational actor model, and to bring into view what is too often left invisible (even by Keynes himself) – the capitalist workplace. Keynes and his successors focused entirely on the role of animal spirits in investment and consumption, ignoring the labor process or assimilating it to rational choice mythology. From their view capitalism is a system of wealth creation which may operate more or less efficiently (and fairly). What's left out is any sense of capitalism as system of power relations where the powerful constrain the powerless by creating "structures of feeling" (Williams 128 ff.) as well as economic structures. We need a history of capitalism that takes both kinds of structures into account.¹

What would that history look like, with respect to American capitalism? It would devote sustained attention to animal spirits in the workplace, as well as on the trading floor and in the department store. It would address the myriad meanings emotion can acquire when viewed from various economic vantages: a resource for resistance and solidarity (slave songs, sit-down strikes); a disruption or distraction in need of management (corporate retreats for executive slackers, Muzak for bored workers); a commodity offered by receptionists and salespeople (service with a smile.) And it would reflect broader shifts in American cultural history: from assumptions of psychic scarcity to assumptions of psychic abundance, and from the containment of animal spirits to their manipulation.

It is possible to divide this history into three stages, even while acknowledging their artificiality. The nineteenth century marks the first. It is dominated by individual entrepreneurs, operating in a largely unregulated environment, which turns toward monopoly capitalism at the end. This development can be summarized by Emerson's aphorism: "Every spirit makes its house; but afterwards the house confines the spirit" (qtd. in Whicher 333). The second stage runs from about 1900 into the 1970s, a period when monopolistic capitalism enters gradually and not

always willingly into an uneasy partnership with the administrative state under the aegis of a managerial world view. It is the Fordist moment, the moment of hierarchically-organized mass production, growing union power, uneven but genuine job security, and fitful fears of conformity in the managerial class. The third stage brings us from the 1970s to our own time – the rise of neoliberalism, the shift from Fordist mass production to flexible accumulation, the celebration of entrepreneurial risk by the people most insulated from it, and the experience, for the majority, of increasing insecurity.

II

Everyone knows one thing about the Victorian business man: he was repressed. What is less well-known is the relation between this self-contained emotional style and everyday workings of the emerging market economy. The would-be entrepreneur was awash in a sea of animal spirits that flowed all too easily into manias and panics. In 1856, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher compared feverish investors to maniacal gamblers:

A speculator on the exchange, and a gambler at his table, follow one vocation only with different instruments.... Both burn with unhealthy excitement ... they have a common distaste for labor ... neither would scruple in any hour to set his whole being on the edge of ruin, and going over, to pull down, if possible, a hundred others. (76-77)

This parallel suggests another: the consumer's dream of magical self-transformation through purchase – of clothing, jewelry, patent elixirs – this was the origin of modern advertising, already well underway by the time Beecher penned his warning. Things were increasingly tethered to fantasies, and the fantasies were becoming more important than the things themselves. As John Keats observed, “Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are sweeter” (ll. 11-12).²

A boom and bust economy fostered a boom and bust psychology, to judge by many of the leading money men of the era, including J.P. Morgan and his lieutenants. Their business lives were charged with sustained bouts of manic activity punctuated by breakdowns into depressive passiv-

ity, which could only be relieved, it seemed, by a long sea voyage. For those without the resources for that kind of therapy, the most prudent alternative was to cultivate a steady self-discipline, as the self-help writer Jerome Bates recommended in *The Imperial Highway* (1888):

Keep cool, have your resources well in hand, and reserve your strength until the proper time arrives to exert it. There is hardly any trait of character or faculty of intellect more valuable than the power of self-possession, or presence of mind. The man who is always 'going off' unexpectedly, like an old rusty firearm, . . . who has no control over himself or his powers, is just the one who is always in trouble, and never successful or happy. (228)

Behind this passage lie assumptions of psychic scarcity, which paralleled economic scarcity: there was only so much emotional energy to go around, just as there was only so much money to go around. Psychic wastrels could overdraw their accounts and bankrupt themselves. The prudent man consigned strong feelings to the private sphere, the domain of women (where even they had to keep strict accounts of emotional expenditure). With appropriate self-discipline, consumer fantasy could be modulated into consumer confidence, and the dream of overnight wealth could be modulated into what Adam Smith, in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), had called the "calm and dispassionate" desire of self-betterment (qtd. in Hirschman 66).

No one better embodied this careful striving than John D. Rockefeller, Sr. – his relentless work habits, his rigid self-discipline, his obsessive thrift. He was the very model of the upright business man, determined to shield his wife and children from "the world." As he wrote his wife: "the world is full of Sham, Flattery, and Deception, and *home* is haven of rest and freedom" (qtd. in Chernow 138).³ Rockefeller's domestic piety pointed to larger reasons for cultivating composure – the world outside the allegedly sacrosanct family was thronging with poseurs, imposters, and counterfeiters (there was no uniform U.S. currency until 1863). Herman Melville, Mark Twain, and other observers documented the ubiquity of distrust. Pervasive anxiety demanded ideological work: the creation of a self-made man, to exorcise his shadowy double, the confidence man. The male culture of success pivoted on a series of dialectical antitheses: hard work and sincer-

ity played counterpoint to manipulation and deceit, emotional stolidity to emotional suavity, a faith in social transparency to a fear of misleading appearances.

Calm rationality was not always enough to keep the specter of deception at bay. Indeed, rationality could itself become a pose, as Rockefeller's career demonstrated. The quintessential self-made man was also a confidence man, a master of deceit through legal or illegal chicanery, perfectly willing to prevaricate under oath. And there was a deeper problem as well. Even Rockefeller's sympathetic biographer, William O. Inglis, noted "something bordering on the superhuman, perhaps the inhuman" about Rockefeller's "unbroken, mechanical perfection of schedule" (qtd. in Chernow 502). For most people, this relentless organization of life could be the death of animal spirits.

This becomes clear in Melville's "Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street." It is told by an attorney, the very embodiment of uncomprehending rationality when he's confronted by the strange behavior of Bartleby, who appears one summer morning on the office threshold applying for a job, "pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn." At first he copies documents continually, "by sunlight and candlelight," "silently, palely, mechanically," until one day he announces quietly but firmly, when asked to check the accuracy of a copy: "I would prefer not to." This is the beginning of Bartleby's odd rebellion, which leads him from silence to self-starvation, and ends with Bartleby "strangely huddled at the base of a wall" in the Tombs, wasted entirely away (30-67).⁴ Bartleby haunts the affective history of capitalism. He embodies the withdrawal of affect, the deadening soul-sickness that accompanies rationalized work and that baffles those insulated from it – Bartleby's boss to be sure but also the re-enchanters of capitalism at work in the mid-nineteenth century – the rhetoricians of divinely ordained progress, the British celebrants of the Crystal Palace as God's Work, the American devotees of Manifest Destiny. This was the capitalist sublime.

Between this rhetoric and the emotional facts on the ground there was an appalling distance. American workers in the nineteenth century were more troubled by economic scarcity than by psychic scarcity. In keeping with Marx's classic description of the drive for surplus value, employers strained to maximize productivity by minimizing labor costs through

technological innovation and the constant threat of layoffs. The stakes in the struggle between capital and labor were raised by the presence of a reserve army of unemployed workers. American farmers were insecure as well. The vagaries of commodities markets were even less predictable than the weather. Farmers faced the constant threat of crop failures, plummeting prices, and spiraling indebtedness. Among the “producing classes” (farmers, workers, small businessmen) by the end of the century, anxiety bred fear. It focused on the “monstrous” specter of monopoly. Monopoly was monstrous because it was not a product of natural law (despite the claims of classical economics) but of unnatural collusion. Fear of monopoly provoked Populist and Progressive efforts to tame wealth in the interests of commonwealth. This was the beginning of the second, managerial phase in the history of American capitalism.

III

The years between 1900 and the early 1970s saw fitful and finally decisive moves toward government regulation, amid the growing domination of the economy by giant corporate organizations. The corporate workplace was transformed as female “typewriters” swarmed into the labor force and male middle managers multiplied. A key figure in the emotional history of this period was the social psychologist Elton Mayo, who conducted the Hawthorn Experiments in the 1920s among women clerical workers at a Western Electric plant outside Chicago. Mayo discovered that productivity shot up if employers paid attention to workers’ feelings – or seemed to pay attention. It was not long before management consultants were promoting collaboration between managers and workers, to achieve organizational goals. The corporate workplace saw a growing emphasis on fitting in, team play, and interpersonal relations – and on manipulating emotions rather than mastering them. The prime mover of prosperity had shifted “from invisible hand to glad hand,” as the sociologist David Riesman observed in 1950 (126).⁵

The transformation of the corporate workplace reflected a more fluid, mobile concept of self, based on popularized (and Americanized) psychoanalysis – a cheery creed that defined the unconscious as a reservoir of psychic energy to be tapped in times of need. This discovery (or invention) of

psychic abundance coincided with the discovery of economic abundance by the proto-Keynesian Simon Nelson Patten. Henceforward, personal growth and economic growth could proceed hand in glove. So said Patten and other prophets of a New Era, which is what the Tom Friedmans of their time called the 1920s.⁶

The problem, of course, was that capitalism could manufacture scarcity even amid natural abundance. With the collapse of the price system in the 1930s, oranges were burned in ditches and milk poured down storm drains. When the bottom dropped out, as FDR brilliantly saw, the dominant popular response was fear. “The only thing we have to fear is . . . fear itself” – those words were penned by his speechwriter, Napoleon Hill, a professional positive thinker and author of the best-seller *Think and Grow Rich* (1937, still in print). As Warren Susman observed, fear combined with the shame of downward mobility generated a longing to belong – to fit in, to be accepted by a community, to immerse oneself in a larger collective identity. The collectivist sentimentality of 1930s culture, from *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* to *The Grapes of Wrath*, embodied a redirection of animal spirits away from individual striving and toward communal solidarity.⁷

Of course solidarity could be suffocating – a fearful clinging together could promote fascism, and even in the United States demands for cohesion could become oppressive: demands for conformity to an American Way of Life, for commitment to an American century – more ennoblements of capitalism, more rhapsodies to what the historian Eugene McGarragher calls the enchantments of mammon, in the guise of hymns to providence.⁸ As the film critic Robert Warshow observed in 1949, in both the United States and the Soviet Union, happiness was a public duty; “if the authorities find it necessary, the citizen may even be compelled to make a public display of his cheerfulness on important occasions, just as he may be conscripted into the army in time of war” (85). Such was the collectivist imperative at midcentury, on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

That imperative linked the 1930s with the 1950s. The quintessential success manual of the Depression, Dale Carnegie’s *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (1936), stayed popular well into the post World War II era. Fitting in was all the fashion from the 30s through the 50s. The manicured suburbs of the postwar period embodied the deepest longings of

the Depression. Yet the managerial synthesis was precarious from the beginning. Postwar observers of white collar workplaces began to scent the dread disease of conformity. Riesman coined the term “other direction” to describe “modes of manipulating the self in order to manipulate others” (149). William Whyte lamented the rise of a “social ethic” of bland accommodation to suburban normality (3). Conformity was a threat to creativity, energy, spontaneity, to the animal spirits that delight in risk – and risk was a key to authentic selfhood, in the emerging countercultural critique of corporate America. The suits had sold their souls for security, or so the counterculture charged. The working class had struck a parallel bargain: during the late 1930s they had been allowed to form unions in exchange for accepting management control over the speed and structure of the labor process – to trade scientifically managed work for economic security. Thirty years on, young workers influenced by the counterculture began to protest the deadening quality of work on the fastest assembly line in world – the General Motors plant at Lordstown, Ohio, site of a three week strike in 1972. “There’s only three ways out of here,” one worker said. “You either conform and become deader each day, or you rebel, or you quit” (qtd. in Cowie 7). The problem was not wages or benefits but quality of life.

Still the main enemy of the midcentury agreement between capital and labor was not labor but capital, as corporations in competition with overseas rivals began closing U.S. plants, seeking cheaper labor abroad. What delivered the *coup de grace* to the midcentury managerial synthesis, as David Harvey has shown, was a successful counter-revolution against economic regulation, sponsored by multinational capital and known to posterity as neo-liberalism. As Fordist mass production gave way to flexible accumulation, job security disappeared and union power plummeted. “Just in time” workers could not stay in one place long enough to join a union.⁹

IV

The rise of personal computing reinforced an individualist vision of utopia – “Free Agent Nation,” as *Fast Company* magazine would call it in 1997. Suddenly visionary entrepreneurs were popping up everywhere. Tom Peters and George Gilder were their prophets, Steve Jobs their apotheosis. When he died, the extraordinary outpouring of public grief showed how

faith in entrepreneurial incandescence could blind believers to the very existence of the out-sourced employees who made the entrepreneur's success possible, most of whom worked 84-hour weeks and slept twelve to a room. Emotional capital triumphed over emotional labor. For the last several decades, animal spirits have been revived in the service of entrepreneurial utopia. The death and transfiguration of Jobs marked a culmination (if not a conclusion) of this trend (Pink, Gold).

By the turn of the century, experts agreed: the neoliberal workplace (most called it "postmodern") was nothing if not creative. Yet it was an odd, disembodied creativity, often producing nothing tangible at all – oddly reminiscent (especially during the 1990s) of the schemes that proliferated in London during the mania over the South Sea Bubble. In *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds* (1852) Charles McKay wrote: "the most absurd and preposterous of all . . . which shewed, more completely than any other, the utter madness of the people, was one started by an unknown adventurer, entitled, 'A company for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is'" (55). The adventurer collected a thousand pounds from would-be investors and then promptly skipped town. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*¹⁰

However evanescent its products, the postmodern workplace put a high premium on team play, higher even than its midcentury corporate predecessor. While nearly all contemporary corporations remain hierarchically organized, most prefer to project a phony aura of egalitarian harmony. Consider Hewlett-Packard's self-advertisement: "HP is a firm where one can breathe a spirit of communication, a strong spirit of interrelations, where people communicate, where you go towards others. It [sic] is an affective relationship" (qtd. in Illouz, *Saving the Modern Soul* 93). Sociological conventional wisdom has converged on the discovery that postmodern (neo-liberal) work requires and rewards characteristic feminine traits – empathy, co-operation, active listening, and the like.¹¹ From here, it is only a short step to sighting "Emotional Capitalists" on the horizon. The Emotional Capitalist, like the legendary Jobs, is a visionary and a rebel. The public relations executive Howard Bloom describes this extraordinary development:

There's a new form of capitalism struggling to be born among us. In reality it's been here all along, but we've failed to see it. It's Emotional Capitalism, a capitalism vibrant with the power of something that has yet to seize the heart of every boardroom meeting – the power to care, the power to feel the emotions of the people you serve, and the power to feel your own emotions in new ways.

The closer one looks at Emotional Capitalism, the clearer its utilitarian agenda becomes. In *Emotional Capitalists: The New Leaders*, Martyn Newman incorporates Daniel Coleman's notion of "emotional intelligence" (EQ) into his recipe for business success. Identifying the "seven dynamic emotions" that set exceptional business achievers apart, he "provides the clearest blueprint yet for systematically building your EQ and leadership skills." Here again, animal spirits are turned into emotional capital, serving the schemes of the visionary entrepreneur – but still consistent with the model of the rational actor, manipulating affect to advance his interests.¹²

During recent decades, a few social scientists have examined the spread of emotional labor under neo-liberalism, especially among women forced to manipulate or manufacture emotion to please supervisors or clients. But these critics have become invisible in the blizzard of positive thinking that has enveloped American self-help culture in the last three decades. Of course positive thinking has a long history, but lately it has acquired academic legitimacy. Consider the rise of the sub-discipline of Positive Psychology, invented by Martin Seligman at the University of Pennsylvania – an attempt to re-orient psychology away from abnormality and dysfunction, and toward resilience and well-being. Positive Psychology has become the most popular course at several elite universities and has spawned the Authentic Happiness Inventory, a self-administered test you can take to discover how joyous (or miserable) you really are, on a scale of 1 to 10. Consider, as well, the *Journal of Happiness Studies*, founded in 2000 and full of such startling results as this: "Positivity was associated with norms about ideal life satisfaction such that countries and individuals who highly valued positive emotions were more likely to display positivity." Social Science we may always have with us, but one can nevertheless sniff a change in the atmosphere. The public duty of displaying happiness, identi-

fied by Warshaw more than half a century ago, has now become a private obsession.¹³

There has always been a fundamental contradiction in the pursuit of happiness. Happiness derives from the old Norse *hap*, or chance – happiness is something that happens to you, not something you deliberately set out to achieve. As the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips writes:

Happiness is fine as a side effect. It's something you may or may not acquire, in terms of luck. But I think it's a cruel demand. It may even be a covert form of sadism. Everyone feels themselves prone to feelings and desires and thoughts that disturb them. And we're being persuaded that by acts of choice, we can dispense with these thoughts. It's a version of fundamentalism.... [H]appiness is the most conformist of moral aims. (qtd. in Soltan 38)

For good psychoanalytic reasons, one suspects that the pilgrims of happiness are protesting too much. Confidence has always been meant to counteract anxiety, but when confidence is pumped up to the hysteria of contemporary positive thinking, anxiety may be pumped up too, may be turning into fear – especially at work. To be sure, even in less than ideal situations, employers can be kind to employees and employees can look out for one another. But that does not mean, as Deirdre McCloskey claims, that “Modern capitalist life is love-saturated” (138). What she and other celebrants overlook is the surveillance and subtle coercion behind the apparent spontaneity of corporate “team play.” Fear is no stranger to the neo-liberal workplace, as Corey Robin shows:

The Investigator software program – used by Exxon, Mobil, and Delta – keeps track not only of workplace performance measures (like the number of employee keystrokes and mouse clicks per second), but also of troublemakers. Should an employee type “alert” words like “boss” or “union,” Investigator automatically forwards her document – saved or unsaved, sent or not – to her supervisor. “Back in the fifteenth century,” one PR executive explains, “they used to use a ball and chain, and now they use technology.”

... After NYNEX cut its workforce during the mid-1990s ... it required its MBAs and skilled technicians to attend a three-day-long retreat where they were encouraged to discover their own creativity by hopping around a room in

different ways. Some hopped on one leg, others on two, still others with hands in the air, and one with a hand covering his eye. According to one participant, “The leaders would say things like, ‘Look at how creative you are, how many different ways you can figure out to manage to jump around the room.’ And we all did it.... We all did it.”

A marketing executive at a radio station chain, which had also undergone a round of firings, recounts how a management consultant at a motivational seminar handed out water pistols to him and his colleagues and had them squirt each other – to help them get in touch with their more playful selves.... He thought about not joining in, but reconsidered after asking himself, “If I don’t squirt, will I be gone, too?” (104-5)

We have reached the reduction *ad absurdum* of manipulated animal spirits. These employees are afraid for good Marxian reasons – the specters of failure and poverty, the reserve army of the unemployed. But they are also afraid for good anarchist reasons. In *Debt: The First 5000 Years*, David Graeber documents the implicit threat of physical force that is so often behind power relations under capitalism, even those wrapped in the rhetoric of cooperation and communication. Despite obvious failures of neo-liberalism, contemporary political discourse still resonates with neo-liberal obsessions, especially in the contemporary discourse of debt. The prescription of austerity is at bottom a paean to violence.

What kind of politics can this threat provoke? We are no longer in the 1890s, or the 1930s. Our situation is grimmer. Surveying the convergence of the “war on terror” and the crash of 2008, Graeber writes: “My own suspicion is that we are looking at the final effects of the militarization of American capitalism itself.... the last 30 years have seen the construction of a vast bureaucratic apparatus for the creation and maintenance of hopelessness, a giant machine designed, first and foremost, to destroy any sense of possible alternative futures” (382). He wrote those words before the unleashing of animal spirits in the Occupy Wall Street movement. We know what happened. As winter came, the militarized police stepped in – but did they restore a sense of hopelessness? The return of spring turned the Occupy Movement toward more specific and tangible goals, such as organizing low-wage immigrant workers in New York’s restaurant industry. The

organizers, like the assemblers of iPads, remain invisible to conventional media. But that doesn't mean they're not there.

Notes

¹ There is a flourishing historiography of the emotions in the United States, but surprisingly little of it deals with the relations of emotions to economic life. See for example, Stearns and Lewis.

² On this point in general see Jackson Lears, *Fables of Abundance*, chap. 2.

³ On the pervasiveness of deception, see Mihm, *A Nation of Counterfeiters*.

⁴ For a rich background (and contrapuntal scenario) to Bartleby, see Zakim, and Mihm, "Clerks, Classes, and Conflicts."

⁵ On Mayo, see Meyer, and Illouz, *Cold Intimacies* 11-16.

⁶ On these developments in general, see Jackson Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization."

⁷ See Susman 150-210. On Hill, see Meyer.

⁸ Eugene McGarraher to the author, personal communication.

⁹ On these issues Harvey's three most relevant works are: *The Enigma of Capital* (2010), *A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism* (2005), and *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1991).

¹⁰ The most egregious celebration of the postmodern workplace is Florida, and the most effective antidote to celebration is Crawford.

¹¹ Illouz summarizes the argument about the feminization of the workplace, but Emily Martin notes that a manic management style is more acceptable for men than for women.

¹² Book description: <<http://www.amazon.com/Emotional-Capitalists-The-New-Leaders/dp/0470694211>>.

¹³ See Senior and Diener. On emotional labor, see Hochschild and Chong.

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