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From Correlation to Gestalt. *Cohen's and Rosenzweig's Foundations of Dialogue Philosophy*

ABSTRACT: *A search for the foundations of the philosophy of dialogue turns the researchers to Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig. The two philosophers did not consider their theory as specifically dialogue-oriented, but they both contributed greatly to the development of the philosophy of dialogue. It is important that Rosenzweig is Cohen's successor, so that their ideas give a good illustration of the new philosophy's appearance and development. The purpose of this article includes the study of the contribution of Cohen to the philosophy of dialogue; the analysis of Rosenzweig's concept and its comparison with Cohen's philosophy; elucidation of the continuity of the two philosophers and the further development of the philosophy of dialogue in connection with the concepts of Cohen and Rosenzweig.*

KEYWORDS: *correlation,* Gestalt*, dialogue, philosophy of dialogue, Franz Rosenzweig.*

1. Hermann Cohen as a source of the philosophy of dialogue

In Europe, the philosophy of dialogue is typically associated with Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, which connects it to existentialism and its representatives such as Bernhard Casper, Shmuel Hugo Bergman, Ze'ev Levy etc.[1].

In Russia, there is more comprehensive understanding which connects the philosophy of dialogue with the teachings of Hermann Cohen[2]. There are several reasons for this. Indeed, Cohen is a common starting point of the philosophy of dialogue shared not only by Buber and Rosenzweig, but also by Mikhail Bakhtin, the

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1 The connection between the philosophy of dialogue and existentialism was first addressed in the 1960s, when existentialism enjoyed high popularity. See B. Casper, *Das dialogische Denken. Eine Untersuchung der religionsphilosophischen Bedeutung Franz Rosenzweigs, Ferdinand Ebners und Martin Bubers*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, Herder, 1967; S. H. Bergman, *Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber* (1974), Engl. transl. by A. A. Gerstein, foreword by N. Rotenstreich, Albany (NY), State University of New York Press, 1991; Z. Levy, *Mevaser ekzistentsializm yehudi. Mishnato shel Franz Rosenzweig ve-yeḥasa le-shitat Hegel* [*A Precursor of Jewish Existentialism. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig and Its Relation to Hegel's System*], Tel Aviv, Sifriat Poalim, 1969; Z. Levy, *Franz Rosenzweig's relationship to Hegel's philosophy*, paper submitted to the English section of the Korčula Summer School, August 19th-26th, 1970.

2 Cf. V. N. Belov, *Yavlyaetsya li German Kogen neokantiantsem?* [*Is Hermann Cohen a Neo-Kantian?*], in "Kantovskiy sbornik", 2015, n. 3 (53), p. 42.

most important dialogue philosopher in Russia. Many studies of Bakhtin connect his philosophical ideas with the dialogic concepts of Buber and Rosenzweig[3] and the one and only link to him in the philosophy of dialogue is through the teachings of Cohen[4].

Moreover, Russian researchers associate the philosophy of dialogue with the logic of dialogue linked to logico-epistemological and psychological issues[5]. Thus, the philosophy of dialogue is not limited to continental philosophy, as it is also connected to analytic philosophy[6].

Against this background, the relations between Cohen's and Rosenzweig's concepts acquire much importance. The two philosophers did not consider themselves the creators of the philosophy of dialogue, but both made substantial contributions to it. The relation between Cohen's and Rosenzweig's concepts not only provides a better understanding of Rosenzweig's philosophy, but also helps to uncover the genesis of the philosophy of dialogue. However, neither Cohen nor Rosenzweig described their philosophy as solely the philosophy of dialogue, even though they both contributed greatly to its development. Cohen and Rosenzweig built their concepts before the dispute in Davos that split Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology and analytical philosophy, and they hoped that philosophy returns to its original unity[7].

2. General formulation of the philosophy of dialogue

Since we describe the relation between Cohen's and Rosenzweig's concepts, we formulate off the philosophy of dialogue as it may be understood at the moment.

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3 Cf. M. M. Bakhtin, *Sobranie sochineniy* [*Collected Works*], vol. 1, *Filosofskaya estetika 1920-kh godov* [*Aesthetic Philosophy of the 1920s*], ed. by S. G. Bocharov and N. I. Nikolaev, Moscow, Russkie slovari, 2003; V. S. Bibler, *Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, ili poetika kul'tury* [*Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, or the Poetics of Culture*], Moscow, Progress-Gnosis, 1991; M. M. Bakhtin, *Besedy s V. D. Duvakinym* [*Conversations with V. D. Duvakin*] (1993-1994), ed. by S. G. Bocharov, V. Radzishevskii *et al.*, Moscow, Soglasie, 2002; V. L. Machlin, *Ya i Drugoy. K istorii dialogicheskogo printsipa v filosofii XX v* [*I and Other. On the History of Dialogical Principle in the 20th-Century Philosophy*], Moscow, Labirint, 1997.

4 The mediator between Bakhtin and the Neo-Kantians was Cohen's own disciple, Matvei Kagan, who was deported from Berlin to Nevel in 1918 and later became Bakhtin's close friend and companion in philosophical studies. See M. I. Kagan, *O khode istorii* [*On the Course of History*], ed. by V. I. Makhlin, Moscow, Yazyki slavyanskoy kul'tury, 2004; I. S. Dvorkin, *Kontury filosofii istorii Matveya Kagana* [*Outlines of Matvei Kagan's Philosophy of History*], in "Filosofiya sotsial'nykh kommunikatsiy", 2010, n. 1 (10), pp. 87-95.

5 Cf. V. S. Bibler, *Na granyakh logiki kul'tury. Kniga izbrannykh ocherkov* [*On the Edges of the Logic of Culture. Selected Essays*], Moskow, Russkoe fenomenologicheskoe obshestvo, 1997; G. S. Batischev, *Vvedenie v dialektiku tvorchestva* [*Introduction to Dialectics of Creativity*], Saint Petersburg, RKhGI, 1997.

6 Cf. R. Carnap, *Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*, in "Erkenntnis", II (1931), pp. 219-241.

7 Cf. I. S. Dvorkin, *Analiticheskoe vvednie v filosofiyu dialoga* [*An Analytical Introduction into the Philosophy of Dialogue*], in "Metafizika. Nauchnyy zhurnal", 2016, n. 4 (22), pp. 8-27.

The main proposition that unites various versions of the philosophy of dialogue is that reality is effected not within the framework of the subject-object relation. The relation is between persons engaged in a dialogue about some entity. As a rule, the descriptions of this relation include the three persons of the singular: I, Thou and He/She (It). Some researchers, like those of Cohen and Rosenzweig, add the first-person plural (We) to indicate the environment where the dialogue happens. Let us take the letters i, t, h and w to denote these persons. Now, the relations described by the philosophers mentioned above are: I-Thou or $i{\rightarrow}t$, and I-He/She (It) or $i{\rightarrow}h$. A third relation should be added, that of the dialogue partner to this entity, formulated as Thou-He/She or $t{\rightarrow}h$.

In these terms, the formulation of the dialogue philosophy as we have given it may be written as

$$i{\rightarrow}h = i{\rightarrow}t \ (t{\rightarrow}h).$$

This equation shows that the relation between the first person (I) and the third person (the thing) is only definite if it is identical to my perception of the thing mediated by the second person (Thou).

The relation $i{\rightarrow}t$ cannot express the intellectual relation, since i and t do not form subject-object relationship. It shall be regarded as a special type of relations that cannot be reduced to reasoning. Instead, it may be interpreted as speech or word relation. Indeed, most dialogue philosophers favor this approach. The main role of language in philosophical reasoning is also shown by the attention that the pronoun We receives in the concepts of philosophers, principally Cohen and Rosenzweig. These two philosophers do not reduce the We to a communal subjectivity, as it appears in Marxist approach. Cohen and Rosenzweig describe We as a common space where dialogue can develop. When the first person singular (i) enters the dialogue, it finds this dialogue enclosed by the first-person plural (w). Their relations may be described by the logical formula $ih = iw \ (wh)$.

Let us look how these ideas are reflected in Cohen's and Rosenzweig's concepts in detail.

3. Hermann Cohen's contribution to the philosophy of dialogue

According to our opinion, among the founders of the philosophy of dialogue, Cohen's teaching is the most fundamental. Profound research is required to determine all connections between Cohen's thought and dialogism, but for now we study only several salient propositions[8].

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8 See Z. A. Sokuler, *German Kogen i filosofiya dialoga* [*Hermann Cohen and the Philosophy of Dialogue*], Moscow, Progress-Traditsiya, 2008; I. S. Dvorkin, *Fylosofyya dialoha v poyskakh puty* [*Philosophy of Dialogue in Search of a Way*], in *Filosofs'ki dialohy 2013. Tolerantnist' ta dialoh v suchasnomu sviti* [*Philosophical Dialogues 2013. Tolerance and Dialogue in Modern World*], Kiev, Instytut filosofiyi imeni G. S. Skovorody, Natsional'na Akademiya Nauk Ukraïny, 2013,

Cohen's logic of the origin (*Ursprung*) considers even actual being (*Dasein*) as well as thinking to be processes. It emphasizes temporality, a significant precondition for the philosophy of dialogue. Cohen does not merely suggest that thinking and being unfold in time, which Hegel already stated. Cohen's position in relation to processuality of the world is much more radical. A process that reaches its logical completion cannot be called a process and becomes only a trace of the past. For Cohen, actual being belongs to the present. One illustration of this idea is the following Cohen's description of plurality and unity[9].

Cohen stresses that plurality (*Mehrheit*) should stay plural, but at the same time it should also be considered as divided unity (*Einheit*). How do these two definitions work together? According to Cohen, they can only be related in time. In the present actuality (*Gegenwart*), they can be thought as processes that have not yet been completed.

> So, if differentiation can never be considered completed, it remains a unification. It preserves the unification in itself. And if a unification can never be considered completed, it remains differentiation[10].

Cohen describes the present not as continuation of the past, but as rise towards the future. As he says, the present must become the future[11].

The only way to think the plurality is to think the process of differentiation, and the only way to think the unity is to think the process of unification. When thinking acquires a processual character, it helps to understand the processual character of the reality itself. According to Cohen, this is not a coincidence. It is the very essence of the actual being. Indeed, to describe the actual reality, Cohen also uses the word *Gegenwart* that in German means both the "present time" and the "actually existing".

Even thinking, for Cohen, is thinking the origin of a process[12]. The origin is the beginning, the foundation, the principle. In a way, as with Hegel, Cohen's origin or beginning is Nothing. But differing from Hegel, Cohen does not postulate the absolute Nothing as the beginning. For him, the origin is an infinitesimally small value, a differential. This notion comes from Leibniz, whose concepts Cohen here unites with those of Kant. Cohen suggests to consider the reality in its origin. A

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pp. 112-171; I. S. Dvorkin, *Astrolyabiya. Putevoditel' po filosofii "Zvezdy izbavleniya" Frantza Rozentsveyga* [*Astrolabe. Guide to the Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig's* Star of Redemption], in F. Rozentsveyg, *Zvezda izbavleniya* [*The Star of Redemption*], Russ. transl. by I. S. Dvorkin and E. Yanduganova, ed. by I. S. Dvorkin, Jerusalem-Moscow, Gesharim, 2017, pp. 469-512.

9 Cf. H. Cohen, *System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Logik der reinen Erkenntnis* (1902, 1914²), in idem, *Werke*, ed. by Hermann-Cohen-Archiv at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Zurich under the direction of H. Holzhey, vol. 6, introduction by H. Holzhey, Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms, 1977, pp. 62-67.

10 *Ibidem*, p. 64: "Die Sonderung, die niemals als abgeschlossen gedacht werden darf, bleibt somit Vereinigung. Die Vereinigung erhält sich in ihr. Und die Vereinigung, die nicht abgeschlossen gedacht werden darf, erhält sich dadurch als Sonderung".

11 See *ibidem*, p. 63: "*Die Gegenwart muß indessen zur Zukunft werden*".

12 Cf. *ibidem*, pp. 140 and 35 f.

thing-in-itself is unthinkable, as thinking cannot be identical to a thing. However, the process of thinking can be correlated with a thing as considered in its origin. Instead of Hegel's dialectic that postulates the identity of thinking and being, Cohen proposes a dialectic that regards the process of thinking as the process of correlation with the origin[13].

This view of thinking as a process of correlation is Cohen's great contribution to the philosophy of dialogue. Indeed, the philosophy of dialogue aims to understand reality as a process that is happening in the present time. However, to be sure that Cohen here means dialogue and not just thinking, we have to follow him further. The second important step is to understand that Cohen describes an interpersonal process. This approach opens up the domain of inter-human relations, the sphere of ethics.

In his *Ethik des reinen Willens* (*Ethic of the Pure Will*), Cohen gives a new answer to the old question first asked by Fichte and that later on became the foundation of classical German idealism. Fichte formulates it as the question of the relation between I and Not-I. The Not-I, for Fichte, is the world which faces the human. Thus, the question may be reformulated so that it refers to the relation between the subject and the object, which is the central theme of European philosophy.

Cohen's definition of Not-I is radically different from Fichte. Cohen explains that the world or the objective reality cannot be a real alternative to the human. Since the world may be defined as It, it is not comparable to I. The main feature of I is the personal will, which It does not possess. Accordingly, the alternative to I is not the world. The human faces another human. Thus, the real alternative to I is Thou.

> An individual person does not really possess self-consciousness […]. But I shall experience the otherness in order to become self-conscious […]. Thou is not the same as He. He would mean the Other, who is in danger to be treated like He as well. *But of all things, Thou and I belong together*. I cannot say Thou without relating Thou to me; without uniting Thou with me in this relation. But then at once, there is the requirement: I, for my part, cannot conceive I without thinking of Thou. Thus, in self-consciousness, the Other [person] immediately forms the dual form of I[14].

Fundamentality of interpersonal relations, put in the first place the problem of language and hermeneutics, is the common characteristic of all philosopher of dialogue.

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13 See J. Gordon, *Der Ichbegriff bei Hegel, bei Cohen und in der Südwestdeutschen Schule hinsichtlich der Kategorienlehre untersucht*, part 1, *Der Begriff des Denkens bei Hegel und Cohen*, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1927.

14 H. Cohen, *System der Philosophie. Zweiter Teil. Ethik des reinen Willens* (1904, 1907²), in idem, *Werke*, cit., vol. 7, introduction by P. A. Schmid, Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, Georg Olms, 2002, pp. 248 f.: "das physische Einzelwesen kein echtes Selbstbewusstsein besitzt […]. Aber die Änderung musste das Ich doch erleiden, um Selbstbewusstsein zu werden […]. Du ist nicht Er. Es wäre der Andere. Er kommt in Gefahr, auch als Er behandelt zu werden. *Du und Ich gehören schlechterdings zusammen*. Ich kann nicht Du sagen, ohne dich auf mich zu beziehen; ohne dich in dieser Beziehung mit dem ich zu vereinigen. Aber es liegt darin zugleich die gesteigerte Forderung: dass ich auch nicht Ich denken kann, ohne dich zu denken. So hat der Anderer im Selbstbewusstsein sich gleichsam in den Dualis des Ich verwandelt".

4. Franz Rosenzweig's reception of the logic of the origin

Rosenzweig intentionally draws upon Cohen, and even more consciously he argues with his teacher when he advances of his own philosophy.

Rosenzweig borrows Cohen's logic of the origin, but he also modifies it to large extent. For Rosenzweig, the reality is completed on the level of elements, but on the level of paths it is understood as open, actually existing here and now. However, for this representation the concept of correlation is not enough. According to some researchers Rosenzweig debates with his teacher this point[15]. The theory of correlations seems too static, and Rosenzweig replaces it with a dynamic theory of the *Gestalt* ("figure", "configuration"). Here, the elements are linked not simply by connections – but rather by process, meaning the "path" (*Bahn*)[16].

What is the main difference between *Gestalt* and correlation? The correlation connects the transcendent origin to the process happening here and now. It opens access to the temporality of the present. However, it is a very simple connection that is insufficient to describe real processes. This functional approach can only facilitate the understanding of a completed process. While Hegel claims to give a full understanding of the processual character of the being, describing it as the progress of the absolute spirit, Cohen's logic of origin addresses the processual character of actual being. And Rosenzweig takes a further step. Within the *Gestalt*, two paths are dynamically related to each other. Their interaction makes dynamic of *Gestalt* whole. This dynamic becomes something more than external reality. For Rosenzweig, the paths of creation and revelation are given, and only their interaction within *Gestalt*, which produces the path of redemption, transcends the givenness. According to Rosenzweig, idealism and Islam never transcend *Gestalt* because they do not know the difference between creation and revelation.

The *Gestalt* theory is a highly original concept in Rosenzweig's philosophy. Within *Gestalt*, dynamic processes between God, human and world are interconnected. The notion of *Gestalt* is a development of the concept of subject-object relations, but with processes instead of relations, and instead of two participants (the subject and the object) there are three (human, world and God). Their interaction happens in all three times we know – the past, the present and the future. Within the dialogue, this process develops between the three persons: I, Thou, He/She.

15 Cf. Y. Gil'ad, *'Iyun hashva'ati be-havanat musag hahitgalut be-hagutam shel Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber* [*A Comparative Study of the Concept of Revelation in the Thought of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber*], Haifa, Universitat Heifa, 2005, p. 20.

16 F. Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption* (1921), Engl. transl. by W. W. Hallo, New York-Chicago-San Francisco, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, p. 125.

5. Franz Rosenzweig's reception of the interpersonal relations

Similar to Cohen, the interpersonal relation I-Thou is for Rosenzweig the foundation for the reality of the present. But Cohen only stresses the benefits of I-Thou as compared to I-It and uncovers the role of I-Thou relation in forming the We, whereas Rosenzweig considers all interpersonal relations in detail.

An important innovation that Rosenzweig develops is his philosophy of language. Importantly, it appears almost simultaneously with Cassirer's idea of language as a symbolic form, which suggests Neo-Kantian sources. For Rosenzweig, mathematics describes the organon of thinking that works with existing, i.e. past continuing time. Unlike mathematics, grammar represents the organon of language that deals with present. Grammar works not with elements, but with paths. In *Der Stern der Erlösung* (*The Star of Redemption*), Rosenzweig attempts to implement logical derivation of language. The original words of logic are 'yes' and 'no', while those of grammar are 'good' and 'I'. Its root sentence expresses the concept of 'We'[17]. In Rosenzweig's theory, the pronouns I, Thou, He, She, It, We are transformed into systematic concepts of his philosophical grammar.

Another way for Rosenzweig to explain the language is to deduce linguistics from the structure of the biblical text which he invests with prophetic value. Following the Bible, Rosenzweig treads in Cohen's footsteps, who has presented the foundation for a new biblical hermeneutics. Within the biblical narration, God and human are engaged in a dialogue, which Rosenzweig presents as the genesis of language. God asks the human: "Where are Thou?" (Gen 3:9)[18], but it is not until much later that the human answers: "Here I am" (Gen 22:1.11, 31:11, Exod. 3:4)[19]. And the Divine I first appears in its aspect of judgment (Gen 6:13.17) and only at the time of the testament it becomes the basis for love between God and human: "I am the Lord thy God" (Exod. 20:2, Deut. 5:6).

For Rosenzweig, the three persons of the singular and the three persons of the plural are a system, not just a set of notions.

This point reveals the difference between Rosenzweig and another famous representative of the philosophy of dialogue: Martin Buber[20]. Buber contrasts I-Thou with I-It, while Rosenzweig treats them as a whole. Unlike Buber, for Rosenzweig the I-Thou relation is immediately linked to the I-It, whereas present time is connected to past and future. When the human addresses God as Thou, this is not abstracted from created world and from past time and strives towards redemption in future. As Rosenzweig shows in a letter to Buber, the Jewish prayer formula *Ata hu Eloheinu* (literally "Thou art He our God") is more than the Buberian conception of God as the "eternal Thou". Rosenzweig's *Gestalt*

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17 Cf. *ibidem*, pp. 125-127.
18 *Ibidem*, p. 175.
19 *Ibidem*, p. 176.
20 See M. Buber, *I and Thou* (1923), Engl. transl. by R. G. Smith, with a postscript by the author added, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958[2].

includes not only the dialogue with God, but also the dialogue between people. They are further connected with the process of revelation and directed towards redemption where "eternal We" is formed.

Buber, on the other side, finds eternity already in the position of second person: "in each we are aware of a breath from the eternal *Thou*; in each *Thou* we address the eternal *Thou*"[21]. Buber's "eternal Thou" is fundamentally different from Rosenzweig's "eternal We". The latter always includes an estrangement, because We means not only I and Thou, but also He, She, and They. For Rosenzweig, this connection is necessary. For him God is the God of a community and not only the personal God of an individual man. This leads to certain externalization of God, meaning that God can be spoken of with third person pronouns. Of course, such talk is dangerous, but Rosenzweig does not shun it. On the contrary, Buber's God cannot be expressed using third person; God is not an existing being that can be spoken about. Speech can only be addressed to God: "Something else is not 'given' and God then elicited from it; but God is the Being that is directly, most nearly, and lastingly, over against us, that may properly only be addressed, not expressed"[22].

Buber considers that category of having, or possession in relation, because having is linked to subject-object relations, i.e. to I-It: "But God, the eternal Presence, does not permit Himself to be held. Woe to the man so possessed that he thinks he possesses God!"[23].

But Rosenzweig embraces the formula "Thou art (He) our God" which not only uses the third person pronoun to speak about God, but also declares that God belongs to the community[24].

6. Analytics of interpersonal dialogue and its logico-mathematical model

We will now proceed to formulate Rosenzweig's ideas about interpersonal dialogue, using our logico-mathematical formalism (cf. § 2). Rosenzweig himself suggested that mathematics and logic are only valid inside the completed world of elements and cannot be used in unfolding in the present interpersonal relations that are described by organon of grammar. However, there may be proposed a more comprehensive understanding of logic which includes pronoun structures describing interpersonal relations. Enhanced with grammar, this logic of dialogue will be able to consider the actual processes of the present.

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21 *Ibidem*, p. 6.
22 *Ibidem*, pp. 80 f.
23 *Ibidem*, p. 106.
24 Cf. R. Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou". An Historical Analysis and the First Publication of Martin Buber's Lectures "Religion als Gegenwart"*, Heidelberg, Lambert Schneider, 1978, pp. 183-195.

Let us use the logico-mathematical theory of categories[25]. If Rosenzweig's elements are interpreted as categories and his paths as functors, then the processes that unfold with *Gestalt* can be considered as natural transformations. Then the above-mentioned formula $i{\to}h = i{\to}t\ (t{\to}h)$ describes the dialogue between i and t concerning the thing h.

Let us consider the most important Rosenzweig's theses about significance of language in interpersonal relations. According to Rosenzweig, language joins creation with revelation and, thus, becomes the basis for realization of *Gestalt*.

The above-mentioned formula shows that the dialogue between i and t is about h. However, it is not h itself that is manifested in dialogue, but the transformation of h in the interpersonal relation $i{\to}t$. Following Cohen, Rosenzweig interpreted this transformation as differential. It may be expressed as $dhi{\to}t$. In the first part of *The Star of Redemption* Rosenzweig defines structures of this type as logico-symbolic. However, in the second part of his book he investigates paths of interaction between the elements and analyzes language as the subject of the organon of grammar. Thus, Rosenzweig brings the method where language can be investigated not as direct expression of reality using signs, but rather as interpersonal transformation of one's relation to reality. Furthermore, language communication is not just between separate individuals, but in dialogue of the community of We that exists within the framework of the dialogue. The We may be expressed as following:

$$w{\to}h,\ w\{i,t\}\colon (i{\to}h = i{\to}t\ (t{\to}h)) \to (t{\to}h = t{\to}i\ (i{\to}h)).$$

Thus, there is double relation between i and h, i.e. the person in dialogue has double access to reality – direct as i and mediated through relation with t inside

$$w\colon i{\to}h = i{\to}w\ (w{\to}h).$$

The notion We is an essential element of the theory of dialogue developed by Rosenzweig and Cohen.

7. Conclusions. Prospects for the philosophy of dialogue as the first philosophy

Rosenzweig calls his system the "new thinking"[26] that continues and overcomes the evolution of philosophy "from Parmenides to Hegel"[27]. Rosenzweig did not start this philosophical movement, at least he followed Herman Cohen. Neither

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25 See R. Goldblatt, *Topoi. The Categorial Analysis of Logic* (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 94), Amsterdam-New York-Oxford, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1984².

26 F. Rosenzweig, *The New Thinking. A Few Supplementary Remarks to the* Star, Engl. transl. by A. Udoff and B. E. Galli, in *Franz Rosenzweig's "The New Thinking"*, ed. by A. Udoff and B. E. Galli, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1999, pp. 67-102.

27 F. Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, cit., p. 13.

was Rosenzweig the last dialogue philosopher: Buber, Ebner, Bakhtin and Levinas followed the same road. Vladimir Bibler, an outstanding Russian philosopher of the second half of the 20th century, may be added to this list. It is possible that, thanks to the efforts of these thinkers, the philosophy of dialogue will take the place that Rosenzweig wished for it – that of the new "first philosophy".