Bhaṭṭa Jayanta:

Comprehension, Knowledge, and the Reduction of Testimony to Inference[1]

Alessandro Graheli

The present paper is an analysis of the defense of the epistemological autonomy of verbal testimony (śabda), against its reduction to inference, as found in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī. The article identifies the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Sāṅkhya positions hinted at in the Nyāyamañjarī, and it analyses the reuse by Jayanta of the arguments conceived by the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila. Unlike for Mīmāṃsakas, according to Jayanta the relation between language and reality is established by convention, but in its day-to-day usage it is clear that an a priori connection is a necessary condition for linguistic communication, so that the distinction between a fixed connection and a conventional one weakens. The analysis of Jayanta leads to two general conclusions: 1. In ancient Nyāya as attested by Jayanta there is no distinction between non-committal understanding and committal knowledge from words. Consequently, 2. in ancient Nyāya as attested by Jayanta the language is primarily examined from an epistemological viewpoint, as the conveyer of true statements. There are no "neutral" statements, and false statements are in fact inappropriate uses of language.

1. Introduction

The reasons why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we

perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between

them

(D. Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*)

1.1. The reduction of *śabda* to inference

The present paper is an analysis of the defense of the epistemological autonomy of verbal testimony (*śabda*), against its reduction to inference, as found in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*. This study has

been inspired by pioneering papers on the same passages of the NM, notably Matilal 1994 and Taber 1996. The present effort is more textually-oriented and aims at a contribution in the following respects:

• A more complete presentation of Jayanta's perspective on the issue.

• A deeper analysis of the relation of Jayanta's arguments with Kumārila's.

• A systematic identification and clarification of the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Sāṅkhya positions on the issue, as found in the NM.

Jayanta, an exponent of old Nyāya, stages a debate that integrates arguments from Mīmāṃsaka, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Buddhist sources.[2] Like Kumārila, by whom he is undoubtedly inspired, Jayanta does not explicitly label the various schools and positions, although these are more tidily arranged in Jayanta's presentation. In short, the Vaiśeṣika arguments in favor of a reduction of *śabda* to inference concern the necessary relation among the instrument of knowledge and the object of knowledge (*artha*),[3] on which both inference and *śabda* are based, as well as the unperceived *artha* which distinguishes both inference and *śabda* from direct perception. Quite differently, the Buddhist reduction mainly hinges on the inference of the intention of the speaker and on his authoritativeness. The Sāṅkhya defense of an independent epistemological status of *śabda* is based on the peculiarity of the need of a speaker, of his intention, and of specific processess on the side of the hearer, peculiarities not found in inference; the Sāṅkhya arguments, however, are considered inconclusive by Kumārila and Jayanta.

Some of the pre-Kumārila arguments and objections are summed up by Taber (1996: 22-23). In the present paper further more parallels from Nyāya, Buddhism, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā sources are provided, although an exhausting collection of Jayanta's sources goes beyond the scope of this paper and needs to be carried on elsewhere.

---

[2] As a general indication for non-specialists, the Nyāya tradition largely deals with problems of epistemology, dialectics and logic; Mīmāṃsā is mostly concerned with the interpretation of the Veda and defense of its authority; and Sāṅkhya is mostly known as a system of metaphysics. These three accept *śabda* as an instrument of knowledge, independent from inference. In Vaiśeṣika, also a system of metaphysics, and in Buddhism, which in the present debate refers to the epistemology of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, *śabda* is reduced to inference. For further details, see the introduction of the present volume.

[3] For the purposes of this paper, rendering *śabda* with "verbal testimony", "linguistic expression", etc., and *artha* with "object of knowledge", "meaning", etc., would be a potentially misleading choice. Since the discussion always revolves around *śabda* and *artha,* they will be left untranslated, in the hope that the context will help to understand their import better than an arbitrary English equivalent.

1.2. Understanding words and knowing from words

Upon hearing a linguistic expression, the epistemic reaction of the hearer could be considered committal, non-committal, or both. The issue is eloquently put by Matilal (1994: 348) as follows:

> It is frequently heard "I understand what you mean" and along with it comes the disclaimer "but I do not accept it". As knowledge or belief is based upon total acceptance, such an understanding of what the speaker means can hardly amount to knowledge on the part of the auditor. [...] then understanding (and the attendant interpretation) can be the intermediate stage in providing us with the final knowledge or belief that we may possibly derive from the testimony of [...] any [...] knowledgeable person.

According to Matilal (1994: 355) this scenario is not endorsed in Nyāya: "The Naiyāyikas were against the deployment of such a basic attitude prior to the belief-claim or knowledge claim that arises in the hearer".

Taber (1996: 20), while studying arguments in favour and against the reduction of verbal testimony to inference, noticed that this claim of an absence of distinction between committal and non-committal knowledge from words may not be applicable to Nyāya *tout court*:

> [...] I would like to suggest a minor qualification of Matilal's interpretation of the Nyāya position. While it is indeed the case that Nyāya, especially later Nyāya, rejects an initial grasp of the meaning of a statement as *the author's thought or intention*, it nevertheless does make a distinction between apprehending the meaning of a statement and apprehending its truth.

Taber cautions that his criticism of Matilal's characterisation of Nyāya is specifically based on the point of view of Jayanta, who flourished at the end of the 9th century. Taber, however, also thinks that this point of view can be extended to other Nyāya sources (Taber 1996: 20).

1.3. Jayanta and Mīmāṃsā

As in other sections of the NM, also in the passage studied here Jayanta extensively quotes and draws ideas from Mīmāṃsā works, and most often from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika.* But he also distances himself from Mīmāṃsā tenets not acceptable by Naiyāyikas. More specifically, for the present purposes, the assumption of the *artha* of individual words as a qualified individual (*tadvat*) is an essential aspect in which Jayanta differs from Kumārila and other Mīmāṃsakas, according to whom the *artha* is primarily a universal. Jayanta's reuses of Kumārila's statements should thus be

read, *mutatis mutandis*, with such distinctions in mind, for even when Kumārila's words are cited verbatim it is quite possible that terms denote radically different concepts in the two schools and are thus diversely intended by Jayanta, in the flow of his argumentation.

2. The context

2.1. The Nyāyamañjarī

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* is a treatise on the tenets of Nyāya, the system of epistemology, dialectics and logic traditionally rooted in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda Gotama (c. 200–400 CE). The NM was composed at the end of the 9th c. CE and it unfolds in 12 parts, called *āhnika*-s ("daily lessons").[4]

From NM 3 to NM 6, almost half of the whole NM, Jayanta debates issues related to the acquisition of knowledge from *śabda*. A crucial passage, the topic of this paper, concerns the status of *śabda* as an autonomous instrument of knowledge, or whether it should rather be reduced to inference. The issue of the reduction of *śabda* to inference has already engaged scholars such as Matilal, Chakrabarti, Taber and Ganeri, so there is not much scope to say something new. The goal of this paper is to present again the gist of their arguments in the flow of Jayanta's own treatment, to give them some new perspective, just like "flowers from previous chaplets may generate a new interest when rearranged on a new string."[5]

Jayanta's eloquence in representing views that oppose his own Nyāya tradition, to the extent that scholars often turn to the NM to figure out the original views, is well known.[6] The reason behind the popularity of the NM in modern studies, however, can be traced back not only to Jayanta's lucid and natural style of Sanskrit, but also to his strategically arranged questions and answers. The efficacy of philosophical arguments staged in a dialogical form is brilliantly captured by Gadamer (2000, II, 3, c: 746):

> The essence of the question is that it has a sense. A sense, however, is a direction. The sense of a question is thus the direction in which the answer must result, if it expects to

[4] An overview of the textual transmission and of the contents of the NM, as well as details on Jayanta's time and life, can be found in Graheli (2015, chapter 1).

[5] *vacovinyāsavaicitryamātram atra vicāryatām // tair eva kusumaiḥ pūrvam asakṛt kṛtaśekharāḥ / apūrvaracane dāmni dadhaty eva kutūhalam //* (NMᵛᵃ, I 3, 5–6).

[6] E. g., see Kataoka (2008: 3): "Jayanta explains Kumārila's discussions in a lucid manner [...] Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* can be used as a kind of commentary on or introduction to the *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika*".

be a meaningful, significant answer. The question puts the object of inquiry into a specific perspective.[7]

Jayanta's style of debate is thus a point of strength of his writings. The subject matter appears in full clarity exactly because of the well-structured and increasingly subtler objections and counter-objections. Hence, to render full justice to Jayanta's point of view, it is important to present the complete debate on a given issue.[8] The present attempt is to transmit the flavour of the debate found in the NM as exhaustively as possible.[9]

Furthermore, Jayanta tends to mirror, in his syntheses, the concatenation of the points raised by the staged opponents in the antitheses, so the philosophical import of a full section is significantly influenced by the very position of its various subsections, which will thus be presented in Jayanta's own sequence.

As mentioned above, in this paper the terms *śabda* and *artha* are not translated. The latter term, particularly, requires some explanation, since Jayanta is known for its peculiar views about it.

2.2. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on the *artha* of words

In tune with the realist, empiricist approach of mainstream Nyāya, Jayanta tends to assume the external reality of objects of knowledge,[10] which is true also for objects known by verbal testimony. Such denoted objects, according to *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.66, (NBhTha 132), *vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ*, can be individuals, shapes, or universals. Referring to this *sūtra*, Jayanta asks (NM[Va], II 47, 5-6):

evaṃ siddhe bāhye 'rthe [...] adhunā	Having thus established the external
vivicyate[11] *gośabdaḥ kim ākṛter vācakaḥ*	*artha* [...], now the word "cow" is going

---

[7] *In Wesen der Frage liegt, daß sie einen Sinn hat. Sinn aber is Richtungssinn. Der Sinn der Frage is mithin die Richtung, in der die Antwort allein erfolgen kann, wenn sie sinnvolle, sinngemäße Antwort sein will. Mit der Frage wird das Befragte in eine bestimmte Hinsicht gerückt.*

[8] In this sense Kei Kataoka has set the benchmark of NM studies, by his editions, translations and studies of thematic sections of the NM, each inclusive of all the objections and counter-objections.

[9] The text of NM[Va] has been checked and occasionally emended with the variants found in P and K, as well as GBh[Sha], according to the editorial principles explained in Graheli (2012) and Graheli (2015, chapter 5). A summary of the passage examined in this paper can be found in Potter (1977: 365).

[10] See also NM[Va], II 540, 16, where Jayanta distinguishes the teleological from the ontological use of the word (*arthaḥ arthyamānaḥ ucyate, na vasturūpa eva, abhāvasyāpi prayojanatvasaṃbhavāt /*)

[11] *vivicyate*] *vicāryate* NM[Va]

uta vyakteḥ atha jāter iti.	to be examined. Is it the signifier of the shape, of the individual, or of the universal?

Before Jayanta, the topic of this *sūtra* had been an object of dispute among Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas. Diṅnāga rejected the theory that common nouns refer to universals and saw usages in apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) as a problem in this theory: "If the word '*sat*' denotes the universal *sattā*, then it would not be co-referential with the words denoting particulars, such as '*dravya*', etc., and there would not be such expressions as 'sad dravyam', 'saṅ guṇaḥ' and the like" (Hattori 1996, 387).

Diṅnāga also mentioned with disapproval the notion that the *artha* of words is a *tadvat*, the "possessor of that": "[A *jāti-śabda* is not [a denoter] of a [particular] possessing that [universal] (*tadvat = jātimat*), because [it is] not independent [in denoting that object].[12]

The concept of *tadvat* as the *artha* of words is already introduced by Uddyotakāra in the *Nyāyavārttika*, though it is often associated to Jayanta and the NM, where it is discussed in depth. Merits and flaws of this theory have been discussed in Ganeri 1996 and Ganeri (1999, § 4.1, 4.2). Since for the purpose of the present paper it is important to understand Jayanta's position as clearly as possible, the relevant passages of the NM will be again presented and discussed here.

The *tadvat*, the 'possessor-of-that', would be the *artha* of common nouns denoting substances, such as "cow" — i. e., excluding nouns denoting unique individuals without extension, such as *ākāśa* ("ether"), which do not have a correspective universal (NMVa, II 59,4-60, 7):

anyeṣu tu prayogeṣu gāṃ dehīty[13] *evamādiṣu / tadvato 'rthakriyāyogāt tasyaivāhuḥ padārthatām // padaṃ tadvantam*[14] *evārtham āñjasyenābhijalpati*[15] */ na ca vyavahitā buddhir na ca bhārasya gauravam // sāmānādhikaraṇyādivyavahāraś ca*[16]	In other usages, such as [the injunction] "donate a cow!", they said that the *artha* of a word is the "possessor-of-that" (*tadvat*), because of pragmatic reasons (*arthakriyāyogāt*). The word directly expresses (*āñjasyenābhijalpati*) the artha, i. e., the

---

[12] Tr. Hattori 2000, 142. The Sanskrit version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* passage has been reconstructed in Muni Jambuvijaya 1976, 607, as *tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asambhavāt / bhinnatvād buddhirūpasya rājñi bhṛtyopacāravat*. It is also quoted in GBhSha, 137–138, albeit with *vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād* in *c*.

[13] *dehīty*] *dogdhīty* K

[14] *padaṃ tadvantam*] *padatadvantam* P

[15] *-bhijalpati*] *-bhijalpanti* P

[16] *ca*] *pi* NMVa

mukhyayā / vṛttyopapadyamānaḥ[17] *san nānyathā yojayiṣyate // tasmāt tadvānn eva padārthaḥ*[18] *//*

"possessor-of-that",[19] without interruptions in the cognitive process or anti-economical assumptions.[20] The practical usage, for instance in cases of apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), can be explained by direct signification, and not otherwise. Therefore only the "possessor-of-that" is the *artha* of the word.

Ganeri renders Jayanta's views on the *tadvat* as follows, translating NM*Shu*, 295:

'*Tadvān*' literally means 'this has that' (*tad asyāsti*), so what is meant is that a particular is the owner of a property. But if it is the particular which is the designatum, then the infinity and discrepancy faults recur, [especially] since the property is not [considered by you to be] an undesignated indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*). And if both [particular and property] are designated, then the word has an excessive [semantic] burden (Ganeri 1999: 103).

It may help to have a closer look to the text of the NM (NM*Va* II 59,13-16), which can also be translated as follows:[21]

nanu ko 'yaṃ tadvān nāma.
tad asyāstīti tadvān iti viśeṣa eva sāmānyavān ucyate. viśeṣavācyatve cānantyavyabhicārau tadavasthau. sāmānyaṃ tu śabdenānucyamānaṃ nopalakṣaṇam[22] *bhavati. ubhayābhidhāne ca śabdasyātibhāra ity uktam.*

[Objection:] What exactly is this "possessor-of-that"?
[Reply:] "Possessor-of-that", literally "this has that", is exactly a particular (*viśeṣa*) which possesses the universal (*sāmānya*). If the [mere] particular (*viśeṣa*) is assumed to be expressed, fallacies of endlessness and ambiguity ensue. And the universal (*sāmānya*),

---

[17] *vṛttyopapadyamānaḥ*] *vṛttyopapādyamānaḥ* NM*Va*

[18] *padārthaḥ*] *śabdārthā* K

[19] In the P reading, "they unhesitantly assert that the *artha* is exactly the 'possessor-of-that', i. e., of the word".

[20] The "interruption in the cognitive process" refers to objections about a possible overlapping of cognitive processes such as perception, mnemonic dispositions, memory, and prior knowledge of the relation among words and *artha*-s. The "anti-economical assumptions" are theories which involve the postulation of multiple unseen forces, such as the theory of the sphoṭa, in the view of Jayanta and the Mīmāṃsakas. Such problems are discussed in NM 6. 1.

[21] Ganeri's text of reference is NM*Shu*. In this paper, however, the more reliable text of NM*Va* is adopted and, wherever necessary, emended on the basis of the two best manuscripts, P and K.

[22] *nopalakṣaṇam*] *nopalakṣyamāṇaṃ* NM*Shu* NM*Va*

which is not expressed by a word, cannot be an accidental characteristic (*upalakṣaṇa*)[23] [of a particular]. And in the hypothesis that both [particular and universal] are designated [by a same word], there is an excessive burden on the word.

If common nouns such as "cow" are taken to designate particulars, indeed, major issues arise. By "endlessness" (*ānantya*) it is meant that, since potentially there are endless referents of a common noun, it is absurd to claim that it designates an individual thing. The "ambiguity" *(vyabhicāra)* is that a common noun may then refer to heterogeneous entities such as substances, qualities, etc., as in the case of the word *sat* ("existent", "real thing"), which may refer to a quality as well as to a substance (Hattori 1996, 337; 2000, 141).

A problem in Ganeri's interpretation of the passage is his use of the equivalent "property" for *sāmānya.* In the present context the Sanskrit term is clearly used, as a synonym of *jāti*, "universal". While Ganeri's use may suit the flow of his argumentation, it does not reflect the status of the universals in Jayanta's ontology.

Ganeri further explains Jayanta's position as follows, translating NMShu, 296:

> [Jayanta replies]: What is meant is this. The 'property-possessor' (*tadvān*) is not a particular individual, such as Śābaleya, which is indicated by the word 'this' [in 'this has that'], and it is not the collection of all the individual [cows, say] in the world. It is the substratum of a universal. The aforementioned particular Śābaleya is said to be the '*tadvān*' because it is the substratum of the universal [cowhood], and so neither infinity nor discrepancy are relevant [objections]. Nor do we admit that a word designates the qualificant [i.e. the particular] without designating the qualifier [i.e. the property]. Since [someone who understands the word] knows a relation [between it] and a property-substratum, [the word] just means a *tadvān*. So where is the word's excessive [semantic] burden? (Ganeri 1999, 103).

An alternative translation, and an improved NM text, run as follows (NMVa, II 63,14-64, 6):

ucyate. nedantānirdiśyamānaḥ	[Jayanta's synthesis:] We say: the
śābaleyādiviśeṣas tadvān, na ca sarvas	"possessor-of-that" is not a particular

---

[23] According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a universal inheres in a particular, it is not an accidental aspect of a particular.

trailokyavartī vyaktivrātas tadvān. kintu sāmānyāśrayaḥ[24] *kaścid anullikhitaśābaleyādiviśeṣaḥ tadvān ity ucyate. sāmānyāśrayatvān*[25] *nānantyavyabhicārayos tatrāvasaraḥ. na ca viśeṣaṇam abhidhāya*[26] *viśeṣyam abhivadati*[27] *śabda ity upagacchāmaḥ,*[28] *yenainam atibhāreṇa pīḍayema.*[29] *sāmānyāśrayamātre saṅketagrahaṇāt tāvanmātraṃ vadataḥ śabdasya ko*[30] *'tibhāraḥ. evaṃ ca*[31] *tadvato*[32] *nāsvatantratvād ityādidūṣaṇaṃ parihṛtaṃ bhavati.*

such as Śābaleya indicated by an ostensive individuation (*idantā*). Nor is the "possessor-of-that" the collection of all the individuals of the world. Rather, it is called "possessor-of-that" any unspecified (*anullikhita*) particular, such as Śābaleya, which is the substratum of a universal. Since it is the substratum of a universal, there is no scope for endlessness and ambiguity. And we do not endorse the idea that *śabda* designates an attribute and then it conveys the possessor of the attribute, so that we would cause the problem of overburdening this [*śabda*]. Since the conventional relation [between word and *artha*] is grasped exclusively in relation to this substratum of the universal, what would be the excessive burden of a *śabda* that expresses that from the very beginning? In this way, objections such as *tadvato nāsvatantratvād* are refuted.

The *tadvat*, in Jayanta's system, seems to have an external reality, rather than being a mental construct. The individual (e.g., 'cow') is the substratum of the correspective universal (e.g., 'cowness'). This individual-qualified-by-universal (e.g., cow-qualified-by-cowness), or possessor-of-

---

[24] *sāmānyāśrayaḥ* [...] *pīḍayema*] om. K

[25] *sāmānyāśrayatvān*] *sāmānyāśrayatvāc ca* NMShu NMVa

[26] *abhidhāya*] *anabhidhāya* NMVa

[27] *abhivadati*] *abhidadhāti* NMShu NMVa

[28] *upagacchāmaḥ*] *abhyupagacchāmaḥ* NMShu NMVa

[29] *pīḍayema*] *pīḍayemahi* NMShu NMVa

[30] *ko*] *kataro* NMShu

[31] *ca*] om. NMShu NMVa

[32] *tadvato*] *tadvator* NMShu

that, is the *artha* designated by a common noun (e.g., "cow"). In this way the objections of endlessness and ambiguity, caused by particularism, are neutralized. Since the very thing ontologically is an individual qualified by a universal, the operation occurs at once, by direct designation, and not in two separate instants, so also the charge of semantic burden does not stand anymore.

Jayanta seems to accept some degree of flexibility in the application of the *tadvat* concept, according to the context, in terms of the predominance of the particular, of the universal and the shape in given circumstances. This would also somewhat explain the formulation in *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.66. If this is the case, for Jayanta *tadvat* is not necessary synonym of *jātimat*, though it may be its most frequent application, because it can also be *ākṛtimat*:

<div style="display: flex;">
<div>

tuśabdo viśeṣaṇārthaḥ. kiṃ viśeṣyate.
guṇapradhānabhāvasyāniyamena
śabdārthatvam. sthite 'pi tadvato
vācyatve kvacit prayoge jāteḥ
prādhānyaṃ vyakter aṅgabhāvaḥ yathā
gaur na padā spraṣṭavyā iti sarvagaviṣu
pratiṣedho 'vagamyate. kvacid vyakteḥ
prādhānyaṃ jāter aṅgabhāvaḥ yathā
gāṃ muṃca gāṃ badhāna iti niyatāṃ
kāṃcid vyaktim uddiśya prayujyate.
kvacid ākṛteḥ prādhānyaṃ vyakter
aṅgabhāvaḥ jātis tu[33] *nāsty eva yathā*
piṣṭamayyo gāvaḥ kriyantām iti.

</div>
<div>

In the *Nyāyasūtra*, the word *tu* indicates a specification. What is specified? That the property of being the *artha* of a *śabda* implies, unrestrictedly, a primary-secondary relation. [To explain:] Once established that what is expressed is the possessor-of-that (*tadvat*), (1) in same cases the universal is primary and the individual secondary, as in the injunction "a cow should not be touched with one's feet". (2) in others, the individual is primary and the universal is secondary, as in "release this cow", "tie this cow" [...] (3) and in others, again, the shape is primary and the individual is secondary, while the universal is not there at all, as in "cows made of flour should be modelled" [...].

</div>
</div>

Ganeri (1999: 104-105) thinks that Jayanta's *tadvat* theory is logically flawed, because he "clearly cannot take 'property-possessor', the direct object in his meaning specification, as standing for a certain particular", and because "if this phrase is *mentioned*", it becomes tautological, because "the meaning clause becomes a mere restatement of the fact that 'A-hood-possessor' (A-*tvavān*) and 'A' are

---

[33] tu] om. NMVa

synonyms, which is a consequence of the fact that the abstraction and possession affixes are inverses of one another".[34]

An issue in Ganeri's interpretation seems to be whether it is legitimate to assume that the *tat* in *tadvat* is meant as a "property", i.e., as the *dharma* in the Nyāya theory of inference. If Jayanta believed in the ontological, external existence of particulars-qualified-by-universals, in his system a particular cannot but be a universal-possessor. The distinction between a *tadvat* and a *dharmin*, discussed in § 5.1 below, may help to draw the distinction between *sāmānya* and *dharma*: while the former is a universal, a *dharma*, at least in the context of inference, does not need to be so.[35]

Lastly, in the economy of this paper, it is important to stress that the *tadvat* concerns the *artha* of words, not that of sentences, as it will be explained below.[36]

2.3. About inference

In the following discussion on the reduction of *śabda* to inference, Jayanta analyzes formal aspects of possible versions of the inference from words to their objects. Since it is important to precisely present such inferential structures, a brief clarification on the simplified presentation of inferences adopted in this paper is in order. The formalization originally proposed by Schayer 2001, 106 and clarified by Ganeri 2001, 16 has been here adopted and simplified. The attempt is to render the gist of the Nyāya theory of inference as known at Jayanta's time, that is, without taking into consideration the developments of Navyanyāya.[37] Using Schayer's formalization, the complete smoke-fire argument, the stock example of inference in Nyāya, would run thus:

---

[34] Here Ganeri seems to invoke the *taddvatvam tad eva* rule of inference, which is an expression of x + *vat* + *tva* = x + *tva* + *vat* = x, because "the abstraction operator '-ness' and the concretization operator '-possessing' denote inverse operations" (Bhattacharyya 2001, 175; see also Matilal 2001, 212–213).

[35] As discussed next, in § 2.3.

[36] On Jayanta and his theory of sentence signification, see Graheli 2016 and Freschi and Keidan forthcoming.

[37] Thus some improvements in the formalization of Nyāya inferences, found in Bhattacharyya 2001 and Matilal 2001, have been here ignored. The central role of *paramārśa*, as described in Bhattacharyya 2001, 178, and on pervasion (*vyāpti*) (Bhatta-charyya 2001, 178; Matilal 2001, 206), come to mind. For Jayanta's discussion of inference theory, see NMVa, I 311, 8–11, 375, 3–4, and II 582, 15–23.

(1)	*ayaṃ parvato vahnimān*	This hill possesses fire	Sp
(2)	*dhūmavattvāt*	Because it possesses smoke	Hp
(3)	*yo yo dhūmavān,* *sa sa vahnimān*	For every x, if x possesses smoke, then x possesses fire	(x)(Hx ⊃ Sx)
(4)	*tathā cāyam*	This mountain possesses smoke	Hp
(5)	*tasmāt tathā*	Therefore this mountain possesses fire	∴ Sp

The (1) (*pratijñā*) can be subsumed in (5) (*nigamana*), and (2) (*hetu*) in (4) (*upanaya*), so that it is easier to focus on the *modus ponens*, implicit in the inference:

(x)(Hx ⊃ Sx)   If x possesses smoke, x possesses fire

Hp   This hill possesses smoke

∴ Sp   This hill possesses fire

That this is a formally valid inference is proven as follows:

1. (x)(Hx ⊃ Sx)

2. Hp

∴ Sp

3. Hp ⊃ Sp   1, Universal Instantation

4. Sp   3, 2, Modus Ponens

The relation of "possession" between terms has the technical sense of a "occurrence-exacting" relation (*vṛttiniyamaka*), i.e., it specifies the ontological presence of a property (*dharma*) *on* or *in* another thing, this thing being the possessor (*pakṣa*) of the property. "Property", again, does not need to be a quality as the English term suggests, and indeed in many Nyāya inferences it is a substance:[38]

> Navya-Nyāya logicians define the term 'property' (*dharma*) as the second member (*pratiyogin*) of occurrence-exacting relations which alone are to be denoted by the technical term 'possess' used in inferences. Thus the table *possesses* the book when the book is on the table, and the book is the *property* of the table (Bhattacharyya 2001, 174).

For simplicity's sake, however, I will use the term "property" to render *dharma* in inferential contexts and I will keep track of inferential arguments by means of a simple representation of the

---

[38] Matilal (2001, 209) proposes a relation of "location" of a "locus" and "locatee" as a solution of the ambiguity generated by the use of the term "property".

modus ponens. The purpose is to precisely identify the main components of each inferential argument —namely the probandum (*sādhya*), the locus (*pakṣa*) and the probans (*sādhana, liṅga,* or *hetu*)— and to keep track of the relation of concomitance between probans and probandum:

> If something possesses smoke, then it possesses fire
>
> This hill possesses smoke
>
> Therefore this hill possesses fire

3. Thesis: *śabda* is an autonomous instrument of knowledge

Jayanta's discussion of *śabda* starts with its definition found in the roots of his tradition *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7: "*śabda* is the instruction of an authoritative source" (*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*). This definition is expected to flawlessly and unambiguously justify the inclusion of *śabda* in the list of the four instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇā*-s) accepted in the *Nyāyasūtra*: perception, inference, analogy, and *śabda.*

Since there are also forms of pseudo-*śabda* that are not epistemically productive, Jayanta (NMᵛa, I 396,6-12) suggests that the expression "instrument to realize something" (*sādhyasādhana*) should be supplied from *sūtra* 1.1.6 (*akārake śabdamātre prāmāṇyaprasaktir iti tadvinivṛttaye pūrvasūtrāt sādhyasādhanapadam ākṛṣyate*). Moreover, the words "knowledge" (*jñāna*), *artha*, "certain" (*vyavasāyātmika*),[39] and "undeviating" (*avyabhicārin*) should be supplied from *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5, in order to exclude from the definition invalid cognitions such as recollections, doubts and errors (*jñānapadasya smṛtijanakasya vyavacchedāya cārthagrahaṇasya saṃśayaviparyayajanakanirākaraṇāya ca vyavasāyātmakāvyabhicāripadayor anuvṛttiḥ*).[40] The full definition would thus read: "*śabda* is the instruction of an authoritative source and is an instrument to achieve undeviating and certain knowledge of the *artha*" (*avyabhicārādiviśeṣaṇārthapratītijanaka upadeśaḥ śabda ity uktaṃ bhavati*).

Jayanta also reports an alternative interpretation of the *sūtra*, according to which the possibility of confusing cases of doubts and errors is already excluded by the presence of the words "instruction" and "authoritative source", in which case there is no need to supply words from previous *sūtra*-s.

---

[39] Potter (1977, 167) renders it as "well-defined". Although in other contexts *vyavasāya* indicates apperception or introspection (e. g., see NK, *s. v.*), in this context, at least in the interpretation of the *sūtra* found in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and in the NM, the introspective element does not seem predominant.

[40] Here Jayanta applies the technique of integrating elliptical aphorisms with words used in previous aphorisms, a technique called *anuvṛtti* and most famously used in Pāṇini's grammar.

In either way, it is clear that *śabda* is understood as enjoying the same epistemological status of perception, inference and analogy, since it can generate true knowledge of the *artha*.

The word "instruction" (*upadeśa*) in 1.1.7 is glossed by Jayanta (NMᵛᵃ, I 398,2-3) as "act of designation" (*abhidhānakriyā*). This gloss is further specified (NMᵛᵃ, I 399, 2), as "an act of designation which produces knowledge of its *artha* caused by the perception of an audible entity" (*śrotragrāhyavastukaraṇikā tadarthapratītir abhidhānakriyā*).

A common feature of perception, inference, analogy and *śabda* is that the knowledge produced by them also involves the knower's awareness that he is knowing something. Jayanta justifies the distinction among perception, inference and *śabda* on the basis of the instrumental cause used to obtain them, i.e. sense-organs, inferential marks, and an audible instruction, respectively, and on the basis of the different terminology commonly used to denote these distinct epistemic acts (NMᵛᵃ, I 399,12-13). Here Jayanta argues that *śabda* may have other applications, for instance as an inferential mark to prove the existence of ether (*ākāśa*),[41] which however do not disprove its distinct epistemic role in verbal testimony:

nanu pratīteḥ saṃvidātmakatvāt nābhidhānakriyā nāma kācid apūrvā saṃvid anyā vidyate. tatkaraṇasya copadeśatāyām atiprasaṅga ity uktam.

satyam, saṃvidātmaiva sarvatra pratītiḥ. sā cakṣurādikaraṇikā pratyakṣaphalam liṅgakaraṇikā 'numānaphalam śrotragrāhyakaraṇikā śabdaphalam. na hi dṛśyate anumīyate abhidhīyata iti paryāyaśabdāḥ. tatpratītiviśeṣajanane ca śabdasyopadeśatvam ucyate. ākāśānumānavivakṣādau tu tasya liṅgatvam eveti.

[Objection] A cognition is constituted of awareness (*saṃvit*),[42] therefore there is no [need of] such a new awareness called "act of designation". And there is a fallacy of over-application when one says that its instrument [i.e., *śabda*] has the nature of instruction.

[Reply] True, a cognition is invariably made of awareness, but it is still the outcome of perception when caused by the senses, of inference when caused by an inferential mark, of verbal testimony when it is caused by what is grasped by the hearing organ. In fact, "perceived", "inferred", and "denoted" are not synonyms. One says that [*śabda*] has the character of instruction when there is the production of a

---

[41] See VD, 308, where the inference is explained *tatra śabdaḥ* [...] *na sparśavad viśeṣaguṇaḥ. bāhyendriyapratyakṣād* [...] *nātma-guṇaḥ. śrotragrāhyatvād viśeṣaguṇabhāvāc ca na dikkālamanasām. pāriśeṣyād guṇo bhūtvā ākāśasyādhigame liṅgam.* Incidentally, in the *Nyāyakalikā* (Kataoka 2013, 20, 5–6), Jayanta shows an argument to infer that *śabda* is a quality as an example of *pa-riśeṣānumāna*.

[42] Cf. GBhSha, 213, 27: *samyag vettīti saṃvit.*

specific cognition. In other applications [of *śabda*] such as the inference of ether, however, one specifically refers to its character of inferential mark.

The idea that any conceptual knowledge is necessarily linguistic, regardless of its derivation from perception or inference, is debated and refuted by Jayanta from the viewpoints of several Nyāya authorities in NMᵛᵃ, I 209-225 (NM 2), and from his own perspective in NMᵛᵃ, II 476-485, where he maintains that the theory that every cognition is linguistic is a consequence of the erroneous assumption of a metaphysical unity of *śabda* and of a misguided denial of the reality of differences. This happens because language is used to describe any kind of knowledge:

*kas tvayā dṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ iti pṛṣṭo vakti gaur iti. kīdṛśaṃ te jñānam utpannaṃ gaur iti. kaṃ*⁴³ *śabdaṃ prayuktavān*⁴⁴ *gaur iti. tata eṣā bhrantiḥ. vastutas tu viviktā evaite śabdajñānārthāḥ* (NMᵛᵃ, II 480,12-15).	When asked "what *artha* did you see?", one may answer "Cow". And, "which type of knowledge did you get?" "Cow". And "which *śabda* did you use?" "Cow". This error [of thinking that there are no differences] is caused by such usages. But actually these *śabda*, knowledge and *artha* are distinct entities.

An authoritative source is characterized in NBhᵀʰᵃ ad 1.1.7 as "an instructor who (1) has directly experienced the true essence of the *artha* and (2) is moved by the desire to describe it as it is or it is not" (*āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptiḥ tayā pravartata ity āptaḥ*). Jayanta (NMᵛᵃ, I 399,12-13) enlarges the scope of (1), by writing that there is no restriction to things directly perceived by the instructor, because the authoritativeness is not undermined if the true nature of the *artha* is ascertained by the instructor through inference, etc. (*na tu pratyakṣeṇaiva grahaṇam iti niyamaḥ, anumānādiniścitārthopadeśino 'py āptatvānapāyāt*). Here the *ādi* of *anumānādi* suggests even the possibility of a chain of *śabda*-s.

If these two criteria are met, the source is authoritative regardless of the social or moral status. Echoing NBhᵀʰᵃ ad 1.1.7, Jayanta (NMᵛᵃ, I 400, 11) writes that the authoritativeness is possible in

---

⁴³ *kaṃ*] P K; *kīdṛśaṃ* NMᵛᵃ

⁴⁴ *prayuktavān*] P K; *prayuktavān asi* NMᵛᵃ

seers, cultivated people and barbarians (*ṛṣyāryamlecchasāmānyaṃ vaktavyaṃ cāptalakṣaṇam*).[45] Thus the authoritativeness of the source applies to both common and Vedic language. Unlike in Mīmāṃsā, indeed, even the authority of the Veda is based on the reliability of their author. The foundation of the epistemic validity of language on a trustworthy author also implies that language is not considered permanent, since any instructor's utterance must necessarily occur at some point in time; furthermore, it means that the relation between *śabda* and *artha* needs to be considered conventional, rather than natural.

Jayanta claims, therefore, that *śabda* is a separate instrument of knowledge, quite distinct from direct perception and inferential processes.

4. Antithesis: *śabda* is inference

Reductionists maintain that knowledge produced by *śabda* is nothing but inferential knowledge (NMVa, I 401,9-10):

śabdasya khalu paśyāmo nānumānād vibhinnatām / atas tallakṣaṇākṣepāt na vācyaṃ lakṣaṇāntaram //	We do not see a distinction of *śabda* from inference. Since [the proposal of] its specific character stands refuted, no separate definition needs to be formulated.

4.1. The Vaiśeṣika arguments

4.1.1. Analogy of content and relation

It is clear that both *śabda* and inference can convey knowledge of unperceived objects and are as such distinct from perception.[46] Moreover, they are both based on a necessary relation,[47] which is a general law that can be applied to any given instance and is not confined to individual cases, unlike with perception. A relation among particulars, indeed, would not be productive, because one would need

---

[45] In this connection, see also Chakrabarti 1994, 103, who makes the vivid example of a thief or a murderer confessing in court.

[46] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 55ab: *viṣayo 'nyādṛśas tāvad dṛśyate liṅgaśabdayoḥ //*

[47] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 25: *na cāpy ajñātasambandhaṃ padaṃ kiṃ cit prakāśakam / sambandhānanubhūtyāto na syād ananumānatā //*

to know an infinite number of relationships conforming to the infinite number of particulars (NMVa, I 401,11-14):[48]

parokṣaviṣayatvaṃ hi tulyaṃ tāvad dvayor api / sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca sambandhāpekṣaṇādvayoḥ // agṛhīte 'pi sambandhe naikasyāpi pravartanam / sambandhaś ca viśeṣāṇām ānantyād atidurgamaḥ //	To begin with, they both have an unperceived object, which must also be a generic one, since both *śabda* and inference depend on a [necessarily generic] relation: when the relation is not grasped neither *śabda* nor inference can function. A relation among particulars is inconceivable because of endlessness [of particulars and thus of their possible relations].

This is the basic Vaiśeṣika argument, in which *śabda* is reduced to inference because of its unperceived *artha* and because it is grounded, like inference, on a prior knowledge of a relation between the sign and the signified. The argument is developed in the commentaries ad *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9.1.3, "By this [exposition of inference] knowledge deriving from *śabda* has [also] been explained" (*etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam*).[49]

Therefore, since the epistemic content has the same characteristics (i.e., it is an unperceived and generic object), and since knowledge of the sign-signified relation is a necessary condition, *śabda* is not distinct from inference.

Prima facie, the alleged relation of concomitance between *śabda* and *artha* can be formulated as follows, since the locus is not clarified:

If x possesses *śabda*, x possesses *artha*

---

[48] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 35–37: *śabdānumānayor aikyaṃ dhūmād agnyanumānavat // anvayavyatirekābhyām ekapratyakṣadarśanāt / sambandhapūrvakatvāc ca pratipattir ito yataḥ // pratyakṣānyapramāṇatvāt tadadṛṣṭārthabodhanāt / sāmānyaviṣayatvāc ca traikālyaviṣayāśrayāt //*

[49] Praśastapāda explains it as follows (VD, Bhāṣya, 576): *śabdādīnām apy anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt. yathā prasiddhasamayasyāsandigdhaliṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye 'rthe bhavaty anumānam evam śabdādibhyo 'pīti. śrutismṛtilakṣaṇo 'py āmnāyo vaktṛprāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ, tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam.* Vyomaśiva glosses (VD, *Vyomavatī*, 577): *tathā śabdādeḥ kārakajātasyānumānasāmagryām antarbhāve tatphalasyāpi phale 'ntarbhāvo jñāta eva.* [...] *samānavidhitvāt samānalakṣaṇayogitvād iti* [...]. And Candrānanda (CVṛ, ad 9. 20): *yathā kāryādismṛtisavyapekṣam anumānaṃ trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārthaṃ ca tathaiva śābdaṃ saṅketasmṛtyapekṣaṃ trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārthaṃ ca.*

4.1.2. Analogy of sign

Just like inference, *śabda* works by means of a *sign* which, once directly perceived, can cause knowledge of an object (NMVa, I 402,1-2):[50]

yathā pratyakṣato dhūmaṃ dṛṣṭvāgnir anumīyate / tathaiva śabdam ākarṇya tadartho 'py avagamyate //	Just like fire is inferred after the perception of smoke, after hearing a *śabda* its object is known.

Hence, insofar as the sign, there is no distinction between inference and *śabda*.

If x possesses *śabda*, x possesses *artha*

This x possesses *śabda*

Therefore this x possesses *artha*

4.1.3. Analogy of relation

Moreover, *śabda* is grounded on a relation of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireka*), just like inferential processes (NMVa, I 402,3-4):[51]

anvayavyatirekau ca bhavato 'trāpi liṅgavat / yo yatra dṛśyate śabdaḥ sa tasyārthasya vācakaḥ //	Agreement and difference apply also here, just as with an inferential sign. [The relation of agreement is:] The *śabda* perceived in a given [*artha*] (*yatra*) is the signifier of that very *artha*.

Hence, even from the point of view of the peculiar type of relation among the sign and the signified, which must be known in advance, no distinction can be made. Inferences for which there are examples both in agreement and difference — i.e., for which both a positive example (*sapakṣa*) and a negative one (*vipakṣa*) can be stated — are the most common ones. The theory, then, is that the *śabda* inference is of the *anvayavyatirekin* sort.[52]

---

[50] This text passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda, 36b: *ekapratyakṣadarśanāt*.

[51] This passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda, 36a: *anvayavyatirekābhyām*.

[52] The *anvayavyatirekin* inference is the one explicitly endorsed by Buddhist logicians. While there is scope to accomodated the *kevalānvayin* inference, the *kevalavyatirekin* one is explicitly rejected, unlike in Nyāya from Uddyotakara onwards (Matilal 1998, 117). On the similarity with Mill's method of agreement and difference used to build inductive reasonings, as well as on rendering *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in such terms, see Matilal 2001, 200.

If x possesses *śabda*, x possesses *artha*

If x does not possess *artha*, x does not possess *śabda*

4.1.4. Analogy of property-possessorship

Both *śabda* and inference are based on knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā*, the possession of a property by a locus (NMVa, I 402,5-6):[53]

pakṣadharmatvam apy asti śabda eva yato 'rthavān / prakalpayiṣyate pakṣo dhūmo dahanavān iva //	There is also [in both] the characteristic of being the property possessed by a locus, because *śabda* possesses the *artha* and is thus accepted as a locus, just like smoke possesses the property "fire".

The objector, here, seems to argue that the *śabda* epistemic process is an inference like the one in which fire is inferred with smoke as the locus and smoke-ness as the probans:

If smoke possesses *smoke-ness*, it possesses *fire*

This smoke possesses *smoke-ness*

Therefore this smoke possesses fire

4.1.5. Analogy of universal sign

Furthermore, the sign is a universal, and not a particular, just like in inference (NMVa, I 402,7-8):[54]

tatra dhūmatvasāmānyaṃ yathā vahati hetutām[55] */ gatvādi*[56] *śabdasāmānyaṃ tadvad atrāpi vakṣyati //*	Just like there (in the fire inference) the universal "smoke-ness" has the property of being the inferential reason,[57] so even here (in *śabda*) the universal of *śabda*, e.g., *gatva*, etc., can have it.

---

[53] This text passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda, 36c: *sambandhapūrvakatvāc ca.*

[54] This text passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda 37b: *adṛṣṭārthabodhanāt.*

[55] *yathā vahati hetutām*] P NMVa; *yathāvagatihetutaḥ* K

[56] *gatvādi*] P K; *gotvādi* NMVa

[57] The *tas* suffix in *avagatihetutaḥ* may be explained by means of a metaphorical application of *sūtra* 5.4.48 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *ṣaṣṭhyā vyāśraye.*

The inferential sign is *gatvādi*, i.e., the universal of the phonemes *g*, *au* and *ḥ*, which is possessed by the locus, i.e. the word *gauḥ* ("cow"), and by which the *artha* 'cow' is inferred, since it is also possessed by the locus *gauḥ*:

> If *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*, then it possesses 'cow'
>
> This *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*
>
> Therefore this *śabda* possesses 'cow'

Therefore no distinction should be made, because there is an analogy insofar as the universality of the sign.

The Vaiśeṣika reduction, based on the reason stated in VD, *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, 576, "because [*śabda*] has the same rules [as inference]" (*samānavidhitvāt*), is thus completed. Jayanta next mentions some Sāṅkhya arguments in defense of the autonomy of *śabda* from inference.

4.2. The Sāṅkhya defense of *śabda* is inconclusive

On the strength of the evidence presented above, *śabda* should not be considered as different from inference, because of their analogous epistemic content (*viṣaya*) and formal components (*sāmagrī*).[58] There are some minor differences between *śabda* and inference, but these are not decisive and do not require a distinct categorization. Specifically, there are three aspects that can be found in *śabda* but not in inference (NMVa, I 402,9-14):

evaṃ viṣayasāmagrīsāmyād ekatvaniścaye / na vilakṣaṇatāmātraṃ kiñcid anyatvakāraṇam // pūrvavarṇakramodbhūtasaṃskārasahakār itā / puruṣāpekṣavṛttitvaṃ vivakṣānusṛti[59]kramaḥ // ityādinā viśeṣeṇa na pramāṇāntaraṃ bhavet / kāryakāraṇadharmādiviśeṣo 'trāpi nāsti kim //	In this way, since the unity has been ascertained due to a similarity of epistemic content and formal components (*sāmagrī*), a discrepancy of characters by itself should not be a reason for otherness. The peculiarities [of *śabda*] are (1) the assistence of mental dispositions (*saṃskāra*), generated by [the perception of] past phonemes uttered in sequence, (2) the requirement of a person [in the form of the speaker], (3) a sequence of sounds conforming to the intention [of the

---

[58] On the use of the term *sāmagrī*, cf. VD, *Vyomavatī*, 577: *tathā śabdādeḥ kārakajātasyānumānasāmagryām antarbhāve tatpha-lasyāpi phale 'ntarbhāvo jñāta eva.*

[59] *-sṛti*] P NMVa; *smṛtiḥ* K

speaker]. By means of such specificities *śabda* ought not to be considered a separate instrument of knowledge, because there is nothing special in its effect, cause, property, etc.

These three requirements correspond to the arguments listed in the *Ślokavārttika* as inconclusive reasons for the independency of *śabda*, at least in part attributed to Sāṅkhya sources and not considered by Kumārila a valid defense of the autonomy of *śabda*.[60]

The two reasons are not effective to prove a distinction. In the first reason, although the role of mental dispositions and phonemes is indeed a peculiarity of *śabda*, this concerns the psychological acquisition of linguistic sounds, not the acquisition of knowledge of the *artha*. As for the second reason, although the speaker's intention to designate something is indeed a necessary condition and might be considered a distinction from inferential processes, it is not an exclusive character of *śabda*, since it is observed also in non-verbal situations. As such, it cannot be used as a peculiar characteristic of *śabda* (NMVa, I 402,15-17):[61]

yatheṣṭaviniyojyatvam api nānyatvakāraṇam / hastasaṃjñādiliṅge 'pi tathābhāvasya darśanāt //	Even the application according to an intention is not a cause for otherness, because an intention is observed also in the cases of ostensive indications by hand, gesture, etc. [which are not verbalized and thus they are no instances of *śabda*].

One may argue that while in inferences a clear awareness of the relation and of an illustration is necessary, this does not happen in verbal knowledge. This apparent dissimilarity, however, relates to the peculiarities of unfamiliar and familiar objects of knowledge: in the former case an illustration

---

[60] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 15cd–17: *bhedaḥ sāṅkhyādibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam // pūrvasaṃskārayuktāntyavarṇavākyādikalpanā / vivakṣādi ca dhūmādau nāstīty etena bhinnatā // yair uktā tatra vaidharmyavikalpasamajātitā / dhūmānityaviṣāṇyādiviśeṣān na hi bhinnatā //*

[61] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 19–20: *yatheṣṭaviniyogena pratītir yāpi śabdataḥ / na dhūmāder itīhāpi vyabhicāro 'ṅgavṛttibhiḥ // hastasaṃjñādayo ye 'pi yadarthapratipādane / bhaveyuḥ kṛtasaṅketās te talliṅgam iti sthitiḥ //*

and a relation must be explicitly stated, while in the latter one the process is automated and the illustration does not need to be recollected (NMᵛᵃ, I 403,1-2):[62]

dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvam abhyaste viṣaye samam / anabhyaste tu sambandhasmṛtisāpekṣatā dvayoḥ //	Inference and *śabda* are analogous also because in cases of a frequently recurring object a specific illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) [which corroborates the relation] is not anymore required, while when the object is not recurrent, they both require the recollection of the relation [corroborated by a specific illustration].

Furthermore, one may consider the existence of polysemous expressions as a reason to see *śabda* as an independent instrument of knowledge, but the ambiguity generated by such expressions occurs also in the epistemic results of perception and inference (NMᵛᵃ, I 403,3-6):[63]

anekapratibhodbhūti[64]*hetutvam api dṛśyate*[65] */ aspaṣṭaliṅge kasmiṃścid aśva ityādiśabdavat // sphuṭārthānavasāyāc ca*[66] *pramāṇābhāsato yathā / liṅge tathaiva śabde 'pi nānārthabhramakāriṇi //*	When the inferential sign is unclear multiple impressions can be generated, like [multiple meanings can be generated] by the word *aśva*. And just like in the case of an inferential sign there can be no determination of a distinct *artha* due to a faulty instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*), so [it can happen] in the case of a *śabda* producing the erroneus knowledge of multiple *artha*-s.

Here Jayanta exemplifies polysemy by means of the word *aśva*, which can mean both "horse" and "you grow" (see GBhˢʰᵃ, 71). He also uses the term "pseudo-instrument of knowledge" (*pramāṇābhāsa*), as done elsewhere in the NM (NMᵛᵃ, II 630, 3), where he explains that a genuine instrument of knowledge cannot be falsified (*bādhyabādhakabhāvānupapatteḥ*), and that when a

---

[62] Cf. ŚVRᵃ, śabda 33–34: *dṛṣṭāntānabhidhānaṃ ca dhūmādau vyabhicāritam / prasiddhatvād dhi tatrāpi na dṛṣṭānto 'bhidhīyate // anabhyaste tv apekṣante śabde sambandhinaḥ smṛtim / atra prayukta ity evaṃ budhyate hi cirāt kvacit //*

[63] Cf. ŚVRᵃ, śabda 24cd, *na cehāśvādiśabdebhyo bhedas teṣāṃ pratīyate*, as well as ŚVRᵃ, śabda 32, *yas tv anirdhāritārthanām anekapratibhodbhavaḥ / sa liṅge 'py asphuṭe dṛṣṭas tasmān naitena bhidyate //*

[64] *pratibhodbhūti*] P K; *pratibhotpatti* NMᵛᵃ

[65] *dṛśyate*] P K; *vadyate* NMᵛᵃ

[66] *navasāyāc ca*] P K; *navasāyāś ca* NMᵛᵃ

falsification occurs it is because a pseudo-instrument of knowledge was used. This principle may be applied to any instrument of knowledge, be it perception, inference, or *śabda*.

4.3. The Buddhist arguments

4.3.1. The universal of trustworthiness

Even when *śabda* generates only an impression the epistemic value of the deriving knowledge is guaranteed by the authoritativeness of the statement. According to an often quoted passage originally ascribed to Diṅnāga, *śabda*-derived knowledge can be explained as an inference based on the universal "authoritativeness" as the inferential sign (NM[Va], I 403,7-11):[67]

api ca pratibhāmātre śabdāj jāte 'pi *kutracit / āptavādatvaliṅgena janyate*[68] *niścitā matiḥ // ata eva hi manyante* *śabdasyāpi vipaścitaḥ /* *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā //*	Moreover, in some cases even if by *śabda* itself only an impression is produced, a certain knowledge can be generated by means of the inferential sign of authoritativeness. Therefore learned people think that *śabda* has the character of inference because of the undisputedness of a trustworthy statement.

This seems to suggest, again, a separation between comprehension, or a vague impression of the *artha* generated by *śabda*, and knowledge, which is actually produced by an inference from the inferential sign "authoritativeness of the statement".

The passage *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād* may also be interpreted as "because of the undisputedness common to (*sāmānya*) authoritative statements (*āptavāda*) [and inference]", though this may not be what Jayanta has in mind here, if the interpretation of Cakradhara reflects his intention. In the GBh[Sha], 72, indeed, there are two alternative interpretations of the argument:

āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād iti yathā *dhūmasāmānyād agnisāmānyaniścaya* *evam āptavādasāmānyād*	Just like from the universal of smoke the universal of fire is ascertained, so from the universal of an authoritative

---

[67] The argument is found in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, svārthānumāna, 216ab; Taber (1996: 22) also quotes the *Tātparyaṭīkā* ad *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 (Thakur 1996), "The theory probably originated with Diṅnāga; Vācaspati attributes it to him". Vācaspati introduces the argument with *yathoktaṃ bhadantena*. See also *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* (ŚV[Ra], śabda 23cd).

[68] *janyate*] P NM[Va]; *jayate* K

avisaṃvādāditvasāmānyaniścaya ity arthaḥ. āptavādānāṃ vāvisaṃvādaḥ sāmānyaṃ rūpam, yo ya āptavādaḥ sa so 'visaṃvādīty arthaḥ.

statement the universal of undisputedness is ascertained. Alternatively, the undisputedness of authoritative statements is the same [as that of inferences]: whatever is authoritative, is undisputed.

In the first interpretation the term *sāmānyam* denotes a universal, while in the second it indicates the similarity of *śabda* and inference. The first interpretation can be expressed as follows, perhaps with the *artha* as a locus, though this is not clarified in the GBh:

If an *artha* possesses authoritative-statement-ness, then it possesses undisputedness
This *artha* possesses authoritative-statement-ness
Therefore this *artha* possesses undisputedness

In the second *śabda* may be the locus:

If a *śabda* possesses authoritativeness, then it possesses undisputedness
This *śabda* possesses authoritativeness
Therefore this *śabda* possesses undisputedness

4.3.2. The inference of the speaker's intention

Going back to the notion of *śabda* as a locus that possesses an external object, this does not make sense, because there cannot be a relation of possessorship between an ephemeral *śabda* and a stable object. A better reductionist formulation is to say that the probandum of the *śabda* inference is the speaker's intended signification, rather than the *artha* (NMVa, I 404,1-2):[69]

kiñ ca śabdo vivakṣāyām eva prāmāṇyam aśnute / na bāhye vyabhicāritvāt tasyāṃ caitasya liṅgatā //

Rather, *śabda* can have epistemic validity only in relation to an intention to speak, and not to an external object, because [such an inferential mark] would be flawed by ambiguity. The status of inferential sign of that (*śabda*) is only in [proving] that [intention of the speaker].

The flaw of ambiguity is that the same *śabda* may refer to different things according to the speaker's intention, so one necessarily needs to first determine the intention. The allegation is that a

---

[69] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 39cd: [PP:] *pratyayaḥ kiṃnimitto 'rthe* [UP:] *vaktṛbuddheḥ.*

śabda proves nothing but the speaker's intention, in an inference in which the locus must necessarily be the speaker, although this is not explicitly stated by Jayanta:

> If a speaker possesses *śabda*, then it possesses an intention to speak
>
> This speaker possesses *śabda*
>
> Therefore this speaker possesses an intention to speak

5. Synthesis: *śabda* is not inference

5.1. Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika arguments

5.1.1. Disanalogy of content and relation

Jayanta begins his rebuttal by a deconstruction of his opponent's position (§ 4.1.1) into a dilemma (*vikalpa*): are we referring to *śabda* in its form of sentence or single word? The *artha* of a sentence cannot depend on a pre-established relation and thus it cannot be known by an inferential process, because if that were the case it would be impossible to explain the knowledge produced by newly composed sentences (NM^Va, I 404,3-7):[70]

atrābhidhīyate.[71] dvividhaḥ śabdaḥ padātmā vākyātmākāś ca[72] / tatra vākyam anavagatasambandham eva vākyārtham avabodhayitum[73] alam, abhinavakavi[74]viracitaślokaśravaṇe sati padapadārtha[75]saṃskṛtamatīnāṃ tadarthāvagamadarśanāt. ataḥ sambandhādhigama[76]mūlapravṛttinā 'numānena tasya kaiva sāmya[77]saṃbhāvanā.

There are two kinds of *śabda*, words and sentences. Of these, a sentence is capable of conveying its *artha* without knowledge of a relation, since it is observed that competent people (*saṃskṛtamati*) can know the *artha* upon hearing a newly composed verse. Being this the case, how can a similarity with inference occur, since it (inference) operates on the basis of the knowledge of a relation?

---

[70] Cf. ŚVD^va, Pārthasārathi's *Nyāyaratnamālā* ad śabda 54: *īdṛśasya śabdasyānumānād bhedaṃ pratijānāti "anumāneneti". dvidhā śābdaṃ, padaṃ vākyaṃ ca. tatra padam abhyadhikābhāvād apramāṇam.*

[71] *atrābhidhīyate*] P K; *tatrābhidhīyate* NM^Va

[72] *vākyātmākāś ca*] P K; *vākyātmā ceti* NM^Va

[73] *avabodhayitum*] K; *avagamayitum* NM^Va ; P n.a.

[74] *-kavi-*] K; om. NM^Va ; P n.a.

[75] *padārtha*] K; om. NM^Va P n.a.

[76] *sambandhādhigama*] P NM^Va; *sambandhāvagama* K

[77] *tasya kaiva sāmya*] P; *tasyaikaikarūpatva* K; *tasya kathaṃ sāmya* NM^Va

Notably, Jayanta's theory of sentence signification is a modification of the Bhāṭṭa one, *abhihitānvaya*, according to which the meaning of a sentence is produced indirectly, by a combination of the designated meanings. Jayanta adds to the picture a contextual factor which he calls *tātparya* (see Graheli 2016). The capacity of competent speakers to compose and understand new sentences is one of the main arguments in favour of the *abhihitānvaya* theory and against the *anvitābhidhāna* one.

The case of an analogy of relation may still stand, however, if the signification of single words is meant (NMVa, I 404,8-9):[78]

padasya tu sambandhādhigamasāpekṣatve saty api sāmagrībhedād viṣayabhedāc cānumānād bhinnatvam /	Single words, however, do require knowledge of a relation. There is still a difference from inference, because of a difference in content and formal components (*sāmagrī*).

Having thus discarded the possibility that the *artha* of a sentence, in the epistemological process of *śabda*, is inferential, in the following sections the discussion pertains to single words.

5.1.1.1. The epistemic object of single words cannot be inferential

As explained above (see § 2.2), Jayanta maintains that the referent of words is the possessor-of-that (*tadvat*), thus the content of knowledge derived from single words is quite unlike that of inferential knowledge (NMVa, I 404,10-12):[79]

viṣayas tāvad visadṛśa[80] eva padaliṅgayoḥ. tadvanmātraṃ padasyārtha iti ca[81] sthāpayiṣyate. anumānaṃ tu vākyārthaviṣayam, atrāgniḥ, agnimān parvata iti tataḥ[82] pratipatteḥ. uktaṃ ca tatra dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī sādhya iti.	As far as their epistemic content, a word and an inferential mark are dissimilar. It will be established how the *artha* of the word is a "possessor-of-that" (*tadvat*). Inference, instead, has the *artha* of a sentence as its object,

---

[78] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 55–56, *viṣayo 'nyādṛśas tāvad dṛśyate liṅgaśabdayoḥ / sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca padasya sthāpayiṣyati // dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭaś ca liṅgīty etac ca sādhitam / na tāvad anumānaṃ hi yāvat tadviṣayaṃ na tat*, and ŚVRa, śabda 109, *vākyārthe hi padārthebhyaḥ sambandhānubhavād ṛte / buddhir utpadyate tena bhinnā sāpy akṣabuddhivat.*

[79] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 56–57ab: *dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭaś ca liṅgīty etac ca sādhitam / na tāvad anumānaṃ hi yāvat tadviṣayaṃ na tat // sāmānyād atiriktaṃ tu śabde vākyasya gocaraḥ*

[80] *visadṛśa*] P NMVa; *dhisadṛśa* K

[81] *ca*] P NMVa; *hi* K

[82] *tataḥ*] P NMVa; om. K

because from an inference a knowledge in the form of "here [there is] fire; [there is] a fire-possessing hill" derives. And there[83] it was stated that the probandum of an inference is a property-possessor (*dharmin*) qualified by a property.

The content of an inference involves a *dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī*, an unperceived property possessed by a perceived locus (*pakṣa* or *dharmin*) qualified by a perceived property.[84] The content of knowledge is thus the already perceived locus qualified by a previously unknown property (e.g., the hill qualified by fire); this is the *artha* of a sentence, not of a single word. One may argue that this is not a sentence, but rather a complex word: why do we need to say that "fire-qualified hill" is a sentence? The answer is that a necessary condition of a sentence is the satisfaction of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), which occurs in the case of a well formed inference (NM^Va, I 405,1-5):[85]

nanu padāny api vākyārthavṛttīni saṃsanti[86] *gomān aupagavaḥ kumbhakāra iti.*

satyam, kintu teṣv api sākāṅkṣatāsty eva, padāntaram antareṇa nirākāṅkṣapratyayānutpādāt. gomān ka ity ākāṅkṣāyā anivṛtteḥ.[87]

[Objection] There are also words with the function of the *vākyārtha*, such as "owner of cattle, descendant of Upagu, maker of pots".

[Counter-objection] True, but in those there is still expectancy, because without other words the fulfilment of expectancy is not achieved, since the question "which owner of cattle?" is not satisfied [until the sentence is completed].

---

[83] In ŚV^Ra, anumāna 47cd, *tasmād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā*; or in the NM section on inference, see NM^Va, I 309, 10.

[84] In NBh^Tha, ad 1.1.35 the probandum of an inference is said to be either the property qualified by the property-possessor or the property-possessor qualified by the property (*sādhyaṃ ca dvividhaṃ dharmiviśiṣṭo vā dharmaḥ śabdasyānityatvaṃ dharmaviśiṣṭo vā dharmy anityaḥ śabda iti*). In NM^Va, I 310, 5, however, the latter option is not accepted.

[85] Cf. ŚV^Ra, śabda, 59cd: *vākyārthe 'pi padaṃ yatra gomadādi prayujyate.*

[86] *saṃsanti*] *śaṃsati* K; *santi* NM^Va

[87] *ākāṅkṣāyā anivṛtteḥ*] *ākāṅkṣān ativṛtteḥ* K

5.1.1.2. The content of word-derived knowledge is the property-possessor, not the possessed property

A further difference is that in inferences the qualifier of a qualified, i.e., the property of a locus, is the object of discovery, while in words-derived knowledge it is the qualified, i.e. the that-possessor (NMVa, I 405,6-7):

api ca parvatādiviśeṣyapratipattipūrvikā	Moreover, from an inferential sign
pāvakādiviśeṣaṇāvagatir liṅgād udeti.	knowledge of a qualifier such as "fire",
padāt tu viśeṣaṇāvagatipūrvikā	arises, based upon [perceptual]
viśeṣyāvagatir iti viṣayabhedaḥ.	knowledge of the qualified, such as
	"hill". From a word, instead,
	knowledge of the qualified arises,
	based on knowledge of the qualifier.[88]
	Thus there is a different epistemic
	content.

In inferential knowledge, the previously unkwnown entity, i.e., the probandum, is the qualifier (e.g., fire), which is known on the basis of the perception of a qualified entity (e.g., the hill). On the contrary, in word-derived knowledge the unknown entity that is revealed by the word "cow" is an individual 'cow' qualified by a generic 'cowness'. In fact,

> smoke-possessing hill ⊃ **fire**-possessing hill
>
> is quite different from
>
> "cow" → cowness-possessing **cow**

Even in the case of a complex word such as "cow-possessor", the *artha* would still be an individual 'cow-possessor' qualified by a generic 'cow-possessorness'.

5.1.2. Disanalogy of sign

If *śabda* were the inferential sign and the *artha* the probandum, there would still be the need to explain the locus of such an inference. Obviously, if *śabda* is the sign, it cannot simultaneously be the locus (NMVa, I 405,8-10), as alleged in § 4.1.2 above:[89]

nanu uktaṃ yathā 'numāne dharmaviśiṣṭo	[Objection] It has been said that in

---

[88] GBhSha, 72: "because from the word "cow" comes knowledge of an individual object qualified by cowness" (*gośabdād got-vaviśiṣṭapiṇḍāvagateḥ*).

[89] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 62cd–63ab: *atha śabdo 'rthavattvena pakṣaḥ kasmān na kalpyate // pratijñārthaikadeśo hi hetus tatra prasajyate /*

dharmī sādhyaḥ, evam ihārthaviśiṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ sādhyo bhavatu.

maivam, śabdasya hetutvāt. na ca hetur eva pakṣo bhavitum arhatīti.

inference the object to be known is a property-possessor qualified by the property. Here [in the case of *śabda*], similarly, the probandum is a *śabda* qualified by an *artha*.

[Counter-objection] It cannot be so, because in your inference *śabda* was supposed to be the inferential sign, and a sign cannot be the locus as well.

An inference in which the locus and the probans are the very same entity, in fact, would be absurd:

If *śabda* possesses *śabda*, *śabda* possesses *artha*

This *śabda* possesses *śabda*

Therefore this *śabda* possesses *artha*

The objector may than argue (see § 4.1.5) that the *śabda* inference is analogous to that in which the probandum 'fire' is inferred as a property possessed by the locus 'smoke', from the probans 'smoke-ness' (NM^{Va}, I 405,11-406, 3):[90]

nanu[91] yathāgnimān ayaṃ dhūmaḥ, dhūmatvāt, mahānasadhūmavad, ity uktaṃ[92] "sā deśasyāgniyuktasya dhūmasyānyaiś ca kalpitā" ity evaṃ gośabda evārthavattvena sādhyatām. gatvādi[93]sāmānyaṃ ca hetūkriyatām iti.

[Objection] "This smoke possesses fire, because of smoke-ness, like the smoke in the kitchen". It is said "others postulate that this [object to be known, *prameyatā*] is the locus (*deśa*, here synonym of *pakṣa*) "smoke" endowed with fire". Similarly, the very word *gauḥ*, possessing the property of its *artha*, is the thing to be inferred, and the universal [of the phonemes] *gatva*, etc., is the sign.

---

[90] Cf. ŚV^{Ra}, anumāna 47cd–48ab: *tasmād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā // sā deśasyāgniyuktasya dhūmasyānyaiś ca kalpitā*, where the proposal that *deśa* is smoke is attempted. Cf. also GBh^{Sha}, 72: *sā deśasyeti prameyatā, pūrvasminn ardhe "tasmād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā"*. Moreover, cf. ŚV^{Ra}, śabda, 63cd: *pakṣe dhūmaviśeṣe hi sāmānyaṃ hetur iṣyate //*

[91] *nanu*] *atha* K

[92] *uktaṃ*] *uktañ ca* K

[93] *gatvādi*] *gośabdatvād ityādi* NM^{Va}

> If smoke possesses smoke-ness, then it possesses fire
>
> This smoke possesses smoke-ness
>
> Therefore this smoke possesses fire

> Such an inference would be analogous to

> If *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*, then it possesses 'cow'
>
> This *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*
>
> Therefore this *śabda* possesses 'cow'

The problem, here, is that if *śabdatva* (e.g., *gatvādi*) were the probans and *śabda* (e.g., *gauḥ*) the locus, what exactly would the probandum be? Jayanta here opens a trilemma (NM^{Va}, I 406,3-5):[94]

kiṃ arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ[95] *sādhyate artha*[96]*pratyāyanaśaktiviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā arthapratītiviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā*[97].	[Counter-objection] What would then be the object of knowledge [of such an inference]? Would it be [the locus *śabda*] qualified by (1) the *artha*, (2) by the capacity to cause knowledge of the *artha*, or (3) by the cognition of the *artha*?

5.1.2.1. An *artha* cannot be possessed by a *śabda*

The first, most obvious option is that the probandum is the *artha* possessed by the *śabda* (NM^{Va}, I 406,6-12):[98]

na tāvad arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ sādhyam, śailajvalanayor iva śabdārthayoḥ dharmadharmibhāvābhāvāt. athārthaviṣayatvāc chabdasyārthaviśiṣṭatety[99] *ucyate, tad apy ayuktam, tatpratītijananam antareṇa tadviṣayatvānupapatteḥ. pratītau tu*	To begin with, the probandum cannot be the qualification by the *artha*, because between *śabda* and *artha* there is no property-possessor relation such as the one between fire and hill. An *artha* such as 'cow' is not ontologically resting on the word "cow". If one were

---

[94] The following passage summarizes the options discussed in ŚV^{Ra}, śabda 66–77.

[95] *arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ*] *arthaviśiṣṭavattvaṃ* Ppc; *arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā* NM^{Va}

[96] *artha*] om. NM^{Va}

[97] *arthapratītiviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā*] *arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ* K

[98] Cf. ŚV^{Ra}, śabda 65cd–66ab: *kathaṃ cārthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na tāvad deśakālataḥ // tatpratītiviśiṣṭaś cet paraṃ kim anumīyate /*

[99] *-viśiṣṭatety*] *-viśiṣṭas sa ity* K

siddhāyāṃ kiṃ tadviṣayatva[100]*dvārakeṇa*
taddharmatvena. yadi tu
tadviṣayatvamūlā[101]
taddharmatvapūrvikārthapratītiḥ[102]*,*
arthapratītimūlaṃ ca[103] *tadviṣayatvam,*
tad itaretarāśrayam. tasmān
nārthaviśiṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ sādhyaḥ.

to argue that *śabda* is qualified by the *artha* because *artha* is the content of the cognition generated by it, this would be improper, because until its cognition is generated, the (*artha*) cannot possibly be the content of the cognition. And once the cognition has been generated, what is then the purpose of being the property by being the content? If the cognition of the *artha*, caused by being a property [of *śabda*], is based on being the content [of the cognition], and if being the content of the cognition needs to be preceded by the existence of the cognition of the *artha*, then there is a circular argument. Therefore the probandum cannot be the *śabda* qualified by the *artha.*

The reductionist tries to requalify the relation of possession in terms of "being the content of". This may be legitimate, because, as explained in Bhattacharyya 2001, 177, in Indian inferences the occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiniyamaka*) relation between probans and locus, the "relation of possession", does not need to be the same of the one between probandum and locus, in other words it can be asymmetric. Jayanta, however, argues that the result of the inference, namely that 'cow' is the content of the cognition generated by *gauḥ*, needs to be known before the inference is performed, which leads to a *petitio principii*. Even if accepted, the inference would thus be trivial, if not superfluous. The problem of explaining the acquisition of the general law of concomitance would remain, although a well-formed inference could be formulated:

If *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*, then it possesses (i.e., its content is) 'cow'

This *śabda* possesses (i.e., in it the universal *gatvādi* inheres) *gatvādi*

Therefore this *śabda* possesses (i.e., its content is) 'cow'

---

[100] *viṣayatva*] *viṣaya* K

[101] *mūlā*] *mūla* P; *mūlatvaṃ* K

[102] *-pūrvikārthapratītiḥ*] *-pūrvakā* K

[103] *ca*] om. NMVa

5.1.2.2. The capacity of making the *artha* known cannot be possessed by the *śabda*

The second alternative is that the probandum is that *śabda* possesses the capacity to generate knowledge of the *artha* (NMVa, I 406,13-15):[104]

nāpy arthapratyāyanaśaktiviśiṣṭaḥ, tadarthitayā śabdaprayogābhāvāt. na śaktisiddhaye śabdah kathyate śrūyate 'pi vā. arthagatyartham evāmuṃ śṛṇvanti ca vadanti ca.	Nor is *śabda* qualified by the capacity to cause knowledge of the *artha*, because it is not used for this purpose (*tadarthitayā*): *śabda* is not uttered and heard for the sake of proving a capacity; rather, [people] hear and utter a *śabda* only with the purpose of knowing the *artha*".

Using a word to cause knowledge of the *capacity* of generating knowledge of the *artha* is obviously not the common use of language. The inference is in itself valid, but it cannot be the inferential process *of* learning from words, i.e., of knowing an *artha*, though it may be used *to describe* the process of learning from words:

> If *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*, then it possesses the capacity of generating knowledge of 'cow'
> This *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*
> Therefore this *śabda* possesses the capacity of generating knowledge of 'cow'

5.1.2.3. The knowledge of the *artha* known cannot be possessed by the word

The third alternative is that the probandum is "knowledge of the *artha*" possessed by *śabda* (NMVa, I 406,16-19):[105]

nāpy arthapratītiviśiṣṭāḥ śabdaḥ pakṣatām anubhavitum arhati siddhyasiddhivikalpānupapatteḥ. asiddhayā 'pi[106] tadvattvaṃ śabdasyārthadhiyā katham. siddhāyāṃ tat[107]pratītau vā kim anyad anumīyate.	Nor can a *śabda*, when qualified by knowledge of the *artha*, enjoy the status of locus, because of the impossibility to solve the dilemma: has [the cognition of the *artha*] been accomplished or not [before the inference takes place]? If knowledge of the *artha* has

---

[104] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 66cd: *na pratyāyakaśaktiś ca viśeṣasyānumīyate.*

[105] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 75–77: *tasmād utthāpayaty eṣa yato 'rthaviṣayāṃ matim / tatas tadviṣayaḥ śabda iti dharmatvakalpanā // tatra vācakatāyāṃ vaḥ siddhāyāṃ pakṣadharmatā / na pratītyaṅgatāṃ gacchen na caivam anumānatā // gamakatvāc ca dharmatvaṃ dharmatvād gamako yadi / syād anyonyāśrayatvaṃ tu tasmān naiṣāpi kalpanā //*

[106] *pi*] *hi* K

[107] *tat*] *ca* K

not yet occurred, how could *śabda* possess that [knowledge of the *artha*] (*tadvattvam*, i.e. *arthapratītivatvam*)? And if such knowledge has already occurred, what is then left to be inferred?

As in § 5.1.2, the inference would be trivial, because "knowledge of 'cow' " would already be present before the inferential process begins:

> If *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*, then it possesses (i.e., it generates) knowledge of 'cow'
>
> This *śabda* possesses *gatvādi*
>
> Therefore this *śabda* possesses knowledge of 'cow'

The defect of tautology in the inference, however, could be charged also to common inferences such as the smoke-fire one, because prior knowledge of the invariable concomitance is a feature of any inference (NM^{Va}, I 407,1-4):[108]

jvalanādāv api tulyo vikalpa iti cet, na hi tatrāgnir dhūmena janyate, api tu gamyate. iyaṃ tv arthapratītir janyate śabdenety asyām eva siddhāsiddha[109]*vikalpāvasaraḥ. tasmāt tridhāpi na śabdasya pakṣatvam*	[Objection] The same argument could be raised in the case of 'fire', etc. [Counter-objection] No, because the property 'fire' is not generated by smoke, but rather known [by it]. 'Knowledge of the *artha*', instead, is generated by *śabda*, so there is scope for the dilemma of accomplishment or non accomplishment, if it is considered the property of the locus *śabda*. Therefore, in any of the alternatives of the trilemma, *śabda* cannot have the status of locus.

---

[108] Cf. ŚV^{Ra}, śabda 80–82: *dhūmavān ayam ity evam apūrvasyāpi jāyate / pakṣadharmamatis tena bhidyetottaralakṣaṇāt // na tv atra pūrvasambandhād adhikā pakṣadharmatā / na cārthapratyayāt pūrvam ity anaṅgam itaṃ bhavet // na ca dharmī gṛhīto 'tra yena taddharmatā bhavet / parvatādir yathā deśaḥ prāg dharmatvāvadhāraṇāt //*

[109] *siddhāsiddha*] *siddhāsiddhatva* NM^{Va}

There is a further inconsistency in the status of locus of *śabda*: according to Nyāya, *śabda* is ephemeral by nature and as such cannot possibly be the locus of something that lasts in time (NM^Va, I 407,5-9):[110]

api ca gośabde dharmiṇi[111]
gatvādisāmānyātmakasya hetor grahaṇaṃ
tato vyāptismaraṇam tataḥ parāmarśaḥ
tato 'rthapratipattir[112] *iti*
kāladrāghīyastvād dharmī tirohito bhavet.
na parvatavad avasthitis tasyāsti,[113]
uccaritapradhvaṃsitvāc[114] *chabdasya.*

Moreover, if the word *gauḥ* were the property-possessor (i.e. the locus possessing the property to be inferred), due to the span of time elapsed, the property-possessor would have disappeared: the inferential sign constituted by the universal *gatvādi* is grasped; then the necessary concomitance (between *gatvādi* and *artha*) is remembered; then there is the inferential reasoning (*parāmarśa*); then there is knowledge of the *artha*. That [locus, i.e. the word *gauḥ*] has no stability through time, unlike a hill, because *śabda* disappears right after having been uttered.

Even common sense speaks against the notion of *śabda* as the locus of the *artha* (NM^Va, I 407,9-11):

na ca śabdam arthavattvena lokaḥ
pratipadyate. kintu śabdāt pṛthag
evārtham iti na sarvathā śabdaḥ pakṣaḥ.
ato dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ
sādhyasyehāsambhavāc chabdaliṅgayor
mahān viṣayabhedaḥ.

People do not conceive *śabda* in terms of possessing the *artha*, but they rather regard *artha* as something quite distinct from *śabda*; hence a *śabda* cannot possibly be a locus. Therefore, since here the object of knowledge cannot be a property-possessor qualified by a property, there is a huge difference in the epistemic content of *śabda* and inferential signs.

---

[110] This reason is not found in Kumārila, who, as a Mīmāṃsaka, conceived *śabda* as permanent and not ephemeral (cf. the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā debate in the commentaries on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.6–23). Kumārila discussed the undesired consequences arising from *śabda* as a permanent *liṅga* in ŚV^Ra, śabda 87–89.

[111] *dharmiṇi*] *dharmiṇi sādhye* K

[112] *-pratipattir*] *pratītir* K

[113] *tasya asty*] *tasya / api tu* NM^Va ; om. K

[114] *-pradhvaṃsitvāc*] *pradhvaṃsitvaṃ* NM^Va

The opponent claimed (see § 4.2) that there is also a similarity of causal components in the inferential and verbal processes. Jayanta points to the substantial differences in this respect (NMᵛᵃ, I 407,12-408, 2):[115]

sāmagrībhedaḥ khalv api.	There is certainly a difference also in
pakṣadharmānvayādirūpasāpekṣam	its components (*sāmagrī*). Inference has
anumānaṃ vyākhayātam. śabde tu na[116]	been explained as something that
tāni santi[117] *rūpāṇi. tathā ca śabdasya*	requires formal aspects (*rūpa*)[119] such
pakṣatvapratikṣepān na taddharmatayā	as a property of the locus, a relation of
gatvādisāmānyasya liṅgatā. na cārthasya	agreement (*anvaya*), and so on. These
dharmitvam[118]	characteristics, however, are not found
siddhyasiddhivikalpānupapatteḥ.	in *śabda*. And similarly, since the
	notion that *śabda* is the locus has been
	discarded, the universal *gatvādi*, etc.,
	cannot be the inferential sign that is a
	property of that *śabda*. Nor can the
	artha be a property-possessor (*dharmin*,
	i.e. the locus), because the two
	hypotheses of completeness and
	uncompleteness are both untenable.

5.1.3. Disanalogy of property-possessorship

In § 4.1.5. it was argued that *śabda* possesses both a *śabdatva*, intended as phonemic sound, and the corresponding *artha*. Yet, *śabda* cannot be the locus, as shown above. The reverse, the possibility of the *artha* being the locus, is absurd, because an *artha* cannot possibly be the substratum of the *śabda* (NMᵛᵃ, I 408,2-408, 3):[120]

na ca taddharmatvaṃ śabdasya śakyate	Nor can *śabda* have the character of

---

[115] Cf., for the first part, ŚVᴿᵃ, śabda 98: *tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śābde pratyakṣavad bhavet / trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt*. For the second part, cf. ŚVᴿᵃ, śabda 68–69ab, *tasmād arthaviśiṣṭasya na śabdasyānumeyatā / kathaṃ ca pakṣadharmatvaṃ śabdasyeha nirūpyate // na kriyākartṛsambandhād ṛte sambandhaṃ kvacit*, and ŚVᴿᵃ, śabda 72cd, [...] *tasmān na pakṣadharmo 'yam iti śakyā nirūpaṇā //*

[116] *na*] P NMᵛᵃ; om. K

[117] *santi*] P NMᵛᵃ; om. K

[118] *dharmitvam*] P NMᵛᵃ; *dharmatvam* K

[119] Here *rūpa* may recall Dignāga's *trairūpya* rule, the three conditions of a valid inference.

[120] Cf. ŚVᴿᵃ, śabda 74cd: *na taddeśādisadbhāvo nābhimukhyādi tasya vā //*

vaktum, tatra vṛttyabhāvāt

being the property of the locus, because it (*śabda*) does not reside in it (in *artha*).

One could then argue that although the *artha* is not in a spatial relation with the *śabda*, it has a causal relation with 'knowledge of itself' and could thus be the locus of 'knowledge of the *artha*' (NMᵛa, I 408,3-408, 5):[121]

tat[122]*pratītijanakatvena tu*[123]
taddharmatāyām ucyamānāyāṃ pūrvavad
itaretarāśrayam.[124]
pakṣadharmādi[125]*balena pratītiḥ.*
pratītau[126] *ca satyāṃ*
pakṣadharmādi[127]*rūpalābhaḥ.*

If the status of being its (of the *artha*) property is explained has the causation of its [own] cognition, then there is again the same circular argument as before: the cognition [of the *artha*] is there on the strength of being the property of the locus; the property of the locus is known [only] once the cognition [of the *artha*] is already there.

As before, there would be a *petitio principii*:

If an *artha* possesses *gauḥ*, then it possesses cognition-of-'cow'

This *artha* possesses *gauḥ*

Therefore this *artha* possesses cognition-of-'cow'

Even common sense dictates that an *artha* does not have a natural relation with a *śabda*, unlike the smoke-fire relation, so that by mere observation one could grasp the relation of signification (NMᵛa, I 408,6-408, 9):[128]

---

[121] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 75–77: *tasmād utthāpaty eṣa yato 'rthaviṣayāṃ matiṃ tatas tadviṣayaḥ śabda iti dharmatvakalpanā // tatra vācakatāyāṃ vaḥ siddhāyāṃ pakṣadharmatā / na pratītyaṅgatāṃ gacchen na caivam anumānatā // gamakatvāc ca dharmatvaṃ dharmatvād gamako yadi / syād anyonyāśrayatvaṃ hi tasmān naiṣāpi kalpanā //*

[122] *tat*] P K; om. NMᵛa

[123] *tu*] P K; om. NMᵛa

[124] *itaretarāśrayaṃ*] P; *itarāśrayaṃ* K; *itaretarāśrayaḥ* NMᵛa

[125] *-dharmādi*] P NMᵛa; *-dharmatādi* K

[126] *pratītau*] P NMᵛa; *tatpratītau* K

[127] *-dharmādi*] P NMᵛa; *-dharmatādi* K

[128] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 78: *na cāgṛhītasambandhāḥ svarūpavyatirekataḥ / śabdaṃ jānanti yenātra pakṣadharmamatir bhavet //*

api ca yady arthadharmatayā śabdasya pakṣadharmatvaṃ bhavet, tadā[129] *anavagatadhūmāgnisambandho 'pi yathā dhūmasya parvatadharmatāṃ gṛhṇāty eva*[130] *tathā 'navagataśabdārtha*[131]*sambandho 'py arthadharmatāṃ śabdasya gṛhṇīyāt. na ca gṛhṇātīty*[132] *ato nāsti pakṣadharmatvaṃ śabdasyeti.*

Moreover, if *śabda* were the property of the locus, i.e. of the *artha*, then, just like someone perceives smoke as a property of the hill, even if he does not know the smoke-fire relation [and thus cannot perform the inference], in the same way someone could grasp *śabda* as a property of the *artha*, even without knowing the *śabda-artha* relation. But this does not happen, so *śabda* cannot be the property of the locus.

5.1.4. Disanalogy of relation

The relation of concomitance between a *śabda* and its *artha*, taken for granted by the opponent (§ 4.1.3), is not warranted. In actuality there is no concomitance, neither spatial, nor chronological (NMVa, I 408,10-15):[133]

anvayavyatirekāv api tasya durupapādau, deśe kāle ca[134] *śabdārthayor anugamābhāvāt. na hi yatra deśe śabdaḥ tatrārthaḥ. yathoktaṃ*[135] *śrotriyaiḥ, "mukhe hi śabdam upalabhāmahe bhūmāv artham" iti. vayaṃ tu karṇākāśe*[136] *śabdam*[137] *upalabhāmaha ity āstām etat. nāpi yatra kāle śabdaḥ tatrārthaḥ, idanīṃ*

Also the relation of agreement and difference is hardly tenable, since there is no co-existence of *śabda* and *artha*, neither in time nor in space. For, it is not that wherever there is a *śabda*, there is also its [corresponding] object. As said by the ritualists (*śrotriya*s): "[...] because we perceive *śabda* in the

---

[129] *tadā*] NMVa; *tad* K; P n.a.

[130] *eva*] P NMVa; om. K

[131] *śabdārtha*] P NMVa; om. K

[132] *gṛhṇātīty*] P NMVa; *gṛhṇāty* K

[133] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 86: *yatra dhūmo 'sti tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭaḥ / na tv evaṃ yatra śabdo 'sti tatrārtho 'stīti niścayaḥ //* Cf. also ŚVRa, śabda 65cd, *kathaṃ cārthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na tāvad deśakālataḥ*, as well as Pārthasārathi's *Nyāyaratnamālā* thereon, where the Yudhiṣṭhira example is found: *kena sambandhenārthaḥ śabdaṃ viśinaṣṭi. na tāvad ekadeśakālatayā, yudhiṣṭhiraśabda-deśakālayor yudhiṣṭhirasyābhāvād ity āha —katham iti.* The quote attributed to the *śrotriya*-s is found, verbatim, also in ŚBh, ad 1.1.5 (See Frauwallner 1968, 36, 23).

[134] *ca*] P NMVa; *pi* K

[135] *yathoktaṃ*] P NMVa; *tathoktas* K

[136] *karṇākāśe*] P NMVa; *karṇāvakāśe* K

[137] *śabdam*] P K; *śrotram* NMVa

yudhiṣṭhirārthābhāve 'pi
yudhiṣṭhiraśabdasadbhāvāt[138]

mouth and the object on the ground", though we [Naiyāyikas] know that *śabda* resides in the ear's ether; so that [possibility of a concomitance in space] is ruled out. And it is not that whenever there is a *śabda* also the object is present: even if in this moment the object 'Yudhiṣṭhira' is not extant, the *śabda* Yudhiṣṭhira can actually be there.

Naiyāyikas hold an externalist view of reference. It is clear that when one speaks of past objects these cannot be present while the corresponding words are uttered. The opponent, however, argues in favour of an internal concomitance between the mental image of *śabda* and its *artha*. In reply, Jayanta raises a dilemma and the argument of the superfluosness of such an inference (NMVa, I 408,16-409, 3):[139]

atha[140] *śabdārthayoḥ anvayābhāve 'pi tadbuddhyor anvayo grahīṣyata ity ucyate.*[141]

tarhi vaktavyam. kiṃ arthabuddhāv utpannāyām anvayo gṛhyate anutpannāyāṃ vā. anutpannāyāṃ[142] *tāvat svarūpāsattvāt kuto 'nvayagrahaṇam. utpannāyāṃ tv arthabuddhau kim anvayagrahaṇeneti naiṣphalyam. tatpūrvakatve tu pūrvavad itaretarāśrayam. etena vyatirekagrahaṇam api vyākhyātam.*

[Objection] Even when the [spatial or chronological] concomitance of *śabda* and *artha* is not there [as in the Yudhiṣṭhira example], the concomitance between their mental representations can still be grasped.

[Counter-objection] Then the following should be clarified: is the relation of agreement (*anvaya*) grasped when the cognition of the *artha* is already effected, or when it is not yet effected? When it [the cognition of the *artha*] is not yet effected, since its very existence is not there, how could the agreement be grasped? If the cognition

---

[138] *sadbhāvāt*] P NMVa; *saṃbhāvāt* K

[139] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 93–96: *nāṅgam arthadhiyām eṣā bhaved anvayakalpanā / anvayādhīnajanmatvam anumānasya ca sthitam // jñāte pratītisāmarthye tadvaśād eva jāyate / paścād anvaya ity eṣa kāraṇaṃ katham ucyate // tasmāt tannirapekṣaiva śabdaśaktiḥ pratīyate / na ca dhūmānvayāt pūrvaṃ śaktatvam avagamyate // vyatireko 'py avijñātād arthāc chabdadhito yadi / so 'pi paścāt sthitatvena nārthapratyayasādhanam //*

[140] *atha*] P K; *artha* NMVa

[141] *grahīṣyata ity ucyate*] P NMVa; *grahīṣyeta ity cet* K

[142] *anutpannāyāṃ*] P NMVa; *anutpannāṃ* K

of the *artha* is effected, instead, there would be superfluity [of the inferential process]: what would be the use of grasping a relation of agreement? And if it (grasping the agreement) is based on that [prior existence of the cognition of the *artha*], then, as before, there is a *petitio principii*. The same applies to the relation of difference (*vyatireka*).

The opponent argues that the relation of agreement and difference is normally applied in the common process of language acquisition, by subtraction and addition, so in that context the process of induction has indeed a role. Jayanta answers that in that context the function of agreement and difference is used to acquire the conventional relation between a *śabda* and its *artha* while learning a linguistic usage, and not to generate knowledge of the *artha* in a subsequent application of that linguistic usage (NMVa, I 409,4-409, 9):

nanu āvāpodvāpadvāreṇa śabdarthasambandhe niścīyamāne upayujyete evānvayavyatirekau. yathoktam "tatra[143] yo 'nveti yaṃ śabdam arthas tasya bhaved asau" iti

satyam etat. kintu samayabalena siddhāyām arthabuddhau samayaniyamārthāv anvayavyatirekau. śabde na[144] anvayavyatirekakṛtaiva[145] dhūmāder iva[146] tato 'rthabuddhiḥ.

[Objection] When the *śabda-artha* relation is ascertained on the basis of the phenomenon of addition and subtraction, agreement and difference are indeed used. As it was said, "there (in the operation of addition and subtraction) some *śabda* (i.e., an ending) is put in relation with another *śabda* (i.e. the stem); the *artha* shall be of that [śabda]" (ŚVDva, vākya 160ab).

[Counter-objection] This is true. Yet, while the cognition of an *artha* is achieved on the strength of a convention, a concomitance by agreement and difference has the purpose of fixing (*niyamārtha*) that

---

[143] *tatra*] Pac K; *yatra* Ppc NMVa

[144] *śabde na*] P NMVa; om. K

[145] *-kṛtaiva*] P K; *-kṛtā ca* NMVa

[146] *iva*] P K; *ivāgneḥ* NMVa

convention (*samaya*). In *śabda*, knowledge of the *artha* does not derive directly from a concomitance by agreement and difference, as it instead happens with smoke etc.

Thus Jayanta seems to concede that in the process of language acquisition there is an inferential process at play.

There is a further difference between *śabda* and inference. Unlike the knower who infers fire from smoke, the hearer of the word *gauḥ* knows the *artha* 'cow' because he has been trained in this linguistic usage (NMVa, I 409,10-410, 5. See also GBhSha,72-73):[147]

api ca / dhūmādibhyaḥ pratītiś ca naivāvagatipūrvikā / ihāvagatipūrvaiva śabdād utpadyate matiḥ // sthaviravyavahāre hi bālaḥ[148] śabdāt kutaścana / dṛṣṭvārtham[149] avagacchan taṃ svayam apy avagacchati // yatrāpy evaṃ samayaḥ kriyate, "etasmāc chabdād ayam arthas tvayā pratipattavya" iti, tatrāpi pratītir eva kāraṇatvena nirdiṣṭā draṣṭavyā //

Moreover, knowledge [of the probandum] originated from [inferential marks such as] smoke, etc., is not based on a previous learning (*avagati*). Here, instead, the knowledge [of an *artha*] originated from *śabda* is certainly preceded by learning [the language]. For, a learner, having observed and learnt the designation of an *artha* from a given *śabda* by observing the usage of competent speakers, knows that [*artha*] later on". Even when the conventional relation is taught [ostensively] in the form of "from this *śabda* you ought to know this *artha*", knowledge [of the *artha*] should be regarded as caused [by *śabda*].

The point here is that while inferential processes can be initiated independently by a rational knower, verbal knowledge requires a competence acquired either from the ostensive teaching of competent speakers or, more indirectly, from the observation of their linguistic usages (see GBhSha,73).

---

[147] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 90: *naivam apy asti dṛṣṭo hi vināpy arthadhiyā kvacit / vācakapratyayo 'smābhir avyutpannanarān prati //*

[148] *bālaḥ*] P NMVa; *dṛṣṭvā* K

[149] *dṛṣṭvārtham*] P NMVa; *bālo 'rtham* K

This closes the rebuttal of the reductionist's attempt of construing a *śabda-artha* inference (NM^Va, I 410,5-8):[150]

tasmād anyo liṅgaliṅginor avinābhāvo nāma sambandhaḥ, anyaś ca śabdārthayoḥ samayāparanāmā vācyavācakabhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ pratītyaṅgam. evaṃ[151] viṣayabhedāt sāmagrībhedāc ca pratyakṣavad anumānād anyaḥ śabda iti siddham //	Therefore, one thing is the relation among inferential signs and inferential objects, called "invariable concomitance", another is the relation between signified and signifier, called "conventional relation" between *śabda* and *artha*, as a factor of knowledge. Thus it has been proven that, because of their different object of knowledge and of their different components (*sāmagrī*), *śabda*, like perception, is distinct from inference.

5.2. The Sāṅkhya defense of *śabda* is inconclusive

As for the Sāṅkhya defense of *āptavacana* mentioned in § 4.2, Jayanta agrees (with Kumārila) about their inconclusiveness and bluntly dismisses them (NM^Va, I 410,9-10):[152]

yat tu pūrvavarṇa[153]kramāpekṣaṇādivailakṣāṇyam āśaṅkya dūṣitam, kas tatra phalguprāye nirbandhaḥ	As for the points raised after noticing a difference [between *śabda* and inference] on the basis of the requirement of the sequence of previous phonemes etc., what is the use of writing about that superfluous issue?

---

[150] Cf. ŚV^Ra, śabda 97–98: *sambandhaṃ yaṃ tu vakṣyāmas tasya nirṇayakāraṇam / syād anvayo 'tirekaś ca na tv arthādhigamasya tau // tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śabde pratyakṣava bhavet / trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt //*

[151] *evaṃ*] P K; *evaṃvidha-* NM^Va

[152] Kumārila's dismissal is even harsher: *bhedaḥ sāṅkhyādibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam* (ŚV^Ra, śabda, 15cd), and *paroktā hetuvaś cātra [=sāṅkhyadarśane] nābhedasya nivāritāḥ* (ŚV^Ra, śabda, 35ab).

[153] *-varṇa*] P NM^Va; om. K

5.3. Refutation of the Buddhist arguments

5.3.1. The universal of trustworthiness

As for the Buddhist argument (§ 4.3.1), in which authoritativeness was proposed as the inferential sign in the alleged inferential process of *śabda*, Jayanta replies (NMVa, I 411,1-411, 10):[154]

yat punarabhihitam,
"āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād
anumānatā" iti, tad atīva subhāṣitam,
viṣayabhedāt. āptavādatvahetunā hi
śabdārthabuddheḥ prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate,
na tu saiva janyate. yathāha.[155] anyad eva
hi satyatvam āptavādatvahetukam /
vākyārthaś cānya eveha jñātaḥ
pūrvataraṃ hi[156] saḥ // tatra[157] ced
āptavādena[158] satyatvam anumīyate /
vākyārthapratyayasyātra kathaṃ syād
anumānatā // janma tulyaṃ hi buddhīnām
āptānāptagirāṃ śrutau /
janmādhikopayogī ca nānumāyāṃ
trilakṣaṇaḥ iti //

It was said, that "[*śabda* has] the character of inference because of the undisputedness of an authoritative statement", this was very well said, because of the difference of epistemic content. In fact, by the probans "authoritativeness of the statement" the validity of the knowledge of the *artha* of *śabda* is proven; it is not so that such knowledge is generated [by this probans]. As it was said (ŚVDva, vākya 244-246): "One thing is truth, which is inferred through the authoritativeness of the statement, another thing is the *artha* of the sentence, which is known before [its truth]. In this context, if what is inferred through the authoritativeness is truth, how can knowledge of the *artha* of the sentence have an inferential nature? Because, cognitions produced from authoritative or unauthoritative statements arise in the same way; in this inference even [a probans] satisfying the three required criteria (*trilakṣaṇa*) is not useful to explain anything more than the origin [of knowledge from *śabda*, i.e., the acquisition of linguistic competence, or

---

[154] Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 47: *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyān nṛvacassu hi / lakṣaṇenānumānatvāt prāmāṇyaṃ siddhim ṛcchati //*

[155] *yathāha*] Pac K; *yad āha* Ppc NMVa

[156] *hi*] Pac K; *ca* Ppc NMVa

[157] *tatra*] P K; *tataś* NMVa

[158] *ced āptavādena*] P NMVa; *vedāptavādena* K

the intention of the speaker]".[159]

The inference proposed by this reductionist runs as follows:

If an *artha* possesses (i.e., is caused by) authoritative-statement-ness, then it possesses undisputedness
This *artha* possesses authoritative-statement-ness
Therefore this *artha* possesses undisputedness

It is clear that since the *artha* is the locus it must be known in advance, to make the inference possible.

Here Taber (1996: 26) renders ŚV[Dva], 244 slightly differently: "The truth [of a sentence], based on the trustworthiness of the author, is one thing, the meaning of the sentence, which is known prior [to its truth], another". It is important to ponder how this verse would be read, respectively, from a (Mīmāṃsaka) viewpoint of intrinsic validation and from a (Naiyāyika) one of extrinsic validation. Taber (1996: 26-27), indeed, anchors the core of his argument about an acceptance of two levels of knowledge from *śabda* —non-committal and committal— to this principle of extrinsic validation, while discussing this quotation of the ŚV by Jayanta:

Nyāya considers the truth of a cognition to be known extrinsically, that is, after the cognition has arisen by means of confirmation by other cognitions. *Thus, Jayanta would appear to have the notion of an initial belief evoked by language itself that things are a certain way followed by an explicit awareness that one's belief is indeed true* [A.G.: emphasis by Taber].

Elsewhere, Jayanta explicitly writes that the principle of extrinsic validation applies also to testimony (NM[Va], I 420). As for the application to perceivable *artha*-s, Jayanta seems to suspend his judgement on whether such knowledge is intrinsically or extrinsically validated, while he states that in the case of non-perceivable *artha*-s knowledge is extrinsically validated (NM[Va], I 436).

After quoting the three ŚV verses, however, Jayanta continues by saying that verbal knowledge is not simply an impression, but rather a definite cognition, as evident from common experience (NM[Va], I 411,11-12):

na ca prāmāṇyaniścayād vinā	One cannot say that without the
pratibhāmātraṃ tad iti vaktavyam, śabdād	ascertainment of the validity of

---

[159] On *janmādhikopayogī*, see GBh[Sha],73.

artha[160]*saṃ*[161]*pratyayasyānubhavasiddhat vāt.*

knowledge there is only an impression (*pratibhā*), because the full knowledge of the *artha* caused by *śabda* is proven by experience.

This dychotomy between "impression" and "firm knowledge", and the assertion that the latter, and not the former, is experienced upon hearing a statement, seems to confirm that "The Naiyāyikas were against the deployment of such a basic attitude [of non-committal understanding of words] prior to the belief-claim or knowledge claim that arises in the hearer" (Matilal 1994: 355), and that "When Nyāya uses that expression [A.G.: *śabdabodha*] it simply means *knowledge from words* which is the standard case, i.e., knowledge that *p* gathered from someone's asserting that *p*" (Chakrabarti 1994: 121). Taber (1996: 27), too, concedes this, "for Jayanta himself insists that the initial awareness evoked by a sentence is not a "mere intuition" (*pratibhāmātra*) but a "definite cognition" (*sampratyaya*)".

By reading the passage in context, therefore, Taber's argument is not strengthened, especially with the addition of this last sentence; it thus seems that also for Jayanta knowledge of *śabdārtha*, i.e., *śabdabodha*,

> simply means *knowledge from words* which is the standard case, i.e., knowledge that *p* gathered from someone's asserting that *p*. The distinction is not drawn in terms of truth or falsity or correctness or incorrectness. There is no tendency in Nyāya to hold that word-generated awareness is always knowledge. We can have false belief generated by believingly comprehended false sentences (Chakrabarti 1994: 121).

5.3.2. The inference of the speaker's intention

Lastly, the Buddhist inference of the intention of the speaker (§ 4.3.2) was presented. Such an inference, however, does not lead to the knowledge of the *artha* (NMVa, I 412,1-8):

etena vivakṣāviṣayatvam api pratyuktam. na hi vivakṣā nāma śabdasya vācyo viṣayaḥ kintv artha eva tathā.[162] *vivakṣāyāṃ hi*[163] *śabdasya liṅgatvam iha dṛśyate / ākāśa iva kāryatvāt na vācakatayā punaḥ // śabdād uccaritāc ca*

By this [last argument, that knowing the truth of a statement and knowing the *artha* are two distinct processes], also the possibility that the speaker's intention is the probandum [of an inference having *śabda* as its probans]

---

[160] *śabdād artha*] Ppc K; *śabdārtha* Pac NMVa

[161] *saṃ*] P NMVa; om. K

[162] *tathā*] P NMVa; om. K

[163] *hi*] P NMVa; *tu* K

vācyaviṣayā tāvat samutpadyate saṃvittis
tadanantaraṃ tu gamayet kāmaṃ
vivakṣām asau / arthopagrahavarjitā ca[164]
niyamāt siddhaiva sā jīvatāṃ[165]
tadvācyārthaviśeṣitā tv avidite naiṣā
tadarthe bhavet.

is refuted. For, the content of the signification of *śabda* is not the speaker's intention, but rather the *artha*. Here *śabda* is the inferential sign of the speaker's intention, because it is an effect [of the speaker's intention], like in the case of ether, not because it is a signifier [of the speaker's intention]. From an uttered *śabda*, at first the full knowledge of a signified *artha* is generated; then, that [*śabda*] may well convey [through an inference] also the intention of the speaker, [yielding knowledge of the fact] that this [intention] is related to living beings, without the grasp of a [specific] *artha*.[166] The [intention] which is specifically related to the signified *artha*, however, cannot be there before the *artha* is known.

The example of ether is related to Vaiśeṣika ontology: like one infers the imperceptible ether from the perception of *śabda*, because *śabda* must rest in ether, so one infers that the imperceptible intention of the speaker from the perception of *śabda*.[167] The inference from *śabda* to the intention of the speaker, however, is based on a cause-effect relation, not a signifier-signified one. And in any case such an inference leads to the knowledge that behind the *śabda* there is a sentient being with an intention.

If a speaker possesses *śabda*, then it possesses an intention to speak

This speaker possesses *śabda*

Therefore this speaker possesses an intention to speak

---

[164] *-varjjitā ca*] P K; *-varjitat tu* NMVa

[165] *siddhaiva sā jīvatāṃ*] Pac; *siddhaiva sā jīvatā* K; *siddhaiva sā jīvitā* Ppc; *siddhaivam ājīvatā* NMVa

[166] See GBhSha,73.

[167] Cf. (VD, *Vyomavatī*, 578): *na ca śabdasyānumānatvam eva niṣidhyate, vivakṣākāśādhigame liṅgātvāt. yathā hy ākāśādhigame sarvaḥ śabdo'numānaṃ vivakṣākāryas tu vivakṣādhigame 'pīti.*

Without knowledge of the *artha*, however, the inference cannot prove that the speaker intends to signify that specific *artha*.

Taber (1996: 21-23) proposes a refinement of the Buddhist argument, as a chain of inferences, qualified as "roughly that of Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī*":

> Śrīdhara sought to interpret Praśastapāda as propounding the more sophisticated Buddhist theory: from a word or linguistic sign one does not directly infer its meaning but rather the state of mind of the speaker who employs it, and from that — given that the speaker is reliable — one infers its meaning.

Taber's representation can be summed up in the following two inferences:

If a speaker possesses *śabda*, then he possesses an intention to speak (*vivakṣā*)

This speaker possesses *śabda*

Therefore this speaker possesses an intention to speak

If an authoritative speaker possesses an intention to speak, then he possesses knowledge of the *artha*

This authoritative speaker possesses an intention to speak

Therefore this authoritative speaker possesses knowledge of the *artha*

"Finally, from this knowledge on the part of the trustworthy speaker one is able to infer the existence of the state of affairs that he knows" (Taber 1996: 21). Taber (1996: 24) sees in the inference of the intention an awareness of the "basic idea that thoughts are somehow instrumental in meaning; words indicate primarily, or in the first instance, what we are thinking and do not directly refer to things".

This chain of inferences, however, is not found in the NM and seems to be a post-Jayanta development.

6. Conclusions

6.1. Jayanta and Mīmāṃsā

Most of the arguments presented by Jayanta in this section, both the reductionist and the anti-reductionist ones, are already found in the *Ślokavārtika*. Jayanta, however, rearranges and discusses them in a very clear sequence. Moreover, he adapts them to the Naiyāyika *siddhānta* by some strategic correctives:

- The *artha* of individual words is not a universal, as in Mīmāṃsā, but rather a qualified particular

(*tadvat*).

- This different understanding of what is the *artha* of words has an unavoidable impact on the analysis of the *artha* of sentences and of complex words such as *gomat* ("cow-possessor") as well.

- Since in Nyāya the Veda has an author and as such its passages are standard cases of trustworthy statements, a specific discussion on the Veda is absent in the NM, while it takes about twenty verses in Kumārila's defense of *śabda.*

- In Nyāya, *śabda* is ephemeral by nature, thus it cannot have stable relations with permanent entities and it is not suited as a probans or a locus in Indian inferences. This argument cannot be used in Mīmāṃsā, where *śabda* is considered permanent.

- Jayanta concedes that inference is used during the process of language acquisition to establish the conventional relation. This argument is only hinted at by Kumārila, since the *śabda-artha* relation in not considered conventional in Mīmāṃsā.

- Linguistic competence is a necessary condition to "know from words" and it is used by Jayanta to mark the difference between *śabda* and inference. This argument is not used by Kumārila.

6. 2. Understanding words and knowing from words

Taber's argument for an acceptance on Jayanta's side of a non-committal understanding from words is mainly built on the arguments presented here in § 5.3.2 and § 5.3.1. Unlike him, I did not find a distinction between *understanding* and *knowing* from words in Jayanta's presentation. Therefore, in this respect, I'd rather endorse Matilal's and Chakrabarti's opinions. A Sanskrit expression for non-committal understanding is *śabdabodha* 'understanding from words'. Yet I did not encounter this expression in old, pre-Jayanta Nyāya sources.

In general, from the debate analysed in this paper it emerges that *śabda* was for Jayanta an epistemological, rather than a linguistic, phenomenon, and that its *artha* was an epistemic object. The issue of distinguishing linguistic comprehension and testimonial knowledge might have been a pseudo-problem in Jayanta's view of the world, and he would perhaps have agreed with Coady (1994: 245) in that "if the ability to use language meaningfully is connected with the making of true reports then it is surely the *consistent* making of true reports that matters". In other words, if the appropriate use of language is to communicate truth, there are in principle no "neutral" statements, and false statements can be explained in terms of the inappropriate use of language.

6.3. The reduction of *śabda* to inference

Jayanta starts from the assumption that *śabda* is an autonomous means of knowledge. Unlike for Mīmāṃsakas, for him the relation between language and reality is established by convention, but in its day-to-day usage it is clear that this *a priori* connection is a necessary condition for linguistic communication. At least within the limits of the theory of inference available to him, there were no convincing arguments that could have explained a reduction of *śabda* to perception or inference. He was thus justified in thinking *śabda* as a *sui generis* epistemic tool.

References

Abbreviated Primary Sources

CVṛ   Muni Jambuvijaya, ed. 1961. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda.* Baroda: Oriental Institute of Baroda.

DN   Muni Jambuvijaya, ed. 1976. *Dvādaśāram Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa.* Bhavnagar: Śrī Jain Ātmānand Sabhā.

GBh^Sha   Nagin J. Shah, ed. 1972. *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga.* Lalbhai Dalpatbhai series, 35. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology.

K   "Thenjipalam (Malappuram District), Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, ms. 2606." Undated; foll. 188; cm. 5 × 48 ca.; palm-leaf; Malayalam. Contains the complete NM 1-6 and about one third of NM 7. In the original foliation, the first leaf is foliated as śrī, and is followed by foll. 1-187 in letter numerals.

NBh^Tha   "Nyāyabhāṣya." Anantalal Thakur, ed. 1997b. *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

NBh-NSū   Anantalal Thakur, ed. 1997a. *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. For the first chapter, it is the revised edition of the same author's edition of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, *Adhyāya* 1 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20, 1967).

NMKKe   "Nyāyamañjarī: Kumārila's Criticism of Apoha." Kei Kataoka, ed. 2008. "A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī: The Section on Kumārila's Refutation of the Apoha Theory." *The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture* 154: 1-31.

NM^Shu   Suryanarayana Shukla, ed. 1936. *Nyāyamañjarī: Gautamasūtratātpāryavivṛti.* 2 vols. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 106. Benares: Jaya Krishna Das Haridas Gupta, Vidya Vilas Press.

NM^Va   K. S. Varadacharya, ed. 1969-1983. *Nyāyamañjarī: with Ṭippaṇī Nyāyasaurabha.* 2 vols. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute.

NSū   "Nyāyasūtra." Anantalal Thakur, ed. 1997c. *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. For the first chapter, it is the revised edition of the same author's edition of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, *Adhyāya* 1 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20, 1967).

NVT   Anantalal Thakur, ed. 1996. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra*.
               Nyāyacaturgranthikā 3. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

P   "Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, ms. 390/1875-76." Saka 1394 [CE 1472];
               foll. 432; mm. 130 × 130; birch-bark, bound; Sarada. The manuscript is presently
               constituted of 432 leaves (435 according to Cat. Report 1875, p. XXV). The original
               foliation runs up to NM 3 and restarts from NM 4: 3-149 (= NM 1-3) + 1-270 (= NM 4-12) +
               282-286 (an unidentified work) + 7 (parts of *Raghuvaṃśa* 15. 11-78). Except for occasional
               missing leaves, the NM is complete. The first two folios are lost.

Pā   Svami Prahlad Giri, ed. 1985. *Aṣṭādhyāyīsūtrapāṭha of Pāṇini*. Varanasi: Kṛṣṇadāsa Acade-
               my.

ŚBh   Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar and Ganesh Shastri Ambadas Joshi, eds. 1970-1974.
               Mīmāṃsādarśana. Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvāli 97. Vol. 1: MS 1.1, with *Śābarabhāṣya*
               and *Prabhābhidhā* commentary by Vaidyanath Shastri. Vol. 2: MS 1.2-2.1, with
               Śābarabhāṣya and *Tantravārttika*. Vol. 3: MS 2.2-2.4, with *Śābarabhāṣya* and *Tantravārttika*.
               Vol. 4: MS 3.1-3.8, with *Śābarabhāṣya* and *Tantravārttika*. Vol. 5: MS 4.1-7.4, with
               Śābarabhāṣya and *Ṭupṭīkā*. Vol. 6: MS 8.1-10.8, with *Śābarabhāṣya* and *Ṭupṭīkā*. Vol. 7: MS
               11.1-12.4, with *Śābarabhāṣya* and *Ṭupṭīkā*. Pune: Anandasrama. 1st ed. 1930-1933.

ŚV^{Dva} Śāstrī Dvārikādāsa, ed. 1978. *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary
               Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Prāchyabhārati Series 10. Varanasi.

ŚV^{Ra} "Ślokavārttika". S. K. Ramanatha Shastri, ed. 1971. *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of
               Umveka Bhaṭṭa*. Revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Madras: University of
               Madras. 1st ed. 1940.

VD   Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri, eds. 1925. *The Praśastapādabhāṣya with Sūktiṭīkā,
               Setuvyākhyā and Vyomavatī*. Printed by Jai Krishna Das Gupta at the Vidya Vilas Press.
               Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office.

Further Primary Sources

Frauwallner, Erich, ed. 1968. *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*.
        Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 6.
        Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Jhalakīkara, Bhīmācārya. 1996 (1874). *Nyāyakośa*. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Kataoka, Kei, ed. 2008. "A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī: The Section on Kumārila's
        Refutation of the Apoha Theory." *The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture* 154: 1-31.

Kataoka, Kei, ed. 2013. "A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyakalikā. First Part." *The Memoirs of
        the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia* 163: 1-53.

Muni Jambuvijaya, ed. 1961. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Baroda:
        Oriental Institute of Baroda.

Muni Jambuvijaya, ed. 1976. *Dvādaśāram Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Māllavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Bhavnagar:
        Śrī Jain Ātmānand Sabhā.

Prahlad Giri, Svami, ed. 1985. *Aṣṭādhyāyīsūtrapāṭha of Pāṇini.* Varanasi: Kṛṣṇadāsa Academy.

Sankrtyayana, Rahula, ed. 1937. *Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti.* Patna.

Thakur, Anantalal, ed. 1996. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 3. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Secondary Sources

Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban. 2001. "Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyāya Theory of Inference". In *Indian Logic: A Reader*, edited by Jonardon Ganeri, 162-182. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. Originally published in 1987.

Chakrabarti, Arindam. 1994. "Telling as Letting Know." In *Knowing from Words*, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, 99-124. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Coady, Cecil Anthony John [usually "Coady, C.A.J."]. 1994. "Testimony, Observation and "Autonomous knowledge"." In *Knowing from Words*, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, 225-250. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Freschi, Elisa and Artemij Keidan. Forthcoming. "Understanding a philosophical text: a multi-disciplinary approach to the problem of "meaning" in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, book 5." In *Jayanta on Buddhist Nominalism*, edited by Patrick McAllister and Parimal Patil. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2000. *Verità e metodo.* Milano: Bompiani.

Ganeri, Jonardon. 1996. "Meaning and Reference in Classical India." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 24: 1-19.

Ganeri, Jonardon. 1999. *Semantic Powers.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Ganeri, Jonardon, ed. 2001. *Indian Logic. A Reader*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press.

Graheli, Alessandro. 2012. "The choice of the best reading in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī." In *The Study of Asia between Antiquity and Modernity*, edited by Elisa Freschi et al. Special issue of RSO (*Rivista degli Studi Orientali*) 84: 107-122.

Graheli, Alessandro. 2015. *History and Transmission of the Nyāyamañjarī. Critical Edition of the Section on the Sphoṭa.* Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Graheli, Alessandro. 2016. "The Force of *Tātparya:* Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and Abhinavagupta." In *Around Abhinavagupta - Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir from the 9th to the 11th Centuries*, edited by Eli Franco and Isabelle Ratié. Leipzig: LIT Verlag.

Hattori, Masaaki. 1996. "Discussions on *Jātimat* as the Meaning of a Word." In *Śrījñānāmṛtam - A Memorial Volume in Honour of Prof. Shri Niwas Shastri*, edited by Vijaya Rani. Delhi: Parimal Publications.

Hattori, Masaaki. 2000. "Dignāga's Theory of Meaning. An Annotated Translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti.* Chapter V: Anyāpoha-parīkṣā (I)." In *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding*, edited by J. A. Silk, 137-146. Studies in the Buddhist Traditions 3. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1994. "Understanding, Knowing and Justification." In *Knowing from*

Words, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, 347-366. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1998. *The Character of Logic in India.* Edited by Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2001. "Introducing Indian Logic." In *Indian Logic: a Reader*, edited by Jonardon Ganeri, 183-215. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. Originally published in 1998.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds. 1994. *Knowing from Words. Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony.* Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Potter, Karl H., ed. 1977. *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa.* Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2. Princeton, Delhi: Princeton University Press, Motilal Banarsidass.

Schayer, Stanislaw. 2001. "On the Method of Research into Nyāya." In *Indian Logic: a Reader,* edited by Jonardon Ganeri, 102-109. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. Originally published in 1933.

Taber, John A. 1996. "Is Verbal Testimony a Form of Inference?" *Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences* 3.2: 19-31.

Alessandro Graheli (University of Vienna and Austrian Academy of Sciences) studied Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy in India and in Italy. His fields of research include Nyāya, textual criticism, philosophy of language, theories of knowledge, hermeneutics, aesthetics, and medieval bhakti. He is currently principal investigator of a project on the translation of the *Nyāyamañjarī* at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Apart from other articles and book contributions on Nyāya, bhakti and philology, he is the author of *History and Transmission of the* Nyāyamañjarī*: Critical Edition of the Section on the* Sphoṭa (Vienna 2016).