I presupposti hegeliani de I fondamenti della logica aristotelica di Guido Calogero e delle obiezioni di Emanuele Severino ed Enrico Berti

Abstract

The essay reconstructs the core thesis of Guido Calogero’s I fondamenti della logica aristotelica and identifies the antecedent of his conception of determination in Hegel’s treatment of Daseyn in the Seynslogik, focusing on the contradictions arising from Calogero’s need to understand the immediacy of being as removed mediation, while maintaining a purely passive conception of the intellect. It then discusses Severino’s criticism, highlighting his misunderstanding of Calogero’s conception of judgment and the theoretical reconcilability of the two perspectives within the framework of Hegelian logic. Finally, it highlights the Hegelian presuppositions of Enrico Berti’s attempt to synthesize the two interpretations, showing his impossibility of both justifying such Hegelian presuppositions and overcoming the fundamental instance of Calogero’s reading.