Émeric Crucé's "Nouveau Cynée" (1623), universal peace and free trade

by
Andrew Mansfield

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Émeric Crucé's "Nouveau Cynée" (1623), universal peace and free trade *

Andrew Mansfield **

Émeric Crucé's Nouveau Cynée *(1623) was the earliest work to call for both universal peace and global free trade. Anonymously published, the work endorsed a pacifistic international body that would replace war with diplomatic state cooperation. Crucé claimed that by eschewing belligerent aggrandisement people could not only live in peaceful co-existence, regardless of geography or religion, great material prosperity would also be engendered. But this notion of an end to war within a seventeenth century context of frequent conflict meant the work was largely ignored by contemporaries, who favoured the international law of jurists such as Grotius. As a consequence the* Nouveau Cynée *was largely forgotten. Instead, the abbé de Saint-Pierre's* Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle *(1712) came to be acclaimed as the first plan to value the correlation between non-violent co-operative states and commercial prosperity. Building on the Duke of Sully's call in the* Grand Dessein *(1638) for a European senate, Saint-Pierre envisaged a European political union enriched by trade. Yet these proposals were restricted to Christendom, thereby lacking the breadth and purpose of Crucé's world vision. While the* Nouveau Cynée*'s contribution has been noted in international relations and economics, it has largely been neglected by historians of political thought. Through an interdisciplinary approach this article will discuss the significance of the* Nouveau Cynée*'s early advocacy of global peace and free trade to political thought, as well as its influence on Sully and Saint-Pierre.*

** Department of History, University of Sussex (U.K.) (*a.k.mansfield @ sussex.ac.uk*).

The attainment of peace through state confederation can be found in classical antiquity. While support for pacific federations increased from the late middle-ages, such ideas were frequently dismissed as utopian or nostalgic. This approach was further undermined from the seventeenth century by the impetus of international law which began to guide inter-state peace treaties, as it was more credible to restrain rather than eradicate war at a time of incessant hostilities. Notwithstanding such developments, the production of peace plans gathered momentum during the early modern period particularly from the seventeenth century. Over time, a burgeoning realisation of the potential benefit of peace for commercial interest became manifest and gave rise to a new generation of peace plans that strove to promote trade through the interdependence of pacific states over war. The abbé de Saint-Pierre's *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle* (1712) is commonly referenced as the first work to identify the correlation between peaceable states and commercial prosperity. A reputation enhanced by his later influence upon the pacific projects of the great Enlightenment figures Rousseau and Kant. While the abbé acknowledged inspiration from the Duke of Sully's *Grand Dessein* (published 1638), the *Projet* actually shares many notable characteristics with Émeric Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée* (1623). A work of much greater purpose than either Sully or Saint-Pierre's federations, the *Nouveau Cynée* was the first work to promote universal world peace and the expedience to society of inter-state free trade[1]. This article will

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[1] Crucé has largely been ignored by Anglo-American historians of political thought since the publication of Thomas Willing Balch's translation of the *Nouveau Cynée* in 1909, although he has enjoyed more attention in Italy and France. While Crucé's plan is often credited as the first universal peace plan in international relations and his commercial outlook noted in economic circles, much consideration has principally consisted of brief fragmentary acknowledgements as part of the perpetual peace canon. Crucé is therefore a thinker who is recognised but not largely understood in terms of his significance to the history of political thought. Instead he has been described as a 'shadowy' or 'secondary figure'; see Alain Fenet, "Emeric Crucé aux origines du pacifisme et de l'internationalisme modernes", *Miskolc Journal of International Law* 1, no. 2 (2004): 21-34 (22). For discussions concentrated on Crucé see Pierre Louis-Lucas, *Un plan de paix générale et de liberté du commerce au XVIIe siècle. Le Nouveau Cynée de Emeric Crucé* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1919); Hubert Pajot, *Un rêveur de paix sous Louis XIII: Emeric Crucé, parisien* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1924); Anna Lazzarino Del Grosso, "Utopia e Storia nel 'Nouveau Cynée' di Éméric Crucé", *Il pensiero politico* 9 (1976): 276-332; Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History of Peace 'Classic': Éméric Crucé's le Nouveau Cynée* (London: Housemans, 1980); Miriam Eliav-Feldon, "Universal Peace for the Benefit of Trade: The Vision of Émeric Crucé", in *Religion, Ideology and Nationalism in Europe*

underline the originality of Crucé's innovations regarding universal peace and free trade (within their context). Beginning with a brief sketch of of Sully's work, after a discussion of the *Nouveau Cynée* the article will end by assessing Saint-Pierre's *Projet*. This will emphasise the uniqueness of Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée* at the time of composition and its impact on later peace plans[1].

1. Sully's Grand Dessein

During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century war dominated the geopolitical landscape of Europe, as states were shaped by internal and external tensions. After the Reformation, the notion of following pacific ideology over the dictate of meeting force with force (a Roman law) appeared absurd in an era of divisive social and religious conflict. Reacting to this context of sustained belligerence, both Machiavelli and Jean Bodin's *Six livres de République* (1576) facilitated the perception of the state as a legal entity. Moving beyond the medieval imagining of a state as the ruler's territorial possession, the state came to be regarded as a depersonalised 'public thing' (*res publica*). This view had emerged in the thirteenth century, but only found articulation in the sixteenth century due to the intense conflict and European competition. The single sovereign (body)

and America: Essays Presented in Honor of Yehoshua Arieli, eds. H. Ben Israel *et al.* (Jerusalem: Historical Society of Israel and the Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1986): 29-44; Alain Fenet, "Introduction", in Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée ou Discours d'état*, eds. Alain Fenet and Astrid Guillaume (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004).
[1] This article will not include a discussion of either Rousseau or Kant's plans, as it focuses on the importance of Crucé in relation to Sully and Saint-Pierre.

best represented the territorial association of government and people unified as a sovereign person, which strove to achieve its aims in an inter-state framework[1].

As the mid-seventeenth century gave rise to the modern state[2], two clear paths for dealing with war were evident regarding the governance of hostilities between states. The first (more prominent) path was the incipience of international law, reflected in the work of Grotius[3]; the second path was the continuing of peaceful unions. In his *Grand Dessein* Henri IV's chief minister Maximilian de Béthune (1560-1641), the Duke of Sully, ostensibly offered such a union. Its call for a senate proved extremely influential on later peace plans, and Sully professed to have based the work on clandestine attempts by Henri IV to forge peace alliance within Europe[4]. According to Sully the plan had profited from the

[1] Jean Bodin, *Les six livres de la République*, ed. Gérard Mairet (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1993): I, viii (74-76). See also Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2: *The Age of Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): 349-58, and Roland Mousnier, *The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy 1589-1789*, trans. Brian Pearce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979): 645-46.
[2] Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, "War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe War", in *War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, eds. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2010): 5.
[3] See the section on Crucé below.
[4] Sully, *Memoirs of Maximilian de Bethune, Duke of Sully, Prime Minister of Henry the Great*, vol. V, trans. M. De L'Ecluse (Edinburgh: 1773). The *Grand Design* (*Grand Dessein*) is contained within volume XXX of the work. Two folios of the original work were published in 1638 and a further two posthumously in 1662. Saint-Pierre claimed to have based his *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle* on it. From this root the works of Rousseau and Kant stem, and William Penn also acknowledged a debt to Sully's work in his *An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693). Despite the influence of Sully's European senate, such an idea had been promulgated in the medieval period. The French legist Pierre Dubois had called for a Christian republic in which all European powers were equally represented in his *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* (c. 1306, published 1611). Varieties of European pacific union can also be found in Dante's *De Monarchia* (1318), Marsilio of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* (published 1324), and Erasmus's *Querela pacis* (1521); most of which were motivated by the struggle for political power between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. On such works and the struggle for power between the Church and Emperor see J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): 33-34; Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2: *The Age of Reformation*, 36-39; Anthony Black, *Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450* (London: Routledge, 1996); Annabel S. Brett, *Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic*

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input of Elizabeth I of England during his embassies to Dover (1601). Sully asseverated that the plan had the backing of other European monarchs and Pope Clement VIII. There is no historical record of Henri's meetings with Elizabeth, however, nor is there a record of the connection to any other monarchs in this plan[1]. It is assumed that the work was written by Sully alone in retirement (1635)[2], and that the work was actually inspired by Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée*[3].

While Sully claimed that the stimulus for the *Grand Dessein* was peace, the work targeted a re-imagined Europe in which the House of Austria was neutralised as a threat to Europe. It is more fitting to therefore see the work as an anti-peace plan, and an indubitable exercise in *raison d'état*[4]. Despite retirement Sully was provoked by a desire to assert French imperial power during further conflict between the two royal houses in the Thirty Years War (1618-48). This rivalry and threat to France was pertinent both at the time of writing and when Sully claimed Henri IV had endeavoured to secure European concord after the Peace of Vervins (1598) with Spain, when France had been left on the brink of ruin[5]. For Sully, France's natural pre-eminence—of soldiers, necessities of life, commerce, its geographical location, and strong monarchy—meant that it was the natural successor to the Roman Empire. Moreover, its Merovingian line of succession had produced the first Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne

Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), *International Relations in Political Thought. Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 179-80.

[1] See Roland Mousnier, *L'assassinat d'Henri IV* (Paris: Gallimard, 2008); Mark Greengrass, *France in the age of Henri IV: The struggle for stability* (Harlow: Longman, 1984): Ronald. S. Love, *Blood and religion: the conscience of Henry IV, 1553-1593* (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 2001).

[2] Elizabeth Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France* (New York: Kennikat Press, 1972): 28-29.

[3] Miriam Eliav-Feldon, "Grand Designs: The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance", 66.

[4] Louis René Beres, *People, States and World Order* (Itasca, Illinois: Peacock Publishers Inc., 1981); 74; Céline Spector, "Who is the Author of the Abstract of Monsieur l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre's 'Plan for Perpetual Peace'? From Saint-Pierre to Rousseau", *History of European Ideas* 39, no. 3 (2012): 22.

[5] See Maria J. Rodriguez-Salgado, "The Habsburg-Valois Wars", in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 2: *The Reformation 1520-1559*, ed. G. R. Elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 399-400; H.G. Koeningsberger, "Western Europe and the Power of Spain: the French Succession and War with England", in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 3: *The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610*, ed. R.B. Wernham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Presss, 1968); Eleanor C. Lodge, *Sully, Colbert, and Turgot. A Chapter in French Economic History* (New York: Franklin, 1971): 17, 52-54.

(r. 800-814), who had originated from the Gauls that defeated the oppressive Western Roman Emperor Honorius (384-423). Henri's political scheme "proposed to govern, not only France, but all of Europe"[1]. Inspired by the Roman Empire and dressed in peace, the plan was merely a weapon to assault Habsburg pre-eminence. Gallic power would be allowed the security of a wider union, potentially maturing into French universal monarchy.

The first preliminary step on the path to French supremacy through European union was to divest Austria of its empire and all its possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries. This would reduce it to the sole kingdom of Spain, bounded by the ocean, the Mediterranean and the Pyrenean Mountains[2]. Such drastic measures were essential to restrain its craving to be the world's most powerful state, as demonstrated by the reigns of Charles V (r. 1519-56) and his son Phillip II of Spain (r. 1554-98). The alliance would forge a confederacy of European sovereigns against the House of Austria, forcing it to cede its mainland European territories to be divided amongst the other states. Sully was rather sanguine regarding the potential success of his plan, envisaging that other European princes would seize the opportunity to humble Austria while enriching themselves[3]. The Emperor's lack of allies would force him to acquiesce with the *Dessein*. Consequently, Austria would realise the reasonableness of the proposal, especially as many of its claims on European territories were shared by other monarchs. Europe would be divided into fifteen states: "*six great hereditary monarchies*" (France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden and Lombardy); "*the five elected monarchies*" (the Empire, the Papacy, Poland, Hungary and Bohemia); and, "*the four republics*" (Venice, Italian, Swiss and Belgian)[4]. A permanent senate—based upon the model of the *Amphictyonic League* of ancient Greece[5]—would be erected in central Europe where the embassies of each of the fifteen states would meet biannually. The Senate would be used to deliberate different interests, pacify any quarrels, while regulating all the civil, political, and religious affairs of Europe. Leadership would revolve around the

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[1] Sully, *Memoirs*, 116.
[2] *Ibidem* 141.
[3] *Ibidem* 144.
[4] *Ibidem* 149.
[5] Amphictyonic translates as a 'league of neighbours', and relates to an association of Greek tribes in Ionia and Doria in the seventh-century B.C.E.

fifteen states, and the Senate would be run by elected officials. To ensure the efficacy and unity of the Senate and Union, each state would have its own assembly to run its own local affairs. But these assemblies would be subordinate to the Senate, its policies, and its peace[1]. Austria would be humbled, France would be distinguished, and Europe would be united under a Christian senate.

2. Crucé's Nouveau Cynée

Sully's reputation as a harbinger of perpetual peace rests largely upon his influence of Saint-Pierre's later *Projet*. But the multifaceted potential of a pacific union had already been grasped by Émeric Crucé in his *Nouveau Cynée* (1623)[2]. Crucé's view was much broader than Sully's, and rejected state-building ambition in favour of co-operative union that would enrich all states and peoples. Yet while Sully's work became celebrated, Crucé's suffered relative obscurity: a

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[1] Sully, *Memoirs*, 149-50.
[2] *Le Nouveau Cynée: ou Discours d'estat représentant les occasions et moyens d'establir une paix generale, et la liberté du commerce par tout le monde. Aux Monarques et Princes souverains de ce temps* was first published in 1623, followed by a second edition a year later; see Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History of a Peace 'Classic': Emeric Crucé's Le Nouveau Cynée*, 13-14, 50; Alain Fenet, "Introduction", 5. Leibniz said of the work's title, that it "gives to princes the advice which Cyneas gave to Pyrrhus, [that is] to prefer their repose and comfort to their ambition, and proposes at the same time such a common tribunal"; see Gottfried Willhelm Leiniz, "Letter II to Grimarest" (1712), *Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 178. Leibniz wrote in his *Observations on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace* (1715): "I no longer know how to find this book, and I no longer recall any of his details". Yet he remembered the outline, and this led him to wonder whether Saint-Pierre had read the work. Consequently, he believed the two works were likely to be equally successful in their aim as 'romances'. For a discussion of the history of the work see Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History of a Peace 'Classic'*.

problem augmented by his pseudo-anonymous frontispiece ("Em. La Croix")[1]. Despite this the work was not forgotten, and Leibniz recalled reading the work when commenting on a copy of the *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1712) sent to him by Saint-Pierre[2]. This anonymity, however, may have assisted both Sully and Saint-Pierre's use of the *Nouveau Cynée*, and Charles Pfister claimed that Sully's idea of arbitration had been taken directly from the "*Cinée d'Estat*"[3]. This belief has also found credence in recent years. It is argued that while many had not heard of Crucé the man, "all were directly influenced" by Sully reproducing "the part of the *Grand Design* which, influenced by ideas like Crucé's, [that] had sprung from a genuine interest in peace"[4]. Saint-Pierre's claim to have adapted the plan of Sully to forge European peace thereby strengthens a correlation to Crucé's work. But as will be shown, Crucé's influence on Saint-Pierre may have been indirectly taken from Sully, although important thematic similarities lead one to conclude Saint-Pierre was familiar with Crucé[5].

The *Nouveau Cynée* was written in the same context of fervent civil and inter-state war as the *Grand Dessein*[6] . The work began by contending it was

[1] Fenet has descibed Crucé as a "shadowy" figure, an opinion fuelled by the lack of biographical knowledge of Crucé (c. 1590-1648) who was believed to be a humanist teacher from Paris and possibly a monk; see Alain Fenet, "Emeric Crucé aux origins du pacifisme et de l'internationalisme moderne", 22; Alain Fenet, "Introduction", 8-9.

[2] Thomas Willing Balch, "Introduction", in Emeric Crucé, *New Cyneas* (Philadelphia: Allen, Lane & Scott, 1909): xxii-xxiv.

[3] Charles Pfister, "Les 'Economistes Royales' de Sully et le Grand Dessein de Henri Quatre", *Revue Historique* 330, no. 56 (1894); John Arthur Ransome Marriott, *Commonwealth or Anarchy?: A Survey of Projects of Peace from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939): 59.

[4] Francis Harry Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): 33.

[5] Rachida Tlili Sellaouti points to similarities in the organisation of Saint-Pierre's assembly (Association) in "La Présence de la Turquie dans les Projets de Paix de l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre", in *Les projets de l'abbé Castel de Saint Pierre (1658-1743): Pour le plus grand bonheur du plus grand nombre*, éd. Carole Dornier et Claudine Pouloin (Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2011): 67-69. I believe Crucé's influence to be more comprehensive.

[6] For the religious situation in the first half of seventeenth-century France see *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 4: *The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War 1609-48/59*, ed. J.P. Cooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); R.J. Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion, 1559-1598*, Second Edition (London: Longman, 1996); Lucian M. Ashworth, "The limits of Enlightenment: inter-

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necessary to uproot inhumanity: the most common vice from which all others flowed[1]. Crucé rejected as his starting point the notion that theological concerns over atheism or heresy represented the greatest vices, for these issues were not present in all ages. Inhumanity however, had been ubiquitous in history regardless of whether people claimed to be religious or moral, or not. Its utmost expression was war, and it led Crucé to advocate a peace driven by material self-interest. This was a novel approach, as some humanists like Erasmus had called for a virtuous peace in which princes set aside the factors that sowed discord; i.e. the opportunity to enrich themselves and their country. Crucé felt that humanity not only needed to exploit compassionate fellow-feeling but also the emotions that drove the fear and egotism exhibited in (commercial) competition[2]. Human society was inter-connected and universal, and the compassion that humanity possessed demanded peace from its monarchs, as they had the capacity and authority to make such plans a reality[3]. Kings had to renounce their quest for honour and an almost Achilles-like obsession with glory for their own historical reputation if they were to discern the misery it inflicted on their people. To choose to act like "cannibals" and "savages" rather than defending and propitiating the needs of their people was irrational[4]. A monarch's obsession with honour compared to the vicissitudes of the wind, as its cost and reward were arbitrary but rarely positive. Peace treaties were another problem. Frequently broken if advantage was spied by the ruler,[5] treaties were merely negative acts that ensured all nations were bound together psychologically, prepared to go to war rather than maintain peace. This had created a balance within the world, in which even the smallest state felt a sense of security similar to the largest. Since

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state relations in eighteenth-century political thought ", in *From Republican Polity to National Community: Reconsiderations of Enlightenment Political Thought*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2003): 114-121.

[1] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 55.

[2] *Ibidem* 57. See Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, ed. Lisa Jardine, trans. Neil M. Cheshire and Michael J. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 66-73, 105-7; Arthur Charles Frederick Beales, *The History of Peace: a Short Account of the Organised Movements for International Peace* (New York: Dial Press, 1931): 29; Frank Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations. A study in the history of thought* (London: Sage Publications, 1977): 46.

[3] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 61.

[4] *Ibidem* 65.

[5] *Ibidem.*

it would be likely that a small state was allied to a larger one, kings would be foolish to attack one another for fear of a large alliance embarking upon hostilities against them. But that was often the case, so Crucé's (humanistic) entreaty to terminate war originated from a desire to replace unnecessary misery in exchange for positive human action in the wider community[1].

Crucé's solution was to augment this system of inter-connected alliances to include all states in a universal peace that renounced war, the pursuit of glory, and antagonism based on difference. This is the first instance in the history of pacific unions when peace was expanded to encompass the entire world, and regardless of religious or political sensitivities[2]. Earlier plans and later plans (including Sully's) focused on a union in Christendom[3], but Crucé utilised the idea of the *Pax Romana* to extend co-operation into Asia and beyond. Peace would expedite a move beyond religion as a motivation for war, and the frequent masking of intentions for conflict under the banner of a just war. Writing after the French Wars of Religion and at the beginning of the Thirty Years War, Crucé believed that religion was incompatible with war. Humanity could not fight in the name of God as it had no insight into God's will, and such wars were merely masquerades for 'profit' or 'glory'. They did not reflect God's peace as hostilities were often political, ignoring the relationship of blood that bound all men whether they were French, English or Indian[4]. The extension of peace throughout the world removed such concerns and a fixation on religious discord. His peace therefore centred on the material similarities of humanity as the foundation of co-operation between people and states rather than dissimilarities. While an assembly would be difficult to create by using friendship and sociability as the foundation, universal peace could be established and permanently sustained[5]. The world required a perpetual peace rather than one that

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[1] *Ibidem* 162-63.

[2] *Ibidem* 66-67. For the *Nouveau Cynée* as the first universal peace plan see Anna Lazzarino Del Grosso, "Utopia e Storia nel 'Nouveau Cynée' di Éméric Crucé", 332; Francis Harry Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, 20; Louis René Beres, *People, States and World Order*, 71.

[3] As will be discussed below, Saint-Pierre countenanced broadening his peace beyond Europe in the 1712 edition before rejecting the idea in the 1713 edition; see Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, tome I (Utrecht: 1713): xix-xx.

[4] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 82.

[5] *Ibidem* 85.

was frequently patched: "a peace that provided to each one what belonged to him, privilege to the citizen, hospitality to the foreigner, and liberty to the traveller and trader [merchant]"[1]. Crucé therefore encouraged an immediate end to all war and the creation of a worldwide assembly for peace.

3. International Law and Peace

As mentioned in the discussion on Sully, the promotion of a peace federation to eliminate war was one method for dealing with inter-state aggression. Another was framed in the natural law tradition. Perhaps more pragmatically, this wanted to restrain rather than eradicate war and led to the development of international law. Crucial to this advance was the concept of the *ius gentium*, which arose over a number of centuries from the distinction between Roman *ius* (customary law) and *lex* (enacted law). *Lex* was used as (internal) civil law for Roman citizens, but the laws that regulated interaction between citizens and foreigners was customary law (*ius gentium*): a law for different people (*gentes*). This law became common to all societies from medieval times through social practice[2]. For Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1483-1546), while the 'law of nations' (*ius gentium*) did not have the force of agreements between men it did possess the validity of positive law. He claimed that the "whole world, which is in a sense a commonwealth, [had] the power to enact laws which [were] just and convenient to all men; and ... [made] up the law of nations". Those nations that transgressed against these laws either in war or peace thereby committed a

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[1] *Ibidem* 160.
[2] Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), *International Relations in Political Thought. Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War*, 318-20.

"mortal crime" against the wider community[1]. The lack of foundation of Vitoria's *ius gentium* in anything beyond a universal consensus meant that it was virtually impossible to enact or "abrogate"[2].

Despite the absence of an international legal framework the *ius gentium* continued to form the basis of potential international regulation. In *Constancie* (published 1584), Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) argued that rulers should constrain themselves from war and violence to provide their subjects and foreigners with security. He believed that such a course of action was rational, and that reason nurtured 'constancy' allowing stability and the maintenance of the international status quo. Commonwealths and mankind were bound in their behaviour as a moral entity[3]. Such views found resonance in Francisco Suarez's (1548-1617) distinction between internal state law and an *ius gentium* that could be commonly accepted by all peoples to embrace a wider community of individuals[4]. While Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) offered a framework in his *De iure belli libri tres* (published 1612), that claimed the law of nations could supply order through arbitration to regulate disputes between the community of states[5].

It was Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), however, who has received precedence for his interpretation of the *ius gentium*. Following his work on rights in *De Indis* (1604-5) and *Mare Liberum* (1609), his *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625) portrayed civil society as an association that defended citizens from harm by foreigners. Like individuals states also had a right to self-preservation, and could protect themselves (through just war) if their rights were violated by another state[6]. Following in the footsteps of Vitoria and Suarez, *De jure belli ac pacis* was not a work

[1] Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings*, eds. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: 1991), 40.
[2] Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, "Introduction", in Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings*, xvi.
[3] Justus Lipsius, *Two Bookes of Constancie* (London: 1594), I, viii (18-19); I, xi (26-27). On Lipsius see Harald Kleinschmidt, 'War, Diplomacy and the Ethics of Self-Constraint in the Age of Grotius", in *War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, eds. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, 117-26.
[4] Francisco Suarez, *Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore* (London: 1679): II, xvii-xx.
[5] Alberico Gentili, *De iure belli libri tres*, trans. John C. Rolfe (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1964): I, xix (92).
[6] Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace,* ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005): I, iii (87).

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of international law *per se.* Rather it was a moral theory on natural rights and war—which recognised a general sociability present in humanity—that could be applied to both individuals and states through positive law[1]. Earlier scholars of Crucé claimed that Grotius acquired his idea of international rights from Crucé, as the two works were contemporaneous and Grotius was in Parisian exile when the *Nouveau Cynée* was published[2]. This notion has since been debunked, particularly as Grotius did not offer a model of world government[3].

While Crucé's second path of non-violence was less successful than the natural (international) law of Grotius, it must still be viewed as a rational substitute. Such attempts to found a "politico-institutional order", desired to regulate the competing wills of states (pre-Hobbes) by creating a general peace organisation "without eliminating their freedom of action"[4]. Crucé's alternative method was not a nostalgic form of utopianism, but instead a cutting edge theory that relied on humanistic views that were 'vogue' in France at that time[5]. His template was Augustus's *Pax Romana* which had pacified all nations, plus the brief period of European peace in the reign of Francis I of France[6]. A "pacific council" in (neutral) Venice would unite Europe, the Ottomans and beyond. The assembly would be made up of permanent ambassadors from each state who would argue their case (in an appeal to reason) before reaching judgement. Working through

[1] *Ibidem*, III, i (6-9). See Knud Haakonssen, *Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 26-30; Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 152-54, and T.J. Hochstrasser, *Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 9.

[2] For the belief that Grotius employed Crucé's ideas see Elizabeth Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France*, 20, and for its rebuttal see Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History of Peace 'Classic': Emeric Crucé's Le Nouveau Cynée*, 32-33, 40-41.

[3] Joan D. Tooke, *The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius* (London: SPCK, 1965): 195.

[4] Olaf Asbach, "Dynamics of Conflict and Illusions of Law: Making and Thinking Peace in the Modern International System", in *War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, eds. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, 261-63.

[5] Anna Lazzarino Del Grosso, "Utopia e Storia nel 'Nouveau Cynée' di Éméric Crucé", 302-3, 331-32. Fenet argues that Crucé's work smacked of idealism ("l'appel pathetique") which explained its lack of success in comparison with Grotius; see Alain Fenet, "Emeric Crucé aux origins du pacifism et de l'internationalisme moderns", 24. This echoes an earlier claim made by Pierre Louis-Lucas, *Un plan de paix générale et de liberté du commerce au XVII siècle. Le Nouveau Cynée de Emeric Crucé*, 190.

[6] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 57.

delegation and treaty, it would secure the position of each monarch and provide security by the abandonment of weapons and armies. Leadership of the assembly would either be contested by the larger kingdoms—such as China, Denmark, England, France, Persia or Spain—or rotated[1]. While creation of the world assembly appealed to the virtue and reason of the ruler, egoistic motivations were petitioned as the plan consolidated the ruler's position within their state. The setting of territorial boundaries through soldiers not only repelled external enemies but also helped to dissuade their own people from violently threatening the position of the king[2]. The assembly offered a sovereign a safeguard against rebellion, as other rulers within the council would assist them in the repression of civil disobedience as all had an interest in punishing rebellion[3]. Consequently, the *Nouveau Cynée* manifested the same proclivity Saint-Pierre was later to emulate of ensuring a perpetual status quo within states and between them.

4. Commerce and Peace

Crucé's maintenance of the status quo stemmed from his use of Bodin's indivisible sovereignty, which could not be threatened by popular rebellion[4]. Within a similar context to Bodin of internecine French civil and religious war amidst wider European turmoil, Crucé enshrined absolute sovereignty as a method for ensuring stability and peace. While it would not be desirable for a king to behave tyrannically it was within the sovereign's power to do so, and it was a preferred form of government than popular tyranny[5]. Ancient Greece, Republican Rome and the Renaissance Italian republics had been subject to quarrels, confusion and violence in which people were massacred and anarchy had reigned due to their democratic natures. In following Bodin's call for absolute sovereignty, Crucé was participating in a contemporary dialogue and

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[1] *Ibidem* 87-92.
[2] *Ibidem* 71-72.
[3] *Ibidem* 93.
[4] *Ibidem* 107. For Bodin's view on absolute sovereignty see Bodin, *Les six livres de la République*, ed. Mairet, I, viii (74-76); and on the subject's non-resistance to the sovereign see *Ibidem* II, v (135).
[5] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 109.

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process to repel internal and external sources of division and conflict. In the 1620s, Louis XIII's France was undergoing centralisation at the hands of Cardinal Richelieu. The state gained greater control of government, public office, the army, the economy, taxation, and to a lesser extent the nobility[1]. Crucé approved of the drive toward French prosperity and internal order, although he infused absolute authority with a humanist appeal of a duty to mankind and a wish to consolidate collective peace.

While the protection of the state and its monarch were an obvious advantage of universal peace, Crucé's attention was largely absorbed by the gain to commerce. In a radical departure from the earlier peace unions and an application that surpassed Saint-Pierre, Crucé argued that peace would act as the vehicle for international state prosperity. Crucially he understood that mutual interest could be fostered through free trade, stimulating trade further. The use of a small number of police constables in each state to protect foreign merchants would open up all trade routes on land and by sea for its essential development. Crucé pictured the world as a global city enriched by commerce, and foresaw great pleasure in permitting men to go freely to whatever country they preferred to visit[2]. While Crucé acknowledged the importance of agriculture[3], and found luxury—which had brought about the collapse of the Roman Republic—to be lacking in virtue[4], his clear promotion of extensive free trade is the earliest early modern example[5]. This view contrasted with that of his contemporary Antoine de Montchrétien (c. 1575-1621). In the *Traicté de l'oéconomie politique* (1615), Montchrétien advocated an aggressive form of mercantilism that would increase national wealth through the development of trade and industry for the subsidy of the crown and public good[6]. He claimed that social utility could be

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[1] David Parker, *The Making of French Absolutism* (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1983): 81-87. Del Grosso ("Utopia e Storia nel 'Nouveau Cynée' di Éméric Crucé", 327) claims that Richelieu's behaviour as chief minister may have been influenced by Crucé's vision.
[2] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 76.
[3] *Ibidem* 73.
[4] *Ibidem* 148.
[5] Grotius's *Mare Liberum* perhaps offers an alternative example of free trading movement across the seas, but it does not possess the expansiveness of Crucé's trading 'world city'. See Hugo Grotius, *The Free Sea*, trans. Richard Hakluyt, ed. David Armitage (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004): 49-51.
[6] Antoine de Montchrétien, *Traicté de l'oéconomie politique*, ed. Th. Funck-Brentano (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1889): 35-39.

found in avarice and ambition to maximise profit through selfish individualism. Commerce could produce great benefit not only to individual states and princes, but to the world as a whole. Montchrétien utilised Bodin's belief that God had ordered the world and its goods in a manner that necessarily provoked a state to exchange goods with other states they did not possess, binding humanity through inter-connectedness[1]. Bodin's outward looking view of commerce was inverted by Montchrétien to expound a doctrine that mistrusted the effect of foreigners[2]. It used the notion of inter-connection to propound the mercantilist dominion of other states for France's own ends. Crucé eschewed such a negative interpretation. He instead concentrated on the positive aspect of Bodin's humanist co-operation between states to promote a commercial productivity abetted by universal peace[3].

Crucé's commercial plan appeared at a time when France was still gripped by a dire financial situation after years of economically stultifying religious and political wars. The effects of the Wars of Religion from the last century had still not been overcome despite the efforts of Henri IV, as further political reform and turmoil dominated throughout the 1620s. In the reign of Louis XIII the premium on land wealth and the use of taxation to strengthen the financial situation meant that France was a "prisoner of [the] old economic system", despite a great regard throughout Europe for its produce[4]. Like Montchrétien, Crucé's depiction of commerce focused on the internal prosperity of the *patrie* as competition was promoted to augment activity as magistrates rewarded industry to engender virtue. This would induce men in the same occupation to compete

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[1] Lionel Rothkrug, *Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965): 22-26, 61; Nannerl O. Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980): 160-61; Henry C. Clark, *Compass of Society. Commerce and Absolutism in Old Regime France* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007): 16-18.

[2] Antoine de Montchrétien, *Traicté de l'oéconomie politique*, 92.

[3] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 74. See Anna Lazzarino Del Grosso, "Utopia e Storia nel 'Nouveau Cynée' di Éméric Crucé", 309; Yuichi Aiko, "The History of Political Theory in International Relations: Seventeen and Eighteenth-Century Perpetual peace Projects in Intellectual Context" (Sussex University, unpublished Phd Thesis, 2003): 108; Alain Fenet, "Introduction", 35-36.

[4] Victor-L. Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, trans. D. McLockie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 16-19, 30-31. See also Roland Mousnier, *L'assassinat d'Henri IV*, II, vi, 5.

and surpass one another in a desire for recognition[1]. By regulating trade and the mechanical arts, the common people could hope to involve themselves in commerce and profit by it, as it would nourish the state. Consequently, commerce acted as a cohesive vehicle which would create a free (trade) world city. Crucé's direction of this application outwards into the world through universal free trade was seen as essential to humanity's progression. Mercantilism and territorial aggrandisement were spurned for their stultification of commercial co-operation, human progress and peace.

5. Saint-Pierre's Perpetual Peace Projet and Crucé

Sully's concern over excessive European state power was reversed by the Abbé Charles Castel Irenée de Saint-Pierre, who was disturbed by the threat of French hegemony under Louis XIV in his *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1712)[2]. His belief in peace had been formed over a period of twenty years, particularly taking shape as France fought much of Europe in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14)[3]. Saint-Pierre's *Projet* aspired to terminate future differences without war thereby achieving lasting stability[4]. Saint-Pierre's

[1] Emeric Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, 76.
[2] The work was first published in 1712, but Saint-Pierre completed a two-volume edition in 1713, another edition in 1717, and an *Abrégé* in 1729 as he attempted to perfect his *Projet*. On Saint-Pierre see Nannerl O. Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France*, chapter 13; Armand Mattelart, *Histoire de l'utopie planétaire: De la cité prophétique à la société globale* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2009); Carole Dornier et Claudine Poulouin (éd.), *Projets de l'abbé Castel de Saint Pierre (1658-1743): Pour le plus grand bonheur du plus grand nombre* (Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2011).
[3] See Joseph Drouet, *L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre. L'homme et l'oeuvre* (Paris: Librairie Champion 1912): 108; Merle L. Perkins, "The Abbé de Saint-Pierre and the Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Background", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 97, no. 1 (1953), 69-73, 73-76.
[4] Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, tome I (Utrecht: 1713): ii.

resolution was to fashion a perpetual peace through a union based on the purported plans of Henri IV[1]. To Saint-Pierre's mind, Henri had grasped that the disparity of power between sovereigns was the cause of war. So if a confederation could be maintained within a single European republic, it was possible to terminate war. A European union was necessary because the attempt to maintain a balance between the leading houses of Europe (France and Austria), through the use of mediating smaller states had been an abject failure. As it was a sovereign's nature to seek more power via territorial aggrandisement, a balance of states would be replaced by an equilibrium fashioned by the inclusion of all states in a unified whole. Such a body would end the continual contravention of truces by princes, who furthered their ambitions at the slightest opportunity by engaging in war[2].

Hobbes's influence on Saint-Pierre has been documented and his *Projet* could be seen as an international *Leviathan*[3], perceiving as he did the cause of aggression between states to derive from fear and competition. Large empires consequently over-extended their power and this led to collapse and ruination, as the Roman Empire had revealed. For Saint-Pierre, the solution to this ambition was to prevent greater conflict through war (state of war) or law. Treaties were the solution because they were not subject to a higher authority and so often failed, meaning a loss of security. The answer for Saint-Pierre was to utilise law by tying all states to a Leviathan-like peace union in which they were protected by law, possessed rights and could enjoy prosperity. Saint-Pierre rejected the idea of a universal monarchy potentially led by France, due to its natural power and current strength as doomed to failure. He believed that only a co-operative union could provide a cessation to Europe's obsession with war. A union that would actually enact Henri IV's restriction of power by neutralising French aggrandisement while still requiring active French participation for its success, after its ambitions and boundaries had been voluntarily checked.

Saint-Pierre's model for success was based on an erroneous understanding

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[1] *Ibidem* 123-25.
[2] *Ibidem* 35-37.
[3] Merle L. Perkins, "The *Leviathan* and Saint-Pierre's *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle*", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 99, no. 4 (1955), 259-267; Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 141; Céline Spector, "Who is the Author of the Abstract of Monsieur l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre's 'Plan for Perpetual Peace'? From Saint-Pierre to Rousseau", 11.

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of the Germanic League taken from Sully, which offered an example of a co-operative state union[1]. He felt it was conceivable to construct a European union that ensured the independence of each state while effectively warranting peace[2]. As with Sully's plan, a permanent Senate would be established where all states would submit to the treaty of union. Saint-Pierre's desire for 'perpetual peace,' however, was not only governed by a necessity for constant European war to cease. He understood that if a state was not pre-occupied with war its taxation and the time it expended on fighting could be more productively spent. Not only could the arts and sciences be greatly enhanced, but commerce would flourish. This could be exploited as the greatest vehicle to harness the energies of the people for enriching the state[3]. Saint-Pierre undermined Louis XIV's policy of war, stating that it had inhibited French trade, particularly foreign trade which accounted for one third of the total income of France. War provided an obvious barrier to commerce, and a further consequence was a lack of future trust between states as it effected state interaction.

More importantly, war pulled subjects away from commerce and reduced the capacity for agriculture and trade while depleting the number of subjects within a kingdom. Saint-Pierre wanted the state to move away from the mercantile notion that France was the supreme producer of goods required by other states as the breadbasket of Europe that could exist through autarchy. He considered this confidence to be fallacious and damaging, trusting that France would be considerably supplemented through foreign trade[4]. Essentially he moved beyond the narrower scope of Sully's state-building union towards Crucé. He asseverated the benefits of trade to champion a confederacy that would provoke much greater prosperity through commerce, and which offered utility to both the state and the public (good)[5]. Saint-Pierre's early eighteenth century scientific vision contained in his numerous *Projets* grasped the universal value of peace to commercial endeavour and human association. This has led to his portrayal

[1] Patrick Riley, "The Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual Peace in Europe", *World Affairs* 137, no. 3 (Winter 1974-1975): 186-194 (187-88).
[2] Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, tome I, 192.
[3] *Ibidem* 239.
[4] *Ibidem* 260.
[5] Thomas E. Kaiser, "The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy", *The Journal of Modern History* 55, no. 4 (1983): 618-643 (627-28)

as both a precursor to utilitarianism[1], internationalism, and as an early precursor of free trade.

When Saint-Pierre's vision of free trade's assistance to international peace and human utility is related to Crucé's, one finds that the latter's discussion was much broader in ambition. Saint-Pierre's plan to reform the French monarchy attempted to restrain the aggrandising ambition of kings like Louis XIV ensnared in an international state of war. This notion, found in Crucé, was also a reaction to Hobbes and the later work of Hobbists such as Pierre Nicole (1625-95) and Pierre le Boisguilbert (1646-1714)[2]. In the *Essais de morale* (1675) Nicole argued that the Hobbesian battle between states revealed an inter-connection amongst states and individuals, in what was effectively a world city. Boisguilbert used Nicole's view in *Le détail de la France; la cause de la diminution de ses biens et la facilité du remède* (1695), to call for an alteration in the mercantilist policy of Louis XIV as set out by Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-83). Colbertism was an extreme form of (Montchrétien's) mercantilism, in which the primary aim was not necessarily economic security but the manifestation of state power. Colbert believed the total wealth of the world to be finite, so as Louis XIV's finance minister from 1665 to 1683 he adopted a 'zero-sum' strategy that pursued territorial and financial expansion to defeat France's enemies commercially[3]. Boisguilbert wanted France to ascend above the chest-beating of power politics to generate wealth through commerce and free trade. The restrictive taxation policies of Colbert had limited the potential growth and prosperity of France due to Louis XIV's obsessive competition with the Dutch and the English. In Boisguilbert's opinion, Colbertism was riven with problems that had inhibited economic development in France and had been found wanting[4].

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[1] See Bernard Delmas, "La Réforme fiscal coeur du 'Perfectionnement de l'État' chez Castel de Saint-Pierre" and Robert F. Hébert, "Économie, utopisme et l'abbé de Saint-Pierre", both in *Projets de l'abbé Castel de Saint Pierre (1658-1743): Pour le plus grand bonheur du plus grand nombre*, éd. Carole Dornier et Claudine Poulouin, 125-143, 224-26.

[2] Nannerl O. Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, 294, 351-57.

[3] Andrew Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1994): 99. For further background on French reforms after the death of Mazarin see Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *L'Ancien Régime 1610-1770* (Paris: Hachette, 1991): chapter 4.

[4] Pierre le Boisguilbert, *Le détail de la France; la cause de la diminution de ses biens et la facilité du remède* (Paris: 1696): 21-22.

Boisguilbert argued that co-operative international trade would profit France's finances far more than isolationist mercantile policies. Saint-Pierre, akin to Nicholas Barbon's *A Discourse on Trade* (1690) and subsequently Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits* (1714), embraced this belief that free trade would engender much greater profit for the state. Understanding how the growing importance of commercial ventures could be to the expansion of the eighteenth century state[1], an enterprise that could be further maximised by permitting the pursuit of luxury. This view appreciated the potential profits enjoyed—by the Dutch and English[2]—from a public appetite for superfluous goods regardless of the moral questions thrown up by its pursuit. A European union would be able to guarantee free trade between its states. In turn, encouraging and increasing commerce while enriching subjects financially and subsequently their sovereigns through taxation[3]. The overall benefit to the Union and its constituent partners was therefore immeasurable.

Saint-Pierre was left to lament the failure of the plan under Henri IV as he believed Europe could have been four times richer in his own time[4]. In accepting luxury as a driving force for commercial reform, Saint-Pierre followed one of the two predominant paths that came to direct eighteenth century European thought on political economy. Saint-Pierre shunned his associate François Fénelon's conservative agrarian-based commercial activity which pre-occupied the Physiocrats. Instead he adopted a position that welcomed the fiscal advantage to society of wealth generated by luxury goods, which would be later comprehended by David Hume and Adam Smith[5]. Despite his rejection of luxury,

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[1] J.G.A. Pocock, "The political limits to premodern economies", in *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics*, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 127; Michael Sonenscher, "Fashion's Empire: Trade and Power in Early Eighteenth-Century France", in *Luxury Trades and Consumerism in Ancien Régime Paris: Studies in the History of the Skilled Workforce*, eds. Robert Fox and A.J. Turner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998): 265; Istvan Hont, "The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury", in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought,* vol. 1, eds. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 379-383.

[2] Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, tome I, 192.

[3] *Ibidem* 321-26.

[4] *Ibidem* 50-53.

[5] Fénelon, *Télémaque*, ed. Jacques Le Brun (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), livres III, VII, X and XVII. Fénelon later replicated a number of Crucé's ideas, including an incipient peace plan which was added to the end of *Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de Royauté* and entitled *Supplément*. This

Crucé's encouragement of universal co-operation and free trade means that he predates all of these later advocates by some time. Crucé's belief in co-operative peaceful commerce to enrich the state anticipated global free trade and recognised the inherent flaws of mercantilism. His rejection of the French aggrandisement favoured by Sully, promoted a pacific union to profit all states not one alone. In so doing, his vision of a 'world city' based on trade and peace meant he was a forerunner of both policies, who understood the wider material utility for humanity.

6. Concluding Remarks

Émeric Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée* deserves recognition as a harbinger of universal peace and free trade. As a humanist Crucé's pacific union desired to elevate the human condition through peace and commonality. Rather than focusing on theological issues or state-building ambitions, Crucé was governed by materialist considerations to implement co-operation and harmony without war to create commercial prosperity. As part of the traditional peace canon, Crucé's attempts to eradicate war have been viewed as nostalgic or utopian, especially in relation to the pragmatic restraint of war through law by the natural jurists. Yet in many ways Crucé's ambition was loftier. While he is a figure of little renown, his work has seeped into the consciousness of international relations and political economy due to his conception of a world assembly. Its innovation of universal peace and free trade for the material amelioration of humanity, offered an advanced methodology for dealing with contemporary issues while transcending religion. Often the *Nouveau Cynée* has served as little more than a footnote in several disciplines, but its direct influence over Sully's *Grand Dessein* and Saint-Pierre's *Projet* has ensured a legacy that continued throughout the eighteenth century and beyond. Indeed, his promulgation of universal peace

work was published as the *Two Essays on the Ballance of Europe* (London: 1720), and proposed a brotherhood of European states in which commercial activity and free trade flourished while luxury was censured. For David Hume on free trade see his "Of the Balance of Trade", in David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), II, v, 35; and for Adam Smith see *An Enquiry into the Nature and the Wealth of Nations*, *Volume I*, ed. Edwin Cannan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1994), IV, viii, 1 (455-81).

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and free trade was very radical and was far more expansive than anything published before it and for some time after.

"Louis Guébin's Delegate Card for the 6th International Peace Congress of 1894 (Peace Palace Library, The Hague, http://www.flickr.com/peacepalacelibrary/6044709909).