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Figures of Analogy: Paradigm, Metaphor, Symptom

ABSTRACT: *This article analyzes three different forms of analogical reasoning based on the insights provided in Enzo Melandri's reflections. First, I examine the relationship between logic and rhetoric, referencing Melandri's account of the paradigm as a form of analogical reasoning. Next, I address the issue of metaphor, drawing on Melandri's interpretation of Aristotle, and explore the relationship between analogy and metaphor by referencing the works of I. A. Richards and Max Black. Finally, I focus on the attempt to revise semiotics in symptomatic terms, interpreting the symptom as a manifestation of analogical reasoning. Melandri draws on classical sources, particularly Aristotle, to derive consequences that challenge traditional interpretations, thereby tracing an 'analogical' soul within the very philosophical *lógos*. In doing so, a particular stance of thought begins to emerge, which Melandri defines as 'archaeological', and which seeks to regress beyond the division between what is logical and what is illogical.*

KEYWORDS: *Melandri, Analogy, Paradigm, Metaphor, Symptom.*

1. Introduction

In his monumental study on analogy, *La linea è il circolo*, Enzo Melandri opens by expressing dissatisfaction with the theories of analogy developed throughout the history of philosophical thought. In particular, Melandri criticizes a certain confusion between the different ways in which analogy can be understood. In his view, modern and contemporary thought has forgotten an Aristotelian lesson regarding the distinction between three different ways of understanding analogy: the argument by analogy (*parádeigma*), the concept of analogy (*homoiótēs*), and analogical predication (*kat'analogían*)¹. These are well-distinguished declinations of analogical reasoning, even though they are often intertwined in the work of the Stagirite himself. Melandri devotes the most attention to the first of these three meanings, which will serve as my starting point for a deeper exploration of the relationship between logic and

1 Melandri 2004, 10. Besoli 2018 provides a good introduction to Melandri's entire work, highlighting, among other things, the connection between his interest in analogy and the phenomenological framework of his thought. See also Bonfanti 2016.

rhetoric: the argument by analogy, the paradigm, indeed seems to give rise to a kind of boundary-crossing of *logos* towards what exceeds it. The important thing is that, as Melandri often claims, crossing the boundaries of logic does not imply a descent into the irrational. What analogy seems to shape, therefore, is a special form of non-logical rationality. The path I propose here is divided into three stages: first, I will analyze the relationship between logic and rhetoric, using Melandri's reading of Aristotle as the primary lens of investigation. Secondly, still using Melandri's work as the main reference, I will try to illustrate Aristotle's oscillations in the use and function of analogy and metaphor, explaining the relationships between these two figures of thought. Finally, I will show how the very valorization of the analogical-metaphorical element of language can suggest a correction of semiology in a symptomatic key.

2. Rhetoric Beyond Logic: the Paradigm

Among the various forms, it is the paradigm that Melandri regards as most closely corresponding to his own understanding of analogy. This is demonstrated by the many pages dedicated, both in *La linea e il circolo* and in *L' analogia, la proporzione, la simmetria*, to the issue of the paradigm itself as well as to exemplification as an argumentative tool. First and foremost, in Melandri, there is a reevaluation of the role of rhetoric in relation to logic. To demonstrate this, it is sufficient to invoke the primacy that Melandri attributes to the "practical" origin of language. In a significant passage from *L' analogia, la proporzione, la simmetria*, he indeed writes: "The fact is that language did not arise solely for the purpose of knowing reality, but also (some might say especially) to influence and direct the attitudes of others, that is, for political, moral, and coercive purposes"². Melandri often appeals to this practical function of language – exemplified by analogical reasoning – which, in his view, is closely tied to the relationship between analogy and *praxis* that he repeatedly underscores³.

Turning to the argument by analogy, Melandri refers to a classic passage in which Aristotle introduces the concept of *parádeigma*. The reference is to a well-known passage from the *Analitica priora*, in which the Stagirite identifies *parádeigma* as an inference proceeding from particular to particular, and from which the classic definition of analogical has arisen⁴. This placement already identifies analogy as a form of reasoning that exceeds the bounds of logic, since such an inference cannot be reduced to either deduction, which proceeds from the general to the particular, or induction, which, like the paradigm, starts from a particular but, differently from

2 Melandri 2013, 218.

3 Marramao 2000 brought attention to this aspect of Melandri's reflection on analogy.

4 An. pr. 69a 13-15. Aristotle 1962, 517: "Thus it is evident that an example represents the relation, not of part to whole or of whole to part, but of one part to another". I have dealt more extensively with the issue of the paradigm in Melandri in Ricciotti 2024.

the paradigm, results in a general conclusion⁵. Aristotle thus evokes this particular form of reasoning within the *Organon*, although it is only in the *Rhetoric* that he delves deeper into the issue of the paradigm as a variation of a peculiar form of *elocutio* (elocution). In the *Rhetoric*, the paradigm is presented as one of the tools used to convince the interlocutor: the *parádeigma* is – with the enthymeme, the rhetorical equivalent of the logical syllogism – a tool of persuasion. For Aristotle, there are two types of paradigms, or *exempla*: those referring to events that have actually occurred, and those invented by the speaker. In both cases, the starting point and the conclusion of the rhetorical argument are particular propositions. This is one Aristotelian example:

An instance of speaking of [historical] facts is if someone were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the king [of Persia] and not allow Egypt to be subdued; for in the past Darius did not invade [Greece] until he had taken Egypt, but after taking it, he invaded; and again, Xerxes did not attack until he took [Egypt]. But having taken it, he invaded; thus if he [the present king] takes [Egypt], he will invade [Greece]; as a result it must not be allowed.⁶

The inference begins with the observation that King Darius did not enter Greece before conquering Egypt, and concludes with the statement that the current king should not be allowed to take Egypt. The characteristic of the paradigm, therefore, is that it does not transcend the realm of particularity, and evokes a singularity that, as Giorgio Agamben has suggested, seems to escape the logical-dialectical relationship between a particular and a logical universal⁷. It is precisely this ability of the rhetorical argument to slide from one particular to another without ever being reduced to a universal statement that signals its irreducibility to a purely logical dimension of thinking.

In *L'analogia, la proporzione, la simmetria*, Melandri reaffirms the Aristotelian difference between *parádeigma* and *analogía*, deepening the probative value of the example in relation to a starting generalization. Melandri indeed writes: “Now, there is no doubt that exemplificative or paradigmatic arguments, under certain conditions, have a certain probative force. This becomes relevant when the example works by breaking a certain generalization that has already been acquired”⁸. If the starting assumption is a prejudice, that is, an unfounded generalization, then the probative force of an example contrary to that prejudice will be maximal. Dogma is instead a theory that is somewhat grounded, and to be contradicted, it

5 The relationship between analogy and induction, and the possibility that analogy contains an inductive moment, is extensively discussed by Melandri, see Melandri 2013, 43-73.

6 Rhet. 1393 a-b. Aristotle 2007, 162.

7 Agamben 2009, 19: “The epistemological status of the paradigm becomes clear only if we understand – making Aristotle’s thesis more radical – that it calls into question the dichotomous opposition between the particular and the universal which we are used to seeing as inseparable from procedures of knowing, and presents instead a singularity irreducible to any of the dichotomy’s two terms. The domain of his discourse is not logic but analogy”.

8 Melandri 2013, 48

requires the invention of particular examples. Finally, prevention is the case of generalization against which the example has no power and no probative force⁹. From these indications, it is already quite clear how, at least in some cases, paradigmatic reasoning has (or can have) a heuristic, creative value, meaning that it can advance knowledge. This aspect plays a central role in Melandri's understanding of analogy, and it is precisely here that we find a certain ambivalence in Aristotle's account of the link between knowledge and metaphor. It is worth mentioning here that, in Melandri, the creative instance of analogical thought is explicitly outlined at the beginning of *L'analogia, la proporzione, la simmetria* in terms that recall the political background of his entire treatment of analogy. Analogy unfolds in a continuous tension between the 'revolutionary' element of transgression and the 'conservative' element of control. In this play, two forces are at work: intelligence, which steers reasoning toward the new, the unknown, and culture, which reflects reasoning back to what is already known. Authentic analogy, however, is found by Melandri only where the 'transgressive' element prevails over the 'conservative' one. In this, he connects to the famous closing words of *La Linea e il circolo*, where he wrote that good analogies are the revolutionary ones¹⁰. This is a valuable indication for understanding the different nuances of analogy in Melandri's work, which we will return to in the following paragraphs.

Returning for a moment to the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, it is worth recalling that, since ancient times, there has been a close relationship between rhetoric and metaphor, and it is within this relationship that we must trace the reason for the early philosophers' prejudice – Plato and Aristotle in particular – against this figure of reasoning. As Ricoeur has written, "Before becoming futile, rhetoric was dangerous. This is why Plato condemned it. For him, rhetoric is to justice, the political virtue par excellence, what sophistry is to legislation; and these are, for the soul, what cooking in relation to medicine and cosmetics in relation to gymnastics are for the body – that is, arts of illusion and deception". And he immediately adds, explaining the common condemnation of rhetoric and metaphor in early Greek philosophy: "Metaphor will also have its enemies, who, giving it what one might call a 'cosmetic' as well as a 'culinary' interpretation, will look upon metaphor merely as simple decoration and as pure delectation. Every condemnation of metaphor as sophism shares in the condemnation of sophistry itself"¹¹. Therefore, it is now necessary to explore the connection between logic and rhetoric by examining in more detail the issue of metaphor as a peculiar declination of analogical reason.

3. Metaphor and Analogy: Substitution and Interaction View

First of all, it must be explained why Melandri seems to reject – or at least to devalue – another notion of analogy, the one that Aristotle referred to with the term

9 Melandri 2013, 48-50.

10 Melandri 2004, 810.

11 Ricoeur 2003, 10.

analogia. The definition that Aristotle provides in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is well-known, where he defines it as “equality of ratios and requires at least four terms”¹². A good starting point for understanding how this purely proportional concept of analogy affects the meaning of analogy more generally can be the equally classic definition that Aristotle provides of metaphor in the *Poetics*. There, Aristotle writes that “A metaphor is the application of a noun which properly applies to something else. The transfer may be from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy”¹³. It seems, therefore, that analogy, understood as a simple mathematical proportion, represents a kind of ‘guarantee’ of the validity of the metaphor. The metaphor is valid if it can be clarified, made explicit, and precisely ‘guaranteed’ by a proportional analogy. Thus, when Aristotle brings the metaphor back to analogy, it is only to limit its potentially disruptive or, as Max Black would say centuries later, creative aim. It is precisely from Black’s famous text on metaphor that I would now like to extract some insights. In the course of that text, Black critiques the conception of metaphor defined as ‘substitutive’. This consists of the idea that using a metaphor to say something about something else means indirectly saying something that could have been expressed more directly. Black’s example is the following: “The chairman plowed through the discussion”. It is a phrase used to say that the chairman conducted the meeting in a certain way, but it could have been expressed more directly: “Instead of saying, plainly or *directly*, that the chairman deal summarily with objections, or ruthlessly suppressed irrelevance, or something of the sort, the speaker chose to use a word (‘plowed’) which, strictly speaking, means something else”¹⁴. Black calls this theory ‘substitution’ view because the underlying idea is that the metaphorical term acts as a mere ‘substitute’ for the term being metaphorized. “This account treats the metaphorical expression (let us call it “M”) as a substitute for some other literal expression (‘L’, say) which would have expressed the same meaning, had it been used instead. On this view – Black continues – the meaning of M, in its metaphorical occurrence, is just the *literal* meaning of L”¹⁵. What Black is stating (and criticizing) here is, we could say, a purely semantic reading of metaphor. That is, a reading in which the meaning of the individual term (the metaphorized term as well as the metaphorizing term) determines the validity of the metaphor. The metaphor is valid if there is a substantial identity of meaning between the two individual terms, such that, as we read, the metaphorical meaning of M is identical to the literal meaning of L.

Now, even though Black explicitly refers to Aristotle when criticizing the ‘substitution’ conception of metaphor only in a couple of notes, we can say with some certainty that the Stagirite would be its most illustrious representative¹⁶. The idea we started with in this paragraph was indeed that the metaphor must have a se-

12 Et. Nic., V, 1131a 30-31. Aristotle 1999, 72.

13 Poet. 57 b 5-10. Aristotle 1996, 34.

14 Black 1962, 30.

15 Black 1962, 31.

16 That the main objective of Black’s theses is Aristotle’s philosophy is also supported by Hesse 1962, 338.

mantic guarantee that can be entirely made explicit in terms of a proportion, in which all its four terms are explicit. And it is important to emphasize that this guarantee is not only related to the linguistic sphere, but more deeply to the ontological one. In other words: the good metaphor refers to a proportion in which the relations of similarity are explicit, but this latter externalization of relations of similarity, in turn, rests on a real similarity between the things. Daniele Guastini has emphasized this very clearly:

After all, we can go around the issue as much as we want, but in the end we must conclude that, like every other semantic relationship, the relation of similarity and relatedness on which the metaphor is based is understood by Aristotle as a relationship between the things to which the metaphor refers; in the sense of a proportional relationship between entities and their attributes: the withered state of the straw, as, by analogy, the withered state of old age.¹⁷

In this sense, “understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unraveling a riddle”¹⁸. Recalling the terms we used earlier regarding the conception of analogy in Melandri, it could be said that the metaphor assumed according to the substitutive theory manifests a ‘conservative’ tendency, while only the *parádeigma* has an authentically transgressive and revolutionary value. The creative and proposing drive of the metaphor is reduced to the meaning of the individual terms. We could even say that it is precisely the interpretation of the metaphor based on the meaning of the individual term that determines its limited heuristic effectiveness. This is a thesis that is hinted at by Melandri himself in *La linea e il circolo*, where he writes that the main limitation of Aristotle’s theory of analogy was precisely that it reasoned based on the consideration of the individual terms that compose it¹⁹. It is now a matter of understanding whether there are any indications, derived from Aristotle’s text, that could suggest something different, another idea of analogy and, therefore, also of metaphor.

Recently, Giovanni Bottiroli has explicitly spoken of a ‘happy incoherence’ in Aristotle’s perspective on metaphor²⁰. The Stagirite did indeed restrict the metaphor to the dimension of the individual word, but on the other hand, he identified a creative aspect in it when he argues that those who formulate good metaphors possess a particular intuitive intelligence, which Aristotle calls *eustochía*²¹. It is indeed that dimension of ‘intuitive intelligence’ that Melandri identifies as a condition for the existence of analogy, within that tension between intelligence and culture, between the revolutionary drive of the former and the conservative tendency of the latter which characterizes all good analogies. What Aristotle calls *eustochía* in the *Rhetoric* is exactly this special and ‘revolutionary’

17 Guastini 2005, 6. See also Travaglini 2009, 133-139.

18 Black 1962, 32.

19 Melandri 2004, 318.

20 Bottiroli 2020, 176.

21 Bottiroli goes so far as to argue that precisely because of this Aristotelian consideration of *metaphoréin*, Black himself could be considered a neo-Aristotelian, see Bottiroli 2020, 176.

faculty. It is a peculiar word, composed of the prefix *eu*, meaning ‘good’, and the verb *stocházein*, which refers to shooting with a bow, knowing how to hit a target, and having good aim. It thus refers to a special ‘discernment’ that Aristotle attributes to those who are able to recognize similarity. Aristotle also discusses something similar in the *Poetics*, where he refers to ‘genius’, *euphyia*, the good nature possessed by those who can recognize similarities even in things that appear to be very different from one another²². All of this is part of overcoming the ‘substitution’ conception of metaphor, to which Black opposes a conception that we could call ‘creative’. He writes indeed: “It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say it formulates some similarity antecedently existing”²³. The idea is that the use of metaphors contributes to organizing the world, not just describing it. In this case, Black advocates for an ‘interaction’ conception of metaphor, whose roots can actually be traced back to the work of I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, to which Black explicitly refers and to which we can now directly turn. Richards also drew on Aristotle’s doctrine of metaphor, pointing out a sort of prejudice on the part of the Stagirite towards it. This prejudice would manifest, in particular, in three elements of Aristotle’s doctrine. The first is the idea that metaphorical intelligence would be a sort of natural gift. It would, therefore, be a skill available only to those who possess a nature (*euphyia*) suitable for developing it. Unlike other skills – and this is the second Aristotelian prejudice – this ability would not be teachable or transferable. Finally, “the third and worst assumption” about metaphor, introduced by Aristotle and adopted by the entire tradition, is “that metaphor is something special and exceptional in the use of language, a deviation from its normal mode of working, instead of the omnipresent principle of all its free action”²⁴.

As we have seen, Melandri criticized Aristotle primarily for continuing to understand analogy starting from its terms, without placing it within the broader horizon of discourse. A similar critique is made by Richards himself, who extends it to nearly all traditional readings of the concept of metaphor. Richards denounces the erroneous conceptions that consider the metaphor nothing more than a mere rhetorical embellishment of discourse. Against this idea, Richards is the first who advocates for an ‘interaction’ conception of metaphor – the one later adopted by Black – a conception in which the meaning of the metaphor is a sort of emergence from the reciprocal relationship between the ‘vehicle’, the term used metaphorically, and the ‘tenor’, the term to which the vehicle refers. The important thing about this theory is that no meaning of the metaphor exists outside the mutual action of the two terms. Instead, the overall meaning emerges from their dynamic and unpredictable interaction. And it is indeed a ‘recipro-

22 Poet. 59 a 7. Aristotle 1996, 37: “This is the one thing that cannot be learnt from someone else, and is a sign of natural talent; for the successful use of metaphor is a matter of perceiving similarities”.

23 Black 1962, 37.

24 Richards 1936, 90.

cal action' because each of the two terms intervenes to expand and redefine the semantic boundaries of the other, without a common meaning being identifiable in the singularity of each term. This theory is the condition for freeing metaphor from a simple symbolic use, where the metaphorizing word (the vehicle) could be reduced to a mere symbol of the metaphorized term (the tenor). Unlike what happens in a purely substitutive conception, in the interactional dynamic, the metaphor breaks free from the direct relationship between the term and its meaning, thus gaining the ability to 'construct' a world, or at least to see a certain part of the world with different eyes. To return to Black and the example he discusses at length in his work, the Hobbesian saying 'man is a wolf', Black writes that "The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others – in short, *organizes* our view of man"²⁵. Therefore, if metaphor, or rather 'metaphorizing', always involves similarities, the fundamental difference between a substitution conception of metaphor and an interaction one lies in how this similarity is understood. Is it a given similarity, one that is perceived in things and always justifiable based on an implicit analogy, or does the metaphor have a creative value, as well as the ability to establish and create similarities? The first idea corresponds to a semantic conception of language, while the second corresponds to one that we could define, as we will soon see, as symptomatic.

4. The Symptom as Analogy and the Critique of the Symbolic Conception of Language

It can be argued that all the lines of inquiry discussed so far, concerning the relationships between philosophy and rhetoric, logic and analogy, substitutive and interaction metaphor, converge, in Melandri's perspective, in an attempt to correct semiology in a symptomatic key. At the beginning of *La linea e il circolo*, the Italian philosopher writes that, while it is true that when faced with a symptom, the first problem that arises is indeed that of its interpretation – i.e., what the symptom is a sign of, what its implicit reference is, its denotation, and its cause – it is equally true that the interpretation of the symptom can lead us back to an origin that exceeds the boundaries of language and directly connects us with the phenomenon. The correction of semiology in a *semeiotic* key (from *sémeion*, symptom) would therefore make it possible to reconnect language to its non-linguistic origin.

Semeiotics – Melandri writes – is a special form of semiology, and we have already referred to as 'symptomatic' any semiology directly grounded in phenomena and prior to linguistic re-elaboration. In this sense, we consider the symptomatic problem to be

²⁵ Black 1962, 41; see Valagussa 2017, 48. As is well known, the novelty of Black's position regarding the use of metaphors lies primarily in the comparison he proposes with scientific models. For this reason, and for the way in which this position might interact with Melandri's analyses. See Cabassa 2022, 66-68. The issue of the cognitive value of metaphor, primarily explored in an aesthetic key, has been extensively analyzed in Giuliani and Manera 2022.

fundamental. And since it is pre-linguistic (pre-predicative and pre-categorical), its very riproposition [...] is by itself the sign of a regression before the fracture between the logical and the illogical, the rational and the irrational.²⁶

It is therefore the symptom, the third and final figure of analogy that we intend to investigate, once again drawing on Melandri's profound reading of Aristotle's work. The line of inquiry along which, in *La linea e il circolo*, Melandri addresses the issue of the symptom as an expression of analogy is therefore primarily of a strictly semiological nature. Melandri explicitly criticizes the shape that the semiological problem had assumed in works like Roland Barthes' *Éléments de sémiologie* and *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards (thirteen years before Richards' *Philosophy of Rhetoric*). Both approaches had the flaw of unnecessarily complicating the issue of the function of signs, creating semiological taxonomies that were rich but equally abstract and vague. The distinction between signal, index, icon, symbol, sign, and allegory, proposed by Roland Barthes in *Éléments de sémiologie*, is reduced by Melandri to the most elementary distinction between two modes of sign use: "the 'symptomatic', in which the sign is causally connected to its designated; and the 'symbolic', in which no such connection exists at all"²⁷. Melandri's reflection is directed towards a critique of the purely symbolic value of language, if by this term we mean the purely denotative dimension of the linguistic sign, where each sign corresponds determinately to a referent, with no 'direct' link identifiable between the two. What the Italian philosopher seems most interested in, then, is a discourse on the linguistic sign that goes beyond its merely semantic consideration.

The main reason why Melandri is interested in medical semiotics and its symptomatic declination is therefore to be found in the fact that it makes use of a peculiarly analogical methodology. In particular, symptomatology presents itself as the prominent form of what Melandri defines as the 'empirical use' of analogy. In this regard, Melandri also shows how it was Aristotle who first reduced symptomatology to semantics, linking the function of the linguistic sign (even in its metaphorical use) to its meaning, and analyzes the case of an Empedoclean metaphor quoted by the Stagirite himself. Before discussing this, however, it is useful to refer to Melandri's account on the birth of symptomatology. Its roots must be traced back to ancient medicine, and specifically to the Hippocratics. Precisely because it is oriented towards the symptom, the language of the early physicians was not purely denotative. Melandri even observes that it was more akin to the 'poetic language' which Vico talks about. A language, then, that is creative and, we could say, metaphorical. Melandri refers to a supposed (though unproven) connection between Empedocles and the Hippocratic school. It is no coincidence, from this perspective, that Empedocles is also credited with the birth of rhetoric as the art of 'saying things well' without too much concern for the truth of what is said²⁸.

26 Melandri 2004, 193.

27 Melandri 2004, 57.

28 Ricoeur 2003, 10.

Melandri refers here to a passage from *Generation of Animals*, where Aristotle praises Empedocles' metaphorical ingenuity, especially where, in a fragment made famous by Aristotle himself, the sea is compared to the sweat of the earth. The point is to understand to what extent, for Aristotle, such a metaphor can claim heuristic value in the progress of knowledge. Regarding the fragment "the sea is the sweat of the earth", Aristotle is willing to acknowledge a certain wit, a "metaphorical" ingenuity, in the person who formulated it, but he does not attribute any cognitive value to the metaphor. Melandri writes on this topic: "In poetry – Aristotle says – the metaphor is undoubtedly effective [...]. But what is acceptable in poetry, even necessary, does not hold for science. By excluding the metaphor, Aristotle also excludes analogy from science"²⁹. From this condemnation of the metaphor, Melandri infers that Aristotle's operation was essentially one of reconverting symptomatology into semantics, making the value of the symptom fully converge with that of the mere linguistic sign. In the following pages, Melandri acknowledges a fluctuation in Aristotle's way of understanding analogy and its 'demonstrative value': "There is, therefore, a contrast between Aristotle the biologist and Aristotle the logician: the former admits the demonstrative use of analogy, while the latter entirely excludes it from the *Organon*"³⁰. While it is certainly true, as we have insisted on so far, regarding the restrictions imposed by Aristotle on the creative value of metaphor (and thus on the 'transgressive' component of analogy), it is equally true that, especially the 'scientist' Aristotle seems much more willing to acknowledge a certain cognitive value in metaphorical reasoning. Now, identifying the heuristic-experimental value of analogical reasoning within the Aristotelian conception would perhaps be excessive. It is indeed true, as Bottiroli has pointed out, that "metaphor as the discovery of already existing similarities operates within the realm of truth as *adequatio*, correspondence, specular reflection, etc."³¹ and there is no doubt that, for Aristotle, truth is primarily the mirroring in *dianoia* of the connections found in reality, according to the famous definition in *Metaphysics*. That is, the correspondence between the connections formed in thought and those that make up the fabric of reality. However, it is also true, as Ricoeur noted, that in Aristotle's works, there is often a particular shift from treating metaphor as a figure of *léxis*, that is, of *elocutio* – one of the parts that make up discourse – to reflecting on *metaphoréin* as an activity, as the drive of thought to create – and not just to find – similarities.

Overall, the figures of the paradigm, metaphor, and symptom exemplify a mode of thinking that moves beyond the boundaries of *lógos*, pointing to what follows or exceeds it. We have also seen how Melandri's operation is often to appeal to certain classics in order to derive as many consequences as possible that seemingly contrast with those handed down by tradition. In fact, the archaeological method adopted by Melandri and theorized in the first chapter of *La linea e il circolo* is

29 Melandri 2004, 209.

30 Melandri 2004, 213.

31 Bottiroli 1993,

precisely aimed at this objective. It is not about recovering some meaning removed from the works of past authors, nor about creating a new theory of analogy, but rather about identifying fractures, gaps, and internal interstices within philosophical *lógos* itself.

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