

Political Clientelism, Political Culture and Development in Africa

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Culture, society and development are the three most pertinent factors associated with every human civilization; however, they are distinctive and relative. Thus, development exists distinctively in every society. Today, globalization has promoted and consolidated democracy – ‘liberal democracy’ – almost across the globe as the single ideology and the best form of government that must be practised for the protection of individuals’ fundamental human rights. However, the adoption of liberal democracy varies and continues to create a dichotomous marginality between the ‘capitalist West’ and the so-called developing nations with respect to its results. The pertinent questions are: what is the relevance of liberal democracy to Third World development? How important are the desirability, feasibility, conditions and possibilities of liberal democracy for a country where democracy is alien to its political culture? And how is the cultural and historical backdrop of the developing world different from that of the West? We will explore the importance of political clientelism in African political development and look beyond liberal democracy for an African-like democracy. This essay aims to contribute to our collaborative intellectual efforts by looking at the existence of development in human cultural patterns, the historical perspective of liberal democracy, its meaning, its validity, its relationship to African development, neo-colonialism and the global clientelistic structure for continuous dependency, as well as political clientelism importance to African development; by reconstructing the ontological notion of development to the Third World nations as envelopment-overt control of the progress of Third World nations by Global West and by suggesting a possible alternative for a sustainable development.

1. Introduction

Africa suffered great economic and political losses under the exploitative and brutal manifestations of colonial rule. This destruction was so intense that after colonial rule the continent was in no position to develop itself without foreign assistance. A further reflection of this is the importation of the liberal democratic system of government. Liberal democracy as a system of government may be defined in a minimal and procedural fashion as a political system where multiple political parties are in competition to take control of the government by contesting in free and fair elections (Foweraker and Krznaric 1999).

The ideological and philosophical makeup of liberal democracy hails from Western thought, and liberal democracy has been seen as the only, irrefutably good form of government. Many countries around the world are undergoing “democratization:” indeed, some are compelled to adopt it by the emergence of the “good governance” agendas of international institutions such as the World Bank. International organizations and states are intruding on other states’ sovereignty in various and bold ways for the sake of promoting democracy and freedom. They even want democracy to be recognized as a fundamental human right.

This is as a result of their intention to consolidate and promote their capitalist system across Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, the pattern of democratic expansion and improved well-being holds for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

African nation-states consists of multilingual and multiethnic units in which cultural practices and heritages are seen to be distinct and unique. Many African societies practice political clientelism because it can be traced to their social system, heritage, social thought and belief systems. Clientelism is a kind of social relationship whereby the additional privileged people (patrons) exchange merchandise for the loyalty of less privileged people (clients; Joseph 1991; Taylor 2004, Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002). Political clientelism is essential in African society because it is a system in which the loyalty of the people is domiciled in traditional rulers and religious leaders rather than elected leaders.

Consequently, liberal democracy and political clientelism have not taken African nations, including Nigeria, anywhere. This is as a result of the continuous influence of neocolonialism, which causes the loss of internal control among developing nations. This effective loss of internal economic control has occurred while many developing nations have embraced democracy is deeply ironic and carries with it potentially explosive political consequences. Among these consequences are the surge of ethnic hatred, competition, ethnic favouritism and nepotism that are visible in African democratic nations.

Liberal delegative democracy operates as an ambulant monarchy that periodically mobilizes people to choose their new ruler, hijacking and kidnapping society and its resources in the process. No matter its avowed ideology, creed and, occasionally, good intentions, it tends to derail into oligarchy-like structures. Michels’ (1911) “iron law of oligarchy” is perfectly valid, but only so in the case of delegation, not of representation.

Appropriation of power by elites only creates social and political disasters in national policy and at the global level as well as harbours polarization and extreme violence. Globalization, appropriation of power and inter-elite confrontation are contrary to the genuine interests of the people of the

world (Sankatsing 2004). This can be seen in the current insurgency experienced in Nigeria, in which Boko Haram continues to terrorize the nation on both political and religious matters with the ultimate goal of causing a political disaster for the present government.

The West has continued what they called development politics for the ex-colonies, based on their intention to secure the control of resources, economies and politics of the ex-colonies (Monar 2000: 119). Development politics, as it was introduced by the colonial masters during the formation of the EC, was intended to make good on the destruction that Europe had caused in Africa through colonialism. Development aid thus started as a mechanism to provide help to develop the new nations.

Madubuike (2000) emphasized that, in the light of current development, it is urgent to pose the question: what sort of democracy is desirable for Africa? Is it the one bound to the dictates of West? When are we going to determine how much our raw materials are worth to our prospective buyers? Is it still possible to go back to our cultural values as a people, without the colonial mentality of wholesale Western norms?

With social forces and the struggle for survival continuously on the scene, the vital issues are inspiring individuals to pursue self-fulfilment and increasing awareness wherever the deepest secret of political modification is found. The conviction that real options to take command of the own destiny are available, or can be brought within reach, is the key to liberate people from adulterating discourses and from induced consent. A sensible definition of awareness is, therefore, necessary for examining an alternative to the existing reality.

2. Democracy, its origin, meaning and validity

One basic shortcoming created by the elastic use of the construct of democracy is the problem of its definition (Falaye 1998: 97). As one scholar wrote, “the promotion, practice and vicissitudes of democracy in different parts of the world have exposed it to some definitional haze and diverse forms of interpretations (Adediran 1996: 47). Therefore, it is not an issue of surprise that by the word “democracy”, many scholars could have cardinal divergent opinions. Two reasons advanced for this by K. A. Owolabi is that initial “democracy” has become in current usage, another word for political decency and civilisation” (Owolabi 1999: 5).

Democracy is derived from two Greek words: δῆμος and κρατία, meaning *people and rule*, respectively. The combination of both phrases has been translated to literally mean ‘rule by the people’. Perhaps, this explains why Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as the “government of the people and for the people”.

In ancient Athens, democracy was used to describe a practice in which all male citizens (therefore to the exclusion of women, children, slaves and foreigners) met freely on a regular basis to deliberate on issues impacting their lives. Everybody was playing the role of government by creating rules and regulations and running an orderly society. Direct democracy was made easier because the population was not too large for the convenience of such practice. However, we must understand that the economic systems of slavery and feudalism served as a catalyst to the success of direct democracy because the slave owners had ample time to partake in government business.

In a nutshell, etymologically, democracy does not stand for ‘rule of the people’, but for ‘power of the people’ because δῆμος means ‘people’ and κρατία means ‘power’ (the emphasis on power is also found in aristocracy, plutocracy, meritocracy, and theocracy). Rule is expressed by the suffix ‘-archy,’ such as monarchy (one ruler), anarchy (no ruler), oligarchy (family or small group rules) and hierarchy (structure of rule). Therefore, what is needed is a democracy that has evolved into ‘demoarchy,’ not just the power to elect, but rather the power to rule should be in the hands of the people, not delegation but representation.

3. Liberal democracy

In discussing the concept of liberal democracy, it is pertinent to start by separating liberalism from democracy, to trace and scrutinize their historical contexts in order to facilitate a clear meaning and understanding of the concepts. Liberal and democratic principles dominate contemporary political thought. The primary principle is that selection rests with the individual and not with society. The second principle attributes the ability of making decisions to the ‘majority’ (Samet and Schmeidler 2002). As its common etymological derivation suggests, the most basic meaning of the word “democracy” is the rule of the people. As the rule of the many, it is distinguished from monarchy (the rule of one person), aristocracy (the rule of the best), and oligarchy (the rule of the few). The word “liberal” on the other hand in the phrase ‘liberal democracy’ refers not to the matter of who rules, but to the matter of how that rule is exercised.

Liberalism and democracy are not necessarily compatible. While one emphasizes the resolution of disagreement by debate where ideally everyone is convinced and won over, the other resolves it by vote where some are silenced.

There are many other definitions that can validate this claim. Liberal democratic government may be defined in a minimal and procedural fashion as a political system where multiple political parties compete for control of the government through relatively free and fair elections (Foweraker

and Krznaric, 2000). However, beyond this minimum benchmark, it is recognized that liberal democratic performance in such political systems varies widely.

Liberal democracy, whether in theory or practice, seems to be a socio-political formation, which embodies two different tensions:

First, democracy can be seen as a principle of popular rule and popular control of decision-making. We can consider the principle of private property rights in the means of production on the one hand and distribution and exchange on the other. This tension can be expressed in many different ways. The idea of equal citizenship is embedded within the notion of popular rule is restricted by the relationships that control and subordinate possession rights within the sphere of production, and by the unequal weight of the guarantees to a minority within the sphere of politics. The range of popular government is limited by the resource allocation and distributive functions of the market, whether it is conceived in its classical or oligopolistic form.

Second, liberal democracy is a more specifically political term between democracy as a principle of popular control of decision-making, and a conception of representation that assigns the representative a competence to decide public issues according to his or her own conception of the public good. This competence goes beyond the reciprocal influence between leaders and leads to a concern with protecting the positions and prerogatives of the representative against encroachments from below. The elected representative thus embodies essential elements of the liberal ideal of the independent individual, capable of freely assuming responsibility for his or her decisions (Beetham 1992).

Liberal democracy is debatable as a mode of legitimate endorsement of power. The 'electorate' is not the equivalent of the 'people', and it does not even represent any meaningful social force or social group. The electorate is an amorphous mixture of people, delinked from social ties, social contexts and social networks, and it lacks any meaningful existence outside the ballot. It is best then to categorize the electorate not as a social grouping, but as a political construct.

In practical politics, a complicated network of political leaders, intermediary organizations, key persons and opinion-making institutions rearranges pre-existing social, economic, cultural, religious and ethnic power structures into bargained legal authorities. This method endows vested interests, economic elites and dominating powers with ample space to translate their fractional influences in society into concerted efforts to control the monopoly of power by the state (Sankatsing 2004).

4. Africa and liberal democracy

It is important to note that the spread of liberal democracy did not just occur “naturally” or “inevitably,” but it resulted from deliberate steps taken by the victors in World War II that not only governed and stimulated international economic relations but also regulated the internal matters “of the world’s nation-states.” Before the advent of colonialism, most African systems of government were not democratic in any modern sense. Gregory Mahler (1995) clearly explained African situation: he wrote that Africa is a large region of over fifty independent states with diverse political institutions, political histories, political culture and customs; yet, in spite of these differences, there are features the states have in common that affect them politically.

Most African countries were colonized and later gained independence from colonial powers. The political culture in most of the states is heterogeneous due to the various traditional ethnic groups and tribes within these states. Gregory further explains that elections and democratic politics in Africa have common histories because of how the countries were politically organized by their colonial masters. For instance, in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra-Leone and the Gambia, Africans were elected into legislative councils in the 1920s. After independence, the success and importance of elections in African countries became bleak and doubtful. “Elections in much of contemporary African countries were widely regarded as irrelevant or a sham. There was growing evidence of elections which did not reflect democratic values that those responsible followed neither the electoral procedure set out in the institutions bequeathed at independence nor other requirements of free and fair competition” (Mahler 1995: 357).

To differentiate the term African democracy from liberal democracy as used in this research, it is important to analyse the thinking of African leaders of post-independent Africa. According to Ahluwalia (2007), all the African leaders of post-independence Africa, such as Nyerere in Tanzania, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Kenyatta in Kenya, dismissed multiparty democracy, a fundamental principle of liberal democracy, as not being congruent with their African traditions. They argued that a system of one-party government was African and an essential part of the African tradition. Therefore, according to their definitions, African democracy is a form of government based on one-party rule. Political parties may exist nominally, but they may not freely organize political activities in opposition to the rulers and the ruling party.

Another description of African democracy put forward by African leaders after African independence is based on their argument that traditional African societies rested on a politics of consensus, not of competition – a principle they professed to be promoted by proponents of multiparty democracy. In the post-colonial era, the problem with this concurrence under this so-

called African democracy in terms of democratic governance is that it functioned primarily between the monarch and his/her retinue (mainly relatives of the monarchs, such as uncles and in-laws) and the ruling elites. The ordinary voters were rarely consulted. Their role was to adapt, not challenge, the commands of the ruling elites. In this scenario, the powers of the three branches of government, ordinarily separated in Western democratic states, are concentrated in one man (or woman) at the helm of government in a form of African democracy. According to Staffan Lindberg (2004), the 1950s was the initial period for Africa's first wave of democracy. This was the time Africans were struggling to gain independence from their colonial masters. Because African countries were still under their colonial powers, restrictions were imposed on them. In the Francophone countries there were limited electoral roles for Africans, while elections were restricted to the local government in Anglophone countries (Lindberg 2004).

Fayemi (2009) noted that democracy is embedded within political culture of traditional Africa society. This he noted can be found in the mode of governance in Botswana. To justify his position, he gave an historical analysis of the Yoruba (a major ethnic group in Nigeria) political culture before colonialism. He argued that the system of governance in the Yoruba political culture is a balance of "monarchy and democracy". Pre-colonial Yoruba political system comprised of metropolitan cities headed by the *OBA*- traditional ruler or monarch, subordinate villages and towns ruled by *BAALE* or *OLORI ILU* (Head of the village or town) subservient to the Oba. Each town is subdivided into quarters headed by a chief and quarters divided into compounds or extended families joined together by descendants from an ancestor headed by *OLORI EBI* (Family Head). Decisions taken at the various levels of governance is done by consensus and participatory democracy. Before vital decisions are taken at the compound level, all members of the family must be involved in the decision making process. Participation is regarded as a duty for all members, any who refuse to participate may face ostracism. Decision making process is done the same at the quarters and village or town levels. At the metropolitan city, the Oba must consult the chiefs, the cult and sect priests and representatives of vital sections of the populace such as traders, guild of hunters, army etc before making vital decisions.

Leadership is not hereditary- from father to son at any of these levels. The *BAALE OR OLORI EBI* is selected unanimously based on age and prominence. The quarter chiefs are selected amidst the leading family investing with the title and presented for approval to the members of the quarters and then to the *BAALE* or *OBA* for investiture. The *OBA* is selected amidst the families that constitute the royal clan and every male member is eligible for the position. The power to select the new *OBA* is given to a standing council of chiefs called – *AFOBAJE* (the KINGMAKERS) in consultation with the *IFA* oracle. Before the new *OBA* is selected, there are laid down rules and regulations that must be followed- the

eligible candidates are investigated for their moral disposition, leadership styles and skills and personality traits. The consensus of the general populace concerning the candidates are gotten by the the Kingmakers before final selection and the spiritual guidance of the oracle is sought. The new king upon installation is informed that his government is based on the decisions of his subjects. The people have the right to express their opinions about their leaders directly or through other means. The king is not expected to be autocratic since there are several checks and balances curtailing the excesses of any autocratic king. Yoruba history is replete with histories of autocratic kings and how they were rejected and forcibly removed by their subjects.

5. African democracy and political clientelism

The literature is fertile with definitions of clientelism. Some definitions tend to associate the phenomenon with democracy or democratization. Kitschelt (2008) refers to clientelism as a particular mode of principal-agent relationship in democracies. Clientelism, for several authors, is one of many historical forms in which interests are represented and promoted in political society. It is “a practical (although in many ways undesirable) resolution to the matter of democratic representation” (Roniger 2004: 360).

A recent survey of political clientelism by Susan Stokes was based primarily on European and recent Latin American political science literature and barely mentioned are the African literature or the anthropological and sociological sources that have been so influential for understanding of the concept in the low-income world. Focusing on the impact of formal electoral rules on these practices, Stokes defined clientelism as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support” (Stokes 2008).

Irrespective of the varied positions of scholars on patronage, an inherent component of patronage is an inbuilt relationship of power between patrons and clients. Of course, it is straightforward to assume that the patron should have a monopoly of power, since he is the one who provides material resources. It is however necessary to note that clients too exercise an enormous amount of power in the exchange relationship through the non-material resources they control. Indeed, the patron may control power over state and productive resources, but he requires the loyalty of clients to sustain it (Omobowale 2008).

Omobowale (2008) carried out a study on the values and meanings connected to patron-client relationships in Yoruba social thought looking at proverbs that relate to these relationships. The proverbs address the positive values the *baba-Isale* as patron is expected to portray in order to secure the loyalty of the client. Indeed, aside from providing goods, the patron is expected to be exemplar in

his character, all of which is embedded in the social values of *Iwa*, *Ihuwasi*, *Isesi* and *Ajumose*. Once a patron has internalized these ideals, which are relevant to the sustenance of the social structure, he would be recognized as an *omoluabi* and the services he extends to the clients would be significant. This study shows a cordial communal relationship among the Yoruba social group (Omobowale 2008). A similar structure exists among the Hausa: taking the Sokoto caliphate as an example, its administrative system was largely organized around a number of largely independent emirates pledging allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto. The Hausa kingdoms prior to the caliphate were run largely through hereditary succession for leadership.

Omobowale's study on the Ibadan further explains the clientelistic relationship among the social groups. His work clearly explains the perception of people that Ibadan men must be appointed at federal and state administrative levels to represent and protect Ibadan interests. More often than not, officials are selected for positions based on the recommendation of patrons. Of course, such officials are expected to be loyal to the patrons who recommended them, while also extending goods to clients through the patronage/clientelistic system that ensured their appointment (see also Omobowale 2008; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Omobowale 2006; Olurode 1986). He further emphasized in his work that clientelism is unique because it shows that clients do not operate as lone individuals but as members of associations that are deliberately created in order to have more clout with patrons; he emphasized that aggrieved clients, in addition, can exert leverage by changing, or threatening to change, their patrons. A patron is appointed on the basis of his financial strength and good character as exemplified in his philanthropic deeds and wisdom: "the appointment of a patron starts from money and then good character" (Omobowale 2008).

Omobowale concluded that it is important to admit that associations are pivotal to clientelistic structures. Clients do not relate to patrons as individual adherents, but they rather form social and welfare associations in order to increase their clout with prospective patrons. These associations subsequently become essential to the clientelistic system through the attraction of goods in exchange for loyalty. Indeed, once association members yield their support to particular patrons and politicians, they informally campaign and solicit the support of friends, family members and other close associates for a particular politician or party during election periods. This network of associational clients, patrons and politicians goes a long way towards determining who gets power and who retains power (Omobowale 2008).

6. Neo-colonialism: democratic hegemony and global clientelistic relationship

After political independence, many African leaders were perplexed to find that the economic, political and cultural exploitation of the continent actually continued in what became known as “neocolonialism” (Mwaura 2005: 5). Neocolonialism operated in varying ways in post-colonial Africa: control over government in the neocolonial state through foreign financial support or through the presence of foreign consortia serving and upholding foreign financial interests. Whichever way one analyses it, neocolonialism resulted in the exploitation of the African states, such that foreign capital entering African states to foster development “promoted” instead underdevelopment (Nkrumah 1975: 415). In some cases, neocolonialism has gone as far as using troops from colonizing nations to control or support the government of the neocolonial state. For example, French troops remained present and active in French colonies long after independence: in May 1996, French soldiers supporting the CAR government fired at national soldiers who were angry at their government for failing to pay their salaries (New York Times, 24/05/1996).

Kolawole Owolabi discussed extensively on the democratic hegemony the West left for Africa nations as a legacy. He asserted that “having realized that the days of colonization were numbered, the West discovered that it could not survive without exploiting the resources of the third world countries. One way by which the West can successfully realize this goal is to step up its cultural Imperialism and promote its democratic culture as the ideal culture” (Owolabi 1994: 115). Neocolonialism survived because the West established a dependent economic and political structure on the continent, which was inherited and retained by the new leaders. These “ambassadors” of the colonizers, as N. Mwaura (2000: 6) describes them, promoted foreign interests over domestic interests, maintaining the economic and political structures of the colonizers. They got involved in “brainwashing” their followers to support and uphold neocolonialism. The mass brainwashing of post-colonial rulers and their successors resulted in sustained neocolonialism to the detriment and underdevelopment of Africa. Deji Odetoyinbo (1994) chooses to describe the instilling of the neocolonial political culture in African leaders as “brain-dirtying”. According to Odetoyinbo, brainwashing forces the understanding of “cleaning or make pure” in one’s mind, which is far from being the case with neocolonialism. As a result, the minds of Africans “have been deeply and thoroughly sullied by our contact with Europeans” – Odetoyinbo continues - including all “contacts, past and present, wilful and enforced, intimate and casual, malicious and well intentioned”. (Odetoyinbo 1994).

7. The core question: can Africa develop?

7.1. Breaking the hegemony

As illustrated above, democracy as a modern style of governance was not born in Africa. The literature shows that in the early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank used a number of measures, such as financial aid and economic sanctions, to try to force many African countries into adopting a form of liberal democracy. According to Pausewang *et al.*, “today Europe is the driving force in spreading democracy in Africa”.

The most pertinent question is: are Africans doomed forever to be dependent on the West? Can't we rethink our persistent dependence on the West? Uroh (1998) argued that “by implication, Africa may not be able to develop beyond the stage dictated by the west”.

Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony can be used to explain the situation: it refers to social situation in which a certain social group or an alliance of social groups has “a total social control or authority” over other social groups, not as a result of direct imposition of ruling ideas, but by winning and shaping consent, so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural.

Hegemony and discourse are vital concepts for understanding the processes of awareness among social forces. A notable effort to overcome the constraints of economic reductionism within the Marxist tradition is Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, which highlights the role of non-economic factors. Hegemony is the influence exercised by enhancing legitimacy in society, while domination is exercised through control of the state. Hegemony “can be understood as the degree to which a combination of coercion and consent establishes authority and leadership without a direct resort to visible force or violence. It does not draw on naked power but on the awe towards power; therefore, the contribution of ‘power’ to ‘hegemony’ does not lie in its application but rather in the persuasive capacity of power as a potential and latent entity without the need to resort to direct force or violence” (Gramsci 1995: 57).

Hegemony is typically supported by discourses that justify narrations presented as self-evident truths to mitigate the perception of reality. Their prime function is to prevent people and social forces from becoming aware of their real conditions and development options. Once social forces become conscious of their own reality and of their capacity to act, conditions are ready for them to design viable channels for collective survival, starting with the pursuit of interests and objectives that are critical for the own group.

7.2. The need for social change and class consciousness

The most important single factor for triggering social change is awareness, defined as the sight of an alternative to existing reality. Two widely accepted tenacious myths surround the concept among social scientists and social reformers. The first is the tenet that the level of awareness and eagerness to take corrective action bears a causal relationship with the degree of pauperization, similar to Marx's *Verelendungstheorie*. Second, it is believed that change in awareness is impossible on short notice, as changing the mentality of people requires huge efforts during an extended length of time, sometimes even generations. By inference, structural social and political change becomes utopian. The history of Caribbean slavery demystifies this defeatist tenet that only serves the status quo and the vague concept of mentality, which nobody cares to define with precision.

However, class consciousness, according to Marx, is the transition from a 'class in itself' (a category of people having a common relation to the means of production) to a 'class for itself' (a stratum organized in active pursuit of its own interests). History dramatically shows that one can only dominate people by controlling their minds, thoughts and consciousnesses. It also provides the valuable lessons that, under the weight of harsh reality, avenues exist to trigger awareness on short notice. Accumulated frustration and hopelessness alone are not enough, but there comes a point that naked reality can overwhelm the strongest discourse. The time is then ripe for the minds and energies of people to be liberated by watching the conditions of their own reality, unmitigated by false narration. Evidence turned into action always triggers the motor of history.

8. Interrogating concepts: development vs. envelopment

All development theories of the last fifty years have failed, without exception. Worldwide, ambitious development initiatives derailed into deep crisis, casting the majority of humanity, living in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, into deep trouble and grave sorrow for the future. These failures, both in theory and in praxis, had one indisputable historical cause.

The empire that does not claim to bring civilization has yet to be born. By deduction, the other is the barbarian. What was labelled 'development' was, in reality, the very opposite, 'envelopment', a paternalist process to incorporate the other, to overwhelm, to enclose and wrap up by envelopment, as done with an envelope. Annexation, insertion and incorporation into an alien genealogy and teleology were the goal, rather than supporting the growth of inner forces and allowing them to flourish from within the society. In the false development/underdevelopment dichotomy, the transfer and mimicry of devices from abroad were taken as the prime agents of progress, in an

imperial attempt of projecting oneself onto other societies, instead of mobilizing the inner forces of communities. The correct definition of development is the mobilization of the potentialities and social forces in a project of self-realization, in interactive response to nature, habitat, resources, culture and history for the realization of a project of one's own. Development is a process from within that can trigger, support and sustain but can never donate by transfer, not even as a generous gift. This unmasking of the false development discourse has led to a new promising explanatory model, the development/envelopment paradigm, with development as self-realization and its negation, envelopment, as the incorporation of subdued people in a project that is alien to their internal social dynamism.

By merging the development/envelopment paradigm with the social-reality-based extradisciplinary method, a powerful practical tool becomes available to formulate democratic alternatives in the realm of politics. The extradisciplinary approach eliminates the dichotomy between theory and praxis by putting an end to the inverted logic of current social sciences that the analysis of academia determines how society is analysed. This reality-based de-academization of social science rejects autonomous social science disciplines and overcomes the gulf between theory and practice inherent in the academic tradition. Complex social reality and history demand specializations for purposes of study rather than autonomous disciplines derived from academia, but always with the compelling requirement to put bits together before making any final statement. Social reality, rather than fragmentation in disciplines, becomes both the starting place and the end of the scientific enterprise in the extradisciplinary approach.

With the development/envelopment paradigm, the nature of the alternatives of delegation and representation can be elaborated, since delegation is based on envelopment, while representation is an outcome of development.

Development, based on this new paradigm, immediately poses the critical issue to the political realm of how the free individual voice can help secure both its self-realization and the collective destiny in a future-directed, development-oriented politics. Development, democracy and representation go hand in hand. Only in their close conjunction, a genuine project of society is possible under the command of social forces as the architects of history. Only people jointly determining the path to mobilize their own potentialities can control their own destiny by taking their concerns, needs and aspirations as the focal point.

9. Recommendations and possible alternatives to liberal democracy

In history, alternatives are not found in encyclopaedias or the Internet but are constructed as a wilful act of conscious future-oriented people. Alternatives are always created in real life on roads heading to a future. Establishment of a synthetic democratic structure would be considered necessary. Development-based representation as the alternative to delegation is also the only escape route from social death and can promote development. Instead of people with muted voices, representation turns them into their own ombudsmen. At the same time, it opens the difficult but promising avenue to global harmony. An alternative democratic structure will ensure that rights of citizens are respected and kept. Citizens or groups in the society who are socially excluded will be given opportunity to be adequately represented. The new form of democracy will be one that takes into consideration the culture, beliefs, history and ideology of the people in the different African countries. This will form the basis of a new model for development in Africa.

9.1. Establishment of a democratic structure that supports the Afrikan project

For example, the United States and Canada drew a protectionist wedge against Japan's cheap industrial products, and Japan's foreign investments were restricted. However, in spite of these acts of discrimination by the West, and consequent economic depression back home, the Japanese were determined to build a "self-sufficient empire". They formulated policies that drive their political, cultural and diplomatic relationships (Madubike 2000). In this sense, Africa must develop its democracy in the traditional sense because the importance of traditional ruling system cannot be taken away from African society. Africans must develop immunity to foreign influences and structure their own political goals. Taking Japan, Germany and China as examples, whatever form of foreign influences they might have been exposed to at various points in their respective histories, they built their indigenous political systems without support from external factors. This form of democratic structure should take into consideration the existence of cultural diversity and plurality in the society and ensure equality of citizens and in their involvement in governance, this is the best the system to ensure development.

9.2. Democratizing political clientelism

It is pertinent to note that democratization has changed some of the key socio-political characteristics present in Africa while leaving others unchanged. Therefore, political clientelism will not disappear, but it will change in form and function as a result of these changes. However, Africa

has been characterized by unusually high levels of social inequality (van de Walle 2009). This seems inevitable, as the region's political and economic institutions have generated social and economic stratification.

Taking the Oyo state in Nigeria as an example, the Alafin (king or traditional ruler) claims that he is responsible for the installation of any political leader who will govern the state. This simply means that the power of traditional system and ruler can never be removed from Nigerian political culture. The people tend to be more loyal to their patron because they believe that they are closer to their patron than a political delegate as designed by liberal democracy. This is still evidenced in the current administration of Governor Abiola Ajimobi, whose administration seems unfavourable to the Oyo people despite visible infrastructural provisions.

10. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to look beyond the present democratic structure of liberal democracy. However, democracy and development should now be perceived in the African context. Having seen the importance of cultural development in every society, the historical background of liberal democracy, its etymological meaning, context and influences in our contemporary world, it is pertinent to assert that the so-called Third World nations should structure their democratic systems and developmental affairs without the influence of the West. Because liberal democracy received the benefit of the doubt for so many years, the Third World nations have more doubts about the benefits of development.

Our attention should be diverted away from delegation as it is practised in liberal democracies in which the traditional beneficiaries of the system are not the actors most inclined to modify it structurally. Rather than changing the rules of the game, what is at stake is changing the game itself in order to allow people to take command of their own destinies at a time when the stakes are high. Representative democracy is the only viable road left open to pursue global harmony by providing the minimum conditions to overcome three imminent threats, the collision in development, the collapse of ecology and the confrontation in religion, every single one of which directly endanger the survival of humanity. For most contenders in liberal democracy, corruption is not an excess of democracy, but the premium of democracy. Democratization of political clientelism is also pertinent so that the exchange relationship is visible between the political patrons and their clients in order to promote economic and social development. Since they are rational and tend to be calculative, the give-and-take principle will promote long-standing relationships in the political system.

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