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## **Editoriale**

The tension between *logos* and what *logos* cannot fully capture dates back at least to the very origins of philosophy. After all, why does Plato take such a hard stance against the tragedians and the poets? Why does he expel from the *polis*, governed by philosophers, those illustrious “guests” who are nonetheless so dangerous as to threaten the very foundations on which the city stands?

In Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*, when the messenger from Corinth arrives in Thebes, he brings Oedipus news that is both joyful and sorrowful. Sorrowful, because it announces the death of Oedipus’s father. Joyful, because the death is due to natural causes, the result of old age. No act of parricide, then – contrary to the oracle’s prophecy. But how can the same words, at the same time and in the same respect, convey both joy and grief, be both a source of despair and of relief? Tragedy, in short, speaks in a *dissos logos* – a double discourse that breaks the principles of logic, which demand that we speak with clarity and determination.

The twentieth century – philosophically, but also in literature, music and the arts more broadly – has ultimately come to affirm the legitimacy of this double discourse, the possibility that something might escape the grip of a *logos* organized according to its own structures and rules. More generally, one might say that contemporary thought is marked by an attempt to access an immediate truth – what we might call the “concrete”, the real – lying beyond what conceptual thought is capable of articulating. If we were to define the distinctive feature of twentieth century thought, we would have to point to the notion of the residue. The twentieth century as a philosophy of residue.

This does not simply mean, of course, that something resists the claims of thought to assimilate it. It also means – and perhaps above all – that thought itself, in its very work of shaping and forming, produces excess, by-products that it cannot quite absorb or eliminate. European thought in the twentieth century is, in this sense, a recognition of the limits of thought and of form.

European thought, we said – and it would not be hard to trace many of the most significant philosophical directions of the last century back to this general orientation. One finds it in Heidegger, in his recognition of a fundamental truth that precedes and exceeds the truth of logical judgment. One also finds it in a French philosophical current that stretches at least from Jean Wahl to Deleuze, Derrida and Badiou, passing through Foucault. Less well-known, however, is the specific form that this theoretical orientation took within Italian thought in the twentieth century. Certainly, this development was shaped by a reaction to the two great neo-idealist systems of Croce and Gentile. But even those systems, in their later stages, had begun to show signs of strain. Italian thought that seeks something either prior or posterior to *logos* thus emerges in the space opened up by the crisis of Italian idealism.

This issue seeks to contribute to the understanding of what contemporary Italian philosophy has produced in this regard. At least two distinctive features deserve to be highlighted from the outset and are explored in this issue through the work of various authors. The first is the recourse – common in parts of post-Genetian Italian thought – to philology as a tool for recovering a pre-conceptual truth. Within this trajectory, the thought of Giorgio Colli clearly stands out, and it is no coincidence that several contributions in this issue focus on his work. The second is the way in which, from at least the late 1960s, Italian thought succeeds in revitalizing the genealogical method – one that seeks to trace back to the very origins of philosophical *logos*. Hence the recurring reference to forms of reasoning that are not strictly logical, such as the use of metaphor (Grassi), analogy (Melandri) and myth (De Martino first, and later Furio Jesi). It almost goes without saying that all these different paths taken by twentieth century Italian philosophy draw, more or less explicitly, on Nietzsche – and that these two features often overlap and mutually reinforce one another.

The issue is organized in three, distinct sections: 1) *Myth and logos*; 2) *Between ancient and contemporary logic*; 3) *Between archaeology and phenomenology*.

The first section addresses the relationship between myth and *logos* not as a dialectical opposition, but as a constitutive intertwining that reveals how rationality does not arise from a void but rather from sedimentations of images, narratives and symbolic figures that persist as the substratum of its articulation. What *logos* has claimed to surpass thus appears, from this perspective, as an active and productive principle that continues to operate in the genesis and transformation of meaning. This section includes three contributions.

Alessandro Montefameglio's article investigates the thought of Ernesto Grassi, focusing on the aesthetic consequences of Grassi's distinction between indicative and demonstrative *logos*. After examining its theoretical foundations, Montefameglio shows how, in the intertwining of ontology and aesthetics, *logos* is translated into the terms of an original appearance, grounded in the co-constitutive indeterminacy between word and thing. The article concludes with an overall assessment of Grassi's philosophical project, highlighting its limits and consequences.

Francesco Valagussa's contribution explores the sematological and political implications of a certain declension of philosophical inquiry as shaped by the twentieth century, starting from a precise definition of *logos*. In Valagussa's reconstruction, *logos* appears as the soul's capacity to establish increasingly complex connections among beings. The last century then represented on the one hand the expansion of this network of links from the scientific point of view, and on the other the emergence of irreducible differences and radical incompatibilities; an emergence accompanied, however, by the problematic awareness of the non-totalizability of the real.

Finally, Sebastiano Mosti's paper aims to establish an unprecedented theoretical dialogue between Ernesto De Martino and Claude Lévi-Strauss around the symbolic operation of magic in the community context, with a particular focus

on *Il mondo magico* and *Anthropologie structurale*. By reflecting on the heroism of the shamanic figure and its symbolic operations, Mosti investigates its social indispensability.

*Between ancient and contemporary logic* (six contributions) stretches a slender isthmus: on one side, *logos* becomes word and rule of thought; on the other, it appears as a force that exceeds every possible codification. The second part of this issue seeks to traverse this isthmus, moving across it as through a field of vivid tensions, without smoothing over its discontinuities. It is an itinerary that, through dialogue with diverse authors, explores those regions of thought capable of revealing how logical instances can never be fully exhausted within their own formalistic structures, even as they can never entirely break away from them.

The section opens at the very point where the *logos* of the Western philosophical tradition comes into being: at the pre-Socratic threshold as reinterpreted by Giorgio Colli. As Giorgio Grimaldi observes, Colli's point of departure is not yet "philosophy" in its canonical sense, but rather an ancient form of wisdom, rendered distant by the irreversibility of history and yet decisive for understanding the metamorphosis of reason. From that threshold, *logos* has historically embarked on a path that led it to become a classificatory and calculating operation. It is precisely through comparative attention – through the confrontation with Nietzsche's genealogical diagnosis and Heidegger's interrogative turn – that one can measure the scope of this transformation: from the flash of sapiential intuition to the ordering grid of conceptuality. Colli's is not a nostalgia for origins, but rather the most demanding of questions: whether and how that remote entrance might still today open up possibilities for thought, despite the distance that separates us from its original experience of the world.

To this genealogy of *logos* is linked the analysis of its "publication" through the practice of writing. Alice Giordano follows Colli's analyses at the most delicate point: where the living word becomes text. In this passage, *logos* exposes itself, becoming stable and shareable, while at the same time growing rigid. Giordano shows how *Filosofia dell'espressione* teaches us that every act of saying reveals and defines always imperfectly – where this very imperfection is, conversely, the condition of its vitality. Writing, by fixing the oscillation of speech, gains breadth and representability, but also risks – as Colli suggests – handing thought over to a "dead immobility". The dialogue with Nietzsche, for whom the primacy of the spoken word in the Greek world preserves a more immediate relation to meaning, brings into sharper relief, in Giordano's contribution, the ambivalence with which Colli regards philosophical literacy: the emancipation of reason and, at the same time, the loss of its original corporeality. Here the history of logic and the history of the media of thought intersect: the very act of founding passes also through the ways in which *logos* is embodied – or disembodied – in its material supports.

On a similar analytical path, Alberto De Vita's contribution examines the role of logic and language in Giorgio Colli's philosophy, with particular attention to *Filosofia dell'espressione* and *Dopo Nietzsche*. His analysis begins with the notion of a "spurious" *logos*, in which logic appears as an unstable instrument, incapable of expressing the immediacy that grounds it. Through the mediation of language

– and, more specifically, of the word – *logos* conceals this original insufficiency, turning abstraction into rhetoric and constructing the illusion of a stable, founded knowledge. Colli shows how this dynamic is already implicit in the Western philosophical tradition, and how Nietzsche, while sensing its crisis, ultimately left its radical implications incomplete. The dialogue with Derrida, Vattimo, and Heidegger highlights the originality of Colli's position: his proposal is not a deconstructive one, but rather an attempt to rethink representation as "expression", capable of evoking the immediate without ever fully possessing it.

Such considerations allow us to move from the genealogical side of logic to its conceptual arsenal, examined here beginning with Aristotelian reflection, where the lexicon of *noûs* and *dianoia* continues to shape decisive interpretations. Nicola Cirulli reconsiders the debate surrounding Guido Calogero's *Fondamenti della logica aristotelica*, showing how the question of "determination" in Aristotle has often been approached under the aegis – external to Aristotle's own conceptual framework – of the principle *omnis determinatio est negatio*. From this perspective, the responses of Severino, the clarifications of Berti, and the critiques of Sillitti – traced through Cirulli's contribution – converge on a single knot: can determination truly be thought without judgment? If the intellect's intuitive alignment with reality already manifests itself as a subject–predicate relation, then the *noûs*' anapophantic function is not a pure "before," but rather a threshold where intuition is already steeped in negation and opposition. Yet the theoretical thorn remains, exposed by the indeterminacy proper to noetic negation: to what extent can the claim to "immediacy" still be called "logical" without slipping outside the bounds of Aristotelian grammar? The lesson that emerges is twofold: the ancient world is not a repository of ready-made solutions, but a testing ground that forces us to clarify the presuppositions from which we begin; conversely, many modern readings of Aristotle reveal more about our criteria than his.

On the strictly contemporary historiographical front – yet deepening the same theme – Antonio Catalano retraces Enzo Paci's itinerary between Husserl and Whitehead, reopening the question of the foundation of the sciences beyond the dual paradigm that dominated the twentieth century: Fregean-Russellian logicism and neopositivism. What emerges is a characterization of Paci's choice for a pre-predicative threshold: the *Lebenswelt* as a pre-categorical terrain from which to rethink both the meaning of formalizations and their relation to experience. From here arises the possibility of a foundation that is neither reduced to axiomatic deduction nor abandoned to the arbitrariness of pure lived experience: a "relational" foundation that exposes logic to the shock of reality without dissolving its demand for rigor. According to Catalano, the interplay that binds phenomenology and process philosophy in Whitehead shows that *logos* may seek its principle not in opposition to experience, but within it – avoiding both the shortcut of a naïve empiricism and the temptation of a purely self-sufficient formalism.

The second section concludes with the contribution of Marco Rienzi, who shows how, in Emanuele Severino's philosophy, *logos* hyperbolically reaches its own internal limit. If the framework of Severino's *La struttura originaria* aims to secure the necessary foundation of being and seems to restore to philosophy the form of a

systematic treatise – replete with theorems, corollaries, and aporias – the so-called “contradiction C”, Rienzi observes, reveals the impossibility for the totality of being to manifest itself within finite appearing. To the very extent that the logical demand reaches its apex, it must also acknowledge itself as ensnared, unable to conceal its own wound. In this reading, totality thus becomes the “unconscious” of Destiny: that which logic presupposes but can never fully bring into presence. *Logos*, in the very gesture by which it universalizes itself, bears witness to its own limit: it affirms the necessity of the foundation while simultaneously confessing the impossibility of coinciding with the totality that sustains it.

Now, read sequentially, the resulting constellation becomes finally clear: the genesis of *logos* (Colli); its publication and the risk of its rigidity (writing); the testing of its tools in the Aristotelian laboratory (determination, *noûs*, *diánoia*); the attempt to refound it in contact with experience (Paci); and, finally, its blind spot when it seeks totality (Severino). It is within this progression that ancient and contemporary logic appear, in fact, to intersect: in their encounter, each reminds the other that the performativity of *logos* is not born in a void nor fulfilled in the absolute, but is rather the arduous art of giving form to what exceeds it – without forgetting that every form, in order to remain alive, must be able to reopen itself to its own origin and to recognize its own limit.

The final section is devoted to the confrontation between archaeology and phenomenology, understood not as separate traditions but as two complementary modes of inquiry into the crisis of *logos*. On the one hand, archaeology brings to light the discontinuities, stratifications, and fractures that run through the history of thought; on the other, phenomenology, as reread in the second half of the twentieth century, renounces the role of ultimate foundation of consciousness and opens itself to analogy, difference, and excess beyond logical linearity. Within this space of intersection are situated research paths which, from the problem of the unity of science to the analysis of the sign and its genealogies, have shown how philosophical inquiry no longer aims to mend fractures, but rather to render their irreducible productivity thinkable. This section includes three contributions.

Beatrice Monti’s article analyzes Carlo Sini’s reflection on language as an attempt to overcome the impasse of a tradition that has reduced meaning to the truth of *logos*. This reflection unfolds along two main directions: on the one hand, the idea that every interpretation is at once the signification of the Event and the happening of signification as the Event of difference; on the other, the elaboration of an archaeology of the linguistic gesture, capable of revealing both the specificity of linguistic practice and its derivation from pre-linguistic practices of life. Both the thinking of the event as the occurrence of difference and the displacement of the problem of meaning beyond the logical-linguistic dimension converge in the need to place the problem of language on an eminently ethical plane. From this theoretical framework, the article sets out to examine its ethical implications.

Giulio Gorla’s article begins from Foucault’s concept of archaeology, showing how it inspired, in Italy during the 1960s and 1970s, a dialogue among writers (Calvino, Celati), historians (Ginzburg), and philosophers (Melandri). Gorla seeks to clarify whether, in this context, archaeology assumed a specific physiognomy

– especially at the speculative and epistemological level – as a critical practice vis-à-vis metaphysical and foundational knowledge. This issue emerges both in Sini’s semiotic pragmatism and in Melandri’s phenomenological approach. On this basis, the article analyzes several contemporary models of archaeology – scientific (Meillassoux), bio-evolutionary (Deacon), cognitive (Malafouris) – in order to interrogate the logical-semiotic nature of sense production.

Finally, Michele Ricciotti’s contribution addresses the theme of analogy, starting from Enzo Melandri’s reflections and bringing out their main theoretical nuclei. Analogy here emerges as a mode of rationality irreducible to the schemes of formal logic, occupying an intermediate position between univocity and equivocity. In this context, the concept of paradigm is examined as a problematic framework that gathers and relaunches the distinctive features of analogical reasoning. Resuming the Aristotelian tradition, the paradigm is located in a border zone between logic and rhetoric: it appears in logical treatises but finds its most complete elaboration in *Rhetoric*. Far from being a rule or a logical universal, it exceeds any attempt at categorization, while at the same time fulfilling a symbolic, expressive, and symptomatic function. The analysis concludes by discussing the possibility of understanding analogy as a thematization of “singularity,” distinct from mere particularity.

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