Il problema mente-corpo alla luce del confronto fra emergentismo fisicalista e panpsichismo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13135/2704-8195/13165Parole chiave:
Panpsychism, Mind-Body Problem, Monism, Dualism, Physicalist emergentismAbstract
A comparison will be made between emergentism and panpsychism to answer the question of whether panpsychism represents a sound alternative to emergentism: I think that physicalist emergentism is a good solution for the problems raised by the mind-body problem, despite its inhability to define the ontological status of the mental states and to solve the ancient problems connected to dualism. Leibniz’s account of monads will be analyzed to deepen panpsychism, and to frame the contrast between monism and dualism in the current debate in philosophy of mind. Leibniz’s theory of monads proposes a panpsychism that is able to solve an important theoretical difficulty within panpsychism: the “combination” problem. Although panpsychism is a view in vogue and philosophically coherent, it remains an unscientific position which cannot be empirically controlled. By means of this thesis, therefore, it is not possible to adequately answer the questions posed by the mind-body problem, nor can technical solutions, such as artificial consciousness, be based.
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